Mazower, Mark: *Dark Continent,* p. 138-326

REFORMING A DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM

'It suffices to consider countries as different as the United States of America, Soviet Russia, Italy or Germany, insisted the leading Belgian socialist Hendrik de Man in October 1933, 'to understand the irresistible force of this push towards a planned national economy.' The question for western Europe in the 1930s was whether democracy could learn from these striking new tendencies in economic life.

The fascist and communist emphasis on will and action impressed west European intellectuals who felt increasingly surrounded by mediocrity and fatalism. After 1933, it was above all younger socialists - stunned by the swift annihilation of German social democracy - who became impatient with their own leaders' caution. Mocking the mood of the French socialist leadership at their 1933 congress, one critic wrote sarcastically that the delegates had been told 'it was necessary to be prudent, it was necessary to be patient, it was necessary to measure the opposing forces accurately. We were not to advance towards power because that would be too dangerous; we would be crushed by the resistance of capitalism itself; we were not to advance toward revolution because we were not ready, because the time was not ripe . . . We are to advance nowhere!'

In Britain, similar feelings attracted Labour MP Oswald Mosley to fascism; he was not alone in feeling exasperated by what a fellow-MP called the Labour leadership's 'passion for evading decisions'. Mosley had proposed a radical plan for economic recovery at the 1930 Labour Party conference; its rejection by the leadership on grounds of cost prompted him to leave the party and begin the move rightwards which would culminate in the British Union of Fascists. A generational gulf of outlook and temperament separated young men like Mosley, who had fought in the First World War, from the older socialist leadership. The latter were keen to show the electorate they could play by capitalism's rules; the 'Front Generation' thought the rules themselves irrational and the leadership passive, defeatist and geriatric. 'This age is dynamic, and the pre-war age was static,' argued Mosley. 'The men of tthe pre-war age are much "nicer" people than we are, just as their age was much more pleasant than the present time. The practical question lis whether their ideas for the solution of the problems of the age are better than the ideas of those whom that age has produced.' For many of the 'Front Generation', fascism and communism both represented more 'modern' and more dynamic forms of economic organization than either Iliberalism or reform socialism.

Their exasperation was understandable. Only occasionally did socialist parties even try rethinking theory and practice in the light of unemployment and the slump. The best example was Sweden, which devalued early and recovered fast, thanks to the reflationary policies of its 1932 Social Democratic government. Here was an administration keen and prepared to use fiscal policy to engineer an upswing. 'There will be no spontaneous recovery,' affirmed the Swedish finance minister in 1933, 'except to the extentt that the policy of the state will help to bring it about.' The government gave a massive boost to investment and by 1937-8 unemployment was shrinking fast (from 139,000 in 1933 to under 10,000) and there was a manufacturing boom. Official Policy was worked out in acdvance and carefully planned. It is true that Sweden enjoyed certain economic advantages which protected the country from the worst of the international depression: nevertheless, in its counter-cyclical fiscal policies and the pact between unions and employers which helped reguilate industrial relations, it looked ahead to the managed capitalism 'which the rest of - western Europe only adopted after 1945. Industrial Belgium, clinging to gold and mired in depression, provided the other noteworthy response - capitalist planning. In 1933, Hendrik de Man returned there from Germany to work on his *Plan van der Arbeid.* The novelty of the idea that there might be a socialist effort to plan within a capitalist framework, and within a nationalist one at that, was reflected in the opposition which greeted de Man even within his own Workers' Party:

When I first unfolded the Plan before the Executive Bureau of the Workers' "Party in October, I met more opposition than I had foreseen. Some said: 'You are really too moderate in that you replace the concept of socialization with that of a directed economy. And in place of loyalty to class struggle you seek an alliance with the middle class and the farmers.' Others: 'What you lay before us is thinly-disguised fascism. You make the state all-powerful and you can only realize your programme through a dictatorship. And above all, you expect everything from the nation and nothing from the International.'

To such objections, de Man replied that the fate of Weimar had revealed what could happen when social democrats refused to cooperate with the middle classes: it was no use proposing schemes for boosting employment which were politically unacceptable to them, nor to talk of doing away with capitalism when the Party lacked the strength or the will for this. Like Mosley, de Man offered cogent insights into the new situation created by the crisis: the need for socialists to come to terms with nationalism, to challenge the gospel of the balanced budget and to offer a decisive alternative to the market. But in practice he was only slightly more successful: as minister of public works in the 1935 Belgian Government of National Renovation, de Man brought down unemployment substantially. But this was chiefly the result of the long-overdue

currency devaluation the government imposed at the same time rather than of the *Plan de Man*. His achievement was a real one, but far from the triumph of *planisme* he fought for. Disillusioned, de Man moved slowly to the Right, and he collaborated with the Germans in 1940, declaring that Nazism was 'the German form of socialism'. But his ideas bore fruit after the war: the famous *Plan* was in many ways a model for state planning in much of western Europe after 1945.

In France, the *Plan de Man* was widely discussed, but an equivalent plan was entirely omitted from the Popular Front programme in 1936; worse still, the Blum government tried to satisfy workers' demands at the same time as preserving a strong franc. Blum had come to admire Roosevelt's pragmatism, and offered himself as a 'loyal manager' of French capitalism. The result was economic failure, satisfying neither Left nor Right, dashing the high hopes many had held of the Popular Front, and further diminishing the prestige and self-confidence of the non-communist Left in Europe. Even the much-vaunted gains of the popular Front government - the paid holidays, forty-hour week and arbitration in industrial disputes - had already been won in many other countries.

While de Man, Mosley and others gave up on democracy, and came to believe that concerted action against unemployment was only possible through the authoritarian state, the 1930s and its lessons for democracy could also be interpreted rather differently. Some liberals came to reject state interventionism and economic nationalism entirely as the root of the problem, and saw planning itself as inherently authoritarian. This was the free-market critique of the totalitarian state. Popular in both Britain and Italy, it was espoused most forcefully by emigre Austrian economists Hayek and von Mises. The 1930s, however, were not the best time for their message to strike home, and they would have to wait another forty years to make their mark.

In the short run, liberalism's democratic critics were far more successful. Many shared the view of one analyst of the 1930s, H. W. Arndt, who wrote in 1944 that 'the Nazis developed a number of economic techniques - in the sphere of Government finance, planned State intervention, exchange control and the manipulation of foreign trade - which *mutatis mutandis* may well be applicable in a worthier cause'. John Maynard Keynes, for instance, came to discern certain virtues in economic nationalism, in particular the autonomy which individual states had gained over policy as a result of the collapse of a unified international economy. 'Ideas, knowledge, science, hospitality, travel - these are the things which should of their nature be international,' he wrote in 1933. 'But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonable and conveniently possible, and above all, let finance be primarily national.'

A similar moral was drawn by Keynes's Polish contemrporary, Michal Kalecki. In an article on the Blum experiment, Kalecki argued that exchange controls were necessary for governments wishing alter the balance of industrial power to labour's advantage; otherwise capitalists could always threaten capital flight to undermine a regime's credibility. Kalecki belonged to a school of economists which argued that the state needed to 'wind the economy up' to full employment a doctrine which underpinned the Polish 1936 Four-Year Investment Plan, one of the most important ventures in centralized planning to take place outside the Soviet Union. In Keynes, we can see the incipient rethinking of capitalism which provided guidelines for post-war policy in western Europe; in Kalecki, the doctrines which contributed to state socialism in the East. In both East and West, the memory of classical liberalism's failure in the 1930s would provoke a reassessment of the balance between public and private power in the modern economy, paving the way for the great post-war boom. That the state needed to be brought in to the life of the national economy was not, therefore, a lesson which the Europeans needed to be taught by the Russians or American New Dealers; their own experience between the wars pointed to the same conclusion.

5 Hitler's New Order, 1938-45

It is my impression that Germany has certain plans . . aiming at a lasting European new order . . . along the lines of the planned economy known to Germany, which will certainly contain important advantages compared with the lack of planning hitherto reigning, which has been part of liberalist egoism. We had better calmly and willingly collaborate in the adaptation which I have here hinted at.

- Danish Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning, 8 March 1941

It has become increasingly clear to us this summer, that here in the East spiritually unbridgeable conceptions are fighting each other: German sense of honour and race, and a soldierly tradition of many centuries, against an Asiatic mode of thinking and primitive instincts, whipped up by a small number of mostly Jewish intellectuals . . . More than ever we are filled with the thought of a new era, in which the strength of the German people's racial superiority and achievements entrusts it with the leadership of Europe. We clearly recognize our mission to save European culture from the advancing Asiatic barbarism. We now know that we have to fight against an incensed and tough opponent. This battle can only end with the destruction of one or the other; a compromise is out of the question.

- Colonel-General Hermann Hoth, 17 Army, Z5 November 1941

In the spring of 1942 a young Italian diplomat called Luciolli returned home after serving a year and half in the Berlin Embassy. His first task in Rome was to set down his thoughts on the way Italy's ally was tackling the major issues arising out of the war. The result was a penetrating critique of the foundations of the Nazi New Order in Europe; when it was brought to Mussolini's attention, the Duce's reaction was that 'he had not read anything so significant and far-reaching for a long time'. Luciolli noted:

To defend to the death rhe great amount that has so far been conquered, to exploit it, to organise the economic and political life of Europe so as to increase its powers of endurance and develop its offensive capacities - all this seems capable of constituting a clear and precise goal, a programme around which to collect adherents and consensus, were it not for the fact that it is precisely in this political mission that Germany shows herself to be decisively and obstinately inferior to her task.

The emphatic German decision to organise Europe hierarchically, like a pyramid with Germany at the top, is known to all. But this alone fails to capture the attitude of the German regime to the problems of European reconstruction. In every country, even in those which till yesterday had a rather clear anti-German attitude, there was no lack of political personalities and currents ready to admit that the international order which emerged from the French Revolution and culminated in Versailles had been definitively superseded and that the nation-states would have to give way to much larger political entities. . . Thus the concept of a hierarchical organization of Europe in itself was not unacceptable. But what strikes anyone who comes into contact with the Germans is their purely mechanical and materialistic conception of the European order. To organize Europe for them means deciding how much of this or that mineral should be produced and how many workers should be utilised. They have no idea that no economic order can rule if not based on a political order, and that to make the Belgian or Bohemian worker work, it is not enough to promise him a certain wage, but one must also give him the sense of serving a community, of which he is an intimate part, which he feels an affinity with and in which he recognises himself.

As Luciolli observed, many Europeans were ready by the end of the 1930s to leave behind the liberal, democratic order created after 1918 by Britain, France and the United States for a more authoritarian future What they did not bargain for was the brutal reality of Nazi imperialism, the reintroduction of slavery into Europe and the denial of all national aspirations apart from German ones.

Nazi governance was never more chaotic than during the war: Hitler's satraps wrestled for his attention, and a host of allies and collaborators intrigued among themselves. Yet through all the confusion, the uncertainty, the innumerable blueprints for the future which emanated from Nazi think-tanks, one may trace the broad outlines of the New Order as it was realized between 1938 and 1945. No experience was more crucial to the development of Europe in the twentieth century. As both Hitler and Stalin were well aware, the Second World War involved something far more profound than a series of military engagements and diplomatic negotiations; it was a struggle for the social and political future of the continent itself. And such was the shock of being subjected to a regime of unprecedented and unremitting violence that in the space of eight years a sea-change took place in Europeans' political and social attitudes, and they rediscovered the virtues of democracy.

European hearts and minds were not so much won by the Allies as lost by Hitler. Luciolli's assessment of German failure was echoed by many other observers. Reporting from Romania, an acute American journalist noted that on her arrival there in the summer of 1940 she had felt 'that Hitler might not only win the war, but could win the peace and organize Europe if he did'. But by the time she left 'on an icy morning at the end of January 1941, I was convinced that under no circumstances could Hitler win the peace or organize Europe'. Let us, then, begin our analysis of the New Order by dwelling on

what we might call the Führer's lost opportunity.

HITLER'S LOST OPPORTUNITY

Opinion in Europe at the end of the 1930s was by no means opposed to the idea of an authoritarian reconstruction of the continent under German leadership. The potential basis for a New Order which rejected the inheritance of Versailles extended well beyond pro-Nazi or Fascist extremists. Mistrust of German power was blended with admiration for their economic recovery; attachment to British notions of liberty was mixed with suspicion of the 'plutocrats' in the City of London whose defence of the gold standard and laissez-faire had doomed much of the continent to depression and failed to find an exit from it. 'These European peoples themselves had become indifferent to democracy, which was advertised to them in intellectual terms of freedom of thought and freedom of speech, but which in terms of their daily experience meant chiefly freedom to starve,' observed Countess Waldeck. 'I saw that not more than ten per cent of the people on the European continent cared for individual freedom or were vitally interested in it to fight for its preservation.'

In Belgium, in the summer of 1940, public opinion greeted news of the German victory with 'palpable relief, and for a while Brussels was gripped by a genuine 'anti-parliamentary rage'. Belgians appeared well disposed towards the Germans, glad that the war was finally over and hopeful that their country would regain prosperity in a unified continent under a reformed and less divisive domestic political system. Hendrik de Man, president of the Belgian Workers' Party and a close adviser of King Leopold, declared in a famous manifesto on 28 June that the democratic era was ended. In his words: 'This collapse of a decrepit world, far from being a disaster, is a deliverance.' His vision of an authoritarian government led by the Kingseemed briefly-in the summer of 1940 - a more 'realistic' outcome of the war than any foreseeable revival of democracy. For politicians and diplomats who make a fetish out of realism, the summer of 1940 stands as a warning.

In the Netherlands, too, the revulsion against party politics lay behind Hendrik Colijn's attack on the 'evils of democracy'; Colijn, a former prime minister and head of the conservative Anti-Revolutionary Party, envisaged - like de Man - an authoritarian regime loyal to the royal House and willing to work with the Germans. Danish Social Democrat Thorvald Stauning, prime minister since *1924,* advised collaboration in the interests of Europe's future economic well-being, and a national coalition government in Copenhagen cooperated smoothly with Berlin.

In *Strange Defeat,* the historian Marc Bloch searched for the causes of France's humiliation - beyond the mistakes of the Army High Command - in the weaknesses of a parliamentary system ruled by old men, undermined by a cynical civil service and ultimately destroyed by the polarization which followed the 1936 Popular Front era. Few were capable so early in the war of following him out of the depths of 'bourgeois despair' in the search for a renewed and revived form of democracy, to 'adapt ourselves to the claims of a new age'. For many the solution to France's 'decadence' lay in a rapprochement with Nazi Germany. Accepting the inevitable, wrote Andre Gide, was wisdom. Teilhard de Chardin consoled himself with the thought that 'we are watching the birth, more than the death of a World'. Student enrolments for German classes at the Berlitz in Paris shot up from 939 in 1939 to 7,920 two years later; numbers taking English plummeted.

The fall of France reverberated across the continent. 'This afternoon more bad news,' wrote a Polish doctor on 14 June 1940. 'Paris has fallen into German hands.' Two days later, he noted: 'The news from France is terrible. People are emotionally broken. Some have lost all hope. What will happen now?' In Bucharest, Waldeck observed a more positive, if cautious, reaction". 'The fall of France', she wrote, 'formed the climax to twenty years of failure of the promises of democracy to handle unemployment, inflation, deflation, labour unrest, party egoism and what not. Europe, tired of herself, and doubtful of the principles she had been living by, felt almost relieved to have everything settled . . . Hitler, Europe felt, was a smart guy - disagreeable but smart. He had gone far in making his country strong, why not try it his way? That's how Europeans felt in this summer of 1940.'

Such relatively favourable attitudes towards the Germans were quick to disappear. In France and Belgium, for example, the mood swung round totally within two to three months, leaving collaborationists increasingly isolated. The Netherlands Union was disbanded by the Germans in 1941 after it was declared 'untrustworthy'. This shift[r] was to some extent the result of outrage at the behaviour of Germian soldiers and occupation forces, but it also stemmed from the changing international situation. Following the Battle of Britain it became clearer that the war would last longer than people had expected. And as we shall see, doubts over possible boundary shifts and annexations across Europe also undermined faith in Hitler's New Order.

LIVING IN HISTORIC TIMES

For the Germans themselves the mood was one of euphoria. The New Order had prevailed against the 'protectors of a dying epoch'. More than ever before, they felt themselves to be living in 'historic' times After the march into Prague, Hitler declared that 'in the course of its thousand-year past the Reich

has already proved ... it alone is called to resolve the problem of restoring order in central Europe'. On the eve of the western campaign he announced that 'the struggle now beginning will decide the fate of the German nation for the next thousand years'. Goebbels hailed a 'time without precedent' in which the 'historic genius' of the Führer was helping build a 'new Europe'. As the Wehrmacht thrust eastwards towards Moscow the Fiihrer dreamed great dreams, of 'the beauties of the Crimea, which we shall make accessible by means of an autobahn - for us Germans, that will be our Riviera. Crete is scorching and dry. Cyprus would be lovely, but we can reach the Crimea by road. Along that road lies Kiev! And Croatia, too, a tourists' paradise for us. I expect that after the war there will be a great upsurge of rejoicing . . . What progress in the direction of the New Europe!'

Chatting to Ciano in October 1941 - perhaps the point of greatest excitement - the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, predicted that Hitler's New Order in Europe would 'ensure peace for a thousand years'. The cynical Italian could not let that pass. As he recorded in his diary: 'I remarked that a thousand years is a long time. It is not easy to hang a couple of generations on the achievements of one man, even if he is a genius. Ribbentrop ended by making a concession: "Let's make it a century," he said.' But if the former champagne salesman could not resist the chance of making a bargain, the Führer himself had no such doubts. 'When National Socialism has ruled long enough' he declared one night after dinner, 'it will no longer be possible to conceive of a form of life different from ours.'

No one in Berlin, then, doubted that a historic opportunity had been presented to the Third Reich. The question remained, however, how best to exploit it. What the soldiers had won, the politicians must now govern. Yet the land mass controlled by the Germans at the end of 1941 was staggeringly large - stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the fringes of the Sahara desert, from the Atlantic and the Pyrenees to the Ukraine. A quick succession of *Blitzkrieg* offensives had suddenly brought Hitler into possession of a vast empire much of which he had never planned to conquer.

From *Mein Kampf* onwards, the proposed site of the future Greater German Empire had been clear; it lay in the East, roughly covering the territory Germany had briefly controlled in 1918 after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 'We are putting an end to the perpetual German march towards the South and West of Europe,' Hitler had written in *lAein Kampf,* 'and turning our eyes towards the land in the East.' The Ukraine was to be turned through German colonization into 'one of the loveliest gardens of the world'; it was, according to an SS leaflet, 'badly exploited, fertile soil of black earth that could be a Paradise, a California of Europe'.

Poland would provide a connecting link to the East and a source of labour - an *Arbeitsreich* for the *Herrenvolk,* as Hitler put it shortly after the invasion. The dismemberment of the country and brutal treatment of its population after September 1939 showed what methods would be used to this end. Yet what about Scandinavia, the Low Countries, the Balkans, even France? These areas figured less Prominently in Hitler's thinking. All the signs are that at the end of 1939 he was reluctant to take on further military commitmenits. Why bother to invade countries which could be intimidated into alliance and acquiescence? Diplomatic pressure successfully ensured German control of vital resources in Romania, Hungary and Sweden. In early 1940 Hitler resisted as long as he could the idea of invading Norway until he became convinced of the threat British plans posed to Scandi-navian ore shipments to Germany. France had to be knocked out of the war, of course, but its role in the New Order remained unclear. Greece could probably have remained neutral had not the botched Italian invasion brought in the British and demanded a German response. Plans to invade Yugoslavia had to be made on the run when news came in from Belgrade that the pro-Axis government had been toppled by a military coup.

German policy towards many of the defeated states was at first deliberately provisional: their fate was not to be decided until the war was over. Goebbels insisted in May 1940, on the eve of the attack on France, that there was to be *no* media discussion of war aims at all; during the war, these were to be formulated simply as 'a just and durable peace and *Lebensraum* for the German people'. Such a policy reflected the wishes of the Nazi leadership. Hitler insisted that declarations of war aims were beside the point: 'As far as our might extends we can do what we like, and what lies beyond our power we cannot do in any case.'

Although in the summer of 1940 the Wehrmacht and the Foreign Office were both sympathetic to the French desire to conclude a peace treaty with the Third Reich, Hitler's disapproval blocked the way. The German generals in the Netherlands had assumed that the defeated country would remain independent and were taken aback by Hitler's decision to place it under civilian rule. But the Party and the SS were attracted by the racial affinity of the Dutch and swayed by dreams of annexation in order to reconstitute the Holy Roman Empire and Hitler had certainly not repudiated such ideas.

West European statesmen, alarmed by the German annexation or chunks of Poland and Czechoslovakia, sought reassurance that the integrity of their states would be respected, and their sovereignty restored. They naturally did not believe the numerous German declarations to this effect in the absence of solid peace treaties with Berlin. Deluded King Leopold of Belgium had a disappointing interview with Hitler. Vidkun Quisling raised the subject at least three times but got nowhere; indeed, on the last occasion he was told that

Hitler wanted no further discussion of the subject. German officials in the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht who tried to argue for grants of autonomy - for France, for example, and after 1941, for Estonia - were no nore successful. The question of peace settlements banished to the indefinite future, the Third Reich covered the New Europe with a patchwork of more or less provisional occupation regimes. At one extreme, certain countries were dismembered, their national identity entirely suppressed. Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia endured this approach; their very names were to be erased from the map. 'In the future,' said Goebbels the summer of 1940, 'we shall not refer any more to the "Govern-General for the Occupied Polish Territories" but - without expressly drawing attention to this - simply to the "Government-General"; in this way, just as is gradually happening in the Protectorate (of Bohemia-Moravia), which is now simply called the Protectorate, the situation will clarify itself automatically. The population in those territories merely has the task of making our work easier.' Luxem-bourg, too, was all but annexed to the Reich and any reference to the 'Grand Duchy' or the 'country' of Luxembourg was banned. The juridical status of such countries was left unclear, even if their ultimate future was not.

The customary German procedure was to appoint military or civil commanders, who ruled through the existing native civil service. In that war within a war which was the bureaucratic chaos of the Third Reich, these territories became so many fiefdoms, subject to competing claims from different ministries and ruled with varying degrees of success. The Danish government was most effective in preserving public order, perhaps because it was least disrupted by occupation. 1 he king and parliament were allowed to function and in the beginning enjoyed - in theory at least - a considerable measure of sovereignty: as a result a total German staff of fewer than one hundred kept control of thee entire country; in France, Greece, the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, Serbia and Norway puppet governments interposed a fig-leaf of respectability between the conquerors and the civil service. In the Netherlands, a civilian Reich Commissioner governed through the Secretary-Generals of the civil service, while in Belgium the Secretary-Generals answered to the military authorities. Nominally independent governments in Croatia and Slovakia were, in fact, clearly subordinate to German wishes; Axis partners such as Finland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary had slightly more room for manoeuvre. Hitler's imagination was captured by the example of the British in India. Their model of imperial rule, such as he conceived it, struck him as admirable. After the invasion of the Soviet Union his mind returned again and again to the problem of how the British ruled the subcontinent with a handful of men; for him the Ukraine was 'that new Indian Empire'; the Eastern Front would become Germany's North-West Frontier where generations of officers would win their spurs and preserve the martial virtues of the Aryan race. But the Führer had little understanding of British imperial techniques of governance; he was critical of the laxness of British racial attitudes and their willingness to permit some degree of local political autonomy "

The India parallel cropped up on one of the very rare occasions when Nazi war aims were briefly aired in public. This was in a speech made by the prominent radio commentator, Hans Fritzsche, almost certainly following Hitler's instructions, in October 1941 when a Russian defeat seemed assured. Telling the foreign press that the war had been decided, Fritzsche went on to lay out Germany's political plans: Europe was to become economically self-sufficient under German leadership. The Germans themselves would have to be trained in the 'imperial European idea' and prepared for continual minor military operations in the East analogous to the problems the British faced in India. 'As for the nations dominated by us,' he said, 'our language to them will become very much freer and colder. There will, of course, be no question of some crummy little state obstructing European peace by some special requests or special demands - in such an event it would get a sharp reminder of its task in Europe.'

Such a harsh vision reflected contemporary Nazi criticisms of liberal international law. Carl Schmitt, for instance, argued that the conquered territories now formed Germany's own *Grossraum.* Just as the Monroe Doctrine was supposed to justify the non-intervention or other powers in the western hemisphere, he wrote, so Germany had won the right to rule Europe. Above all, it had won the right to govern by new rules: the old system of international law with its universal pretensions and its basis in the relations of sovereign states had to be replaced by a genuinely National Socialist jurisprudence of Volk Law. Not all peoples, according to Schmitt, were equally capable of bearing the weight of a modern constitutional state. Departing abruptly from the liberal notion - as enshrined in the League of Nations - that all states were sovereign and juridically equal, Schmitt declared that a 'high degree of organization' and 'voluntary discipline' were required in the modern world. The Nazi rulers of the Netherlands and the General Government both indicated publicly that the era of 'absolute independence' was over. Nor indeed was neutrality any more acceptable. As one commentator stated:

What small state is there which is sufficiently independent to be neutral towards the Great Powers? The crisis of neutrality is in reality the crisis of the structure of our continent, of the collapse of old orders and empires, and of the birth of new dynasties. The small states have become the prey of an inexorable course of history, and the only question is whether they will give in without hope or full of hope.

Luciolli, then, was surely right to characterize the regime's basic conception of politics as hierarchical. Europe was called to rule the world but only on the condition that it was itself ruled by the Reich. For Hitler no devolution of power to racial inferiors was permissible; it could only be a sign of weakness, not strength. German superiority had to be jealously safeguarded in every sphere, with sometimes ludicrous results. After the Czech national ice-hockey team beat the Germans 5-1 in Prague, Goebbels alluded to 'the mistaken practice of matching oneself with colonial peoples in a field in which we are inferior. Herr Gutterer is to arrange . . . that a repetition of such incidents is made impossible.' Even the Italians, supposedly Germany's partners in the making of the New Order, got the same treatment; directives issued in connection with the treatment of foreign workers ordered that 'relationships with Italians are not welcomed'. At the political level, such attitudes were replicated to the detriment of Germany's would be collaborators. As Luciolli remarked, given the pervasive sense of disaffection from the Versailles order in Europe by 1939 there was little reason to suppose that collaboration as a political project would not be successful. It is hard now to remember that the very concept had a positive ring to those who coined it in France. Laval and Petain saw collaboration as a partnership of two imperial powers, and thus a way of salvaging French sovereignty Hitler stood in the way of such ideas.

He was especially wary of *soi-disant* National Socialists. If unpopular they were likely to be ineffective administrators, if popular, a threat. Quisling scrambled into power during the invasion of Norway but was kicked out after a week. Degrelle in Belgium and Mussert in Holland were put on ice. They might be allowed to recruit gullible or desperate young men to fight on the Eastern Front, but power resided in the hands of professional civil servants. The disillusioned young French collaborator, Robert Brasillach, concluded despon-dently in August 1943: 'There is no longer a fascist Europe.'

What made the Degrelles and Musserts unsuitable partners was precisely, of course, their nationalism. 'For Norway to become ger-manophile it must become national,' declared Quisling. Mussert drew up a scheme for a League of Germanic Peoples in which Hitler would be head but whose members (Germany, the Scandinavian countries, the Greater Netherlands), would have independent National Socialist governments and their own military forces. It is difficult to imagine anything less likely to have appealed to Hitler. On 30 June 1941 young Ukrainian nationalists pre-empted Berlin by their 'Proclamation of the Ukrainian State' in Lviv; two weeks later, most of them had been arrested and the movement was broken. Hitler's imperialism was thus of a very different kind from that of Wilhelm II, who had supported Paul Skoropadsky during the German occupation of the Ukraine in 1918: both favoured authoritarian regimes, but Wilhelm was prepared to allow a local proxy to govern in his name. Hitler refused even that, insisting: 'I cannot set any goals which will some day produce independent. . . autonomous states.'

The essential feature of the 'new European Order' is that it was a German Order. Although numerous Nazi visionaries played with the ideology of Europeanism, for Hitler himself it was only Germany, or more precisely *Deutschtum* that mattered. Following the invasion of the Soviet Union, Berlin propaganda publicized the idea that this was a 'crusade for Europe': a new 'Song for Europe' was broadcast, stamps with the slogan 'European United Front against Bolshevism' were issued and the press even claimed in late November 1941 that 'born ouf of discord, struggle and misery the United States of Europe has at last become a reality'. Nevertheless, such slogans clashed with the reality of occupation rule experienced by ordinary people and there was no sign that this Europeanism was taken any more seriously outside Germany than it was by the Führer. After Stalingrad, when the Germans started to seek out friends and allies more seriously, it was too late. No one was convinced by the U-turn in Nazi jurisprudence which led to declarations of 'anti-imperialism', especially as these had no discernible effect upon policy. In eastern Europe, where the Red Army's advance made anti-communism a potentially fruitful form of oolitical warfare, Nazi racialism had alienated the population beyond Goebbels's reach. In the West, beyond any plausible Soviet sphere of influence, anti-communism offered little. Only in Greece, and to a lesser extent Serbia and Northern Italy, was it possible to poison the domestic scene to the point of civil war. As the German forces with-drew, they left behind them an inheritance of bitter internecine blood-letting. By 1944, the Cold War was already casting a shadow over Europe, but not sufficiently to save Hitler's empire.

ORGANIZING EUROPE

In so far as there was a Nazi vision for Europe, it belonged to the sphere of economics not politics. Associated with the idea of a German Monroe Doctrine was the notion of a *Grossraumwirtschaft* regional economy with Germany at its heart. In certain forms, this bore a more than passing resemblance to the post-war Common Market. The New Order' beloved of the youthful technocrats at the Reich Ministry of Economics involved the economic integration of western Europe and the creation of a tariff-free zone: Minister Walther Funk went so far as to propose such a scheme in the early summer of 1940. Goering, who carried far more weight in the Nazi establishment, also discussed the need for cross-national investment in Europe under German auspices. Others looked to the Balkans, where German

economic penetration had intensified during the 1930s. Trade agreements were negotiated in 1939 and 1940 with Romania and Hungary that brought vital raw materials under the control of the Third Reich.

Late in 1940, Hermann Neubacher - later Hitler's Balkan supreme-confided to an American journalist the bright future which awaited Europe after the war: 'Germany's economic organization of the Balkans is the first step in a plan to set up the entire European contine as a single *Grossraum,* which instead of individual countries would form the economic unit of the future. A common plan would regulate production across the European *Grossraum.'*[27] From this continental bloc both the United States and Great Britain were to be excluded; Europe was to become self-sufficient. The gold standard and laissez-faire of the post-Versailles order were to be replaced by barter trade and planning of production on a continental scale in an extension of German trade policy of the 1930s.

The idea of 'organizing' Europe into a vast continental economy was discussed before and after 1939 far more openly than was the continent's political future. Nevertheless, particularly during the first three years of the war, such grand schemes had little practical impact upon policy. The *Blitzkrieg* strategy for waging war dictated rather different methods of exploiting the economic resources of the conquered territories; only with the turn to 'total war' did the idea of some form of economic integration appear attractive in the context of the war effort itself.

But Nazi thinking about international economics provided no analogue to the liberal doctrine of the mutual benefits offered by the market. The regime sometimes claimed that Germany's partners would benefit from associating with her: this had after all been the case to some extent in the 1930s and was not entirely implausible, especially after the hardships associated with international capitalism in the 1920s. Nevertheless, it was increasingly clear that Europe´s prime economic function was to support Germany. Only in so far as that function was best served by securing the economic prosperity of the rest of the continent did it seem at all likely that the economic benefits would be shared more widely. Countries like Greece and Romania soon suspected they had exchanged the tyranny of the City of London for the stranglehold of Berlin.

Such a narrow vision of the European economy was particularly pronounced during the war itself. To the despair of those like Goering and later Speer, who were responsible for increasing armaments production, Hitler was extremely reluctant to see living standards inside the Reich fall. He wished at all costs to avoid a repetition of the the debacle of 1918, when, he believed, the collapse of the home front has led to military defeat. The regime kept food consumption as close as possible to pre-war levels and was unenthusiastic about encouraging women into the factories. Hitler knew that there was little public enthusiasm for an extended conflict and remained sensitive to Party reports of dissatisfaction. He was reluctant to test his popularity by making sharp cuts in consumer goods production. The economic resources of Europe would enable him to avoid this.

With the Wehrmacht as it invaded one country after another came a variety of economic experts, private businessmen and special agents who took over existing firms, expropriated Jewish-owned businesses, and established contacts with prominent local industrialists. The Wehrmacht, and other authorities, levied 'occupation costs' and requ-sitioned existing stocks of strategic goods from jute to bicycles. The bulk of these were consumed by army units, or sent back to the Reich in soldiers' parcels. In the First World War, German troops in the Balkans had received food from home; this time, they sent food back.

The overall effect of these policies differed rather sharply from one area to another. In the industrial economies of the Protectorate and north-western Europe, the short-term policy of physical expropriation soon gave way to one of allowing existing installations to continue production before taking over the finished products. The Aryanization of Jewish-owned firms offered an avenue to direct control, particularly of Czech and Austrian holdings. Firms, however, owned by non-Jews or by the state were also brought under German control. In this way, much of the most important heavy industry and mining production of Europe was incorporated into the Reichswerke AG 'Hermann Göring' by a process of what has been termed 'legalized theft'. Three quarters of France's iron-ore supply went to Germany, half of total Belgian production was for German purposes. Czech armaments production was crucial to the war effort. From these countries there was a clear net economic gain to Germany.

Ironically, Nazi economic policy worked much better there than in the territories in the East, whose economic importance had loomed so large in National Socialist thinking. Whereas Goering - the economic overlord of the Reich until 1942 - accepted the need to exploit local resources in western Europe *in situ,* in the East he pushed for straight forward 'pillage' until confronted with the resistance of local Party and military rulers in Poland and the Ukraine, who had to cope with the consequences.

In the primarily agrarian economies of Russia and the Balkans German policies of expropriation led swiftly to the most terrible conditions. The peasants' response was to stop producing for the market, the surplus vanished, and city dwellers in these regions faced starvation. Only a month after the German invasion of Greece in April 1941, observers there predicted famine. They were right: around 100,000 Greeks may have died of hunger that first winter. In the East, the Nazi regime was prepared for worse yet. 'Many tens of millions of people will be superfluous in this area and will die or have to

emigrate to Siberia,' concluded one report a month before the invasion. 'Attempts to rescue the population there from famine by drawing upon surpluses from the black earth region can only be at the expense of provisioning Europe.' With the first outbreaks of guerrilla resistance to German rule, and the ruthless German response, life in the country-side became precarious, and all chances of efficiently exploiting the 'black earth' of the Ukraine vanished for the duration of the war.

Whereas Goering and the Nazi Party favoured direct exploitation of the local population, Alfred Rosenberg, who was nominally in charge of policy in the East, favoured encouraging pro-German and anti-Russian nationalist groups. As political warfare this might have worked, except that it was opposed by Rosenberg's own deputies-Reichskommissar Kube promised the Belorussians 'no parliamentary nonsense and no democratic hypocrisy'. In the Ukraine there was Erich Koch, a devoted follower of Hitler. 'I will pump every last thing out of this country,' Koch had said, 'I did not come here to spread bliss but to help the Führer.' The Ukrainians were 'niggers' and their attempts at political assertion met with Koch's contempt. The results were obvious to many of his subordinates. 'If we shoot the Jews' protested one administrator, 'liquidate the prisoners of war, starve considerable portions of the population, and also lose part of the farmers through famine . . . who in the world is then supposed to be economically productive here?' At the start of the occupation, the far mers in the Ukraine had hailed the Germans as liberators. Had Hitler agreed to privatize the collective farms as Rosenberg and his advisers urged, agricultural output might well have risen instead of dropping- But he did not, and the great granary of Europe never fulfilled its promise. Famine spread across the Ukraine and eastern Galicia in the winter of 1941. A revival of industrial activity took place in the East following a change of heart by Goering, but too late to win back the sympathies of a by now totally disillusioned population. By 1943, many peasants were turning their thoughts back to Moscow, arguing that 'a bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises'. Rosenberg believed his underling Koch had 'ruined a great political opportunity'. Only the more moderate policy the Wehrmacht pursued with the Muslim mountaineers in the Caucasus indicated one of the great might-have-beens of the war.

TOTAL WAR

The *Blitzkrieg* is over,' wrote a military economics specialist in January 1942. 'As for the economy, it is a matter of the first priority that it should be clearly reconstructed on the basis of a long war.' In the winter of 1941, the German leadership was forced to move the economy on to a total war footing. This meant, as Milward observes, that the original scheme for the creation of a New Europe had failed and with it Goering's efforts to coordinate arms production through the Four-Year Plan; saving the National Socialist revolution would require a profound transformation of economic relationships and rationalization of the gargantuan but massively wasteful rearmament effort that had been going on since 1936. Now even more intense exploitation of the satellites was required. The young technocrat Albert Speer, a favourite of the Führer's, began to coordinate arms production. Party hack Fritz Sauckel was ordered to conscript millions more foreign workers into the service of the Reich. Having killed off nearly three million Russian POWs that winter, the regime now woke up to its desperate labour needs. As one official noted in February 1942: 'The current difficulty besetting labour deployment would not have arisen had a decision been made in proper time for a larger-scale deployment of Russian POWs. There were 3.9 million Russians available; of these now only 1.1 million are left.'

The Reich was already dependent on foreign labour: some 700,000 Polish workers were employed by the summer of 1940, and one year later there were some 2.1 million civilian labourers and 1.2 million POWs. Far more, however, were now needed. From 1942 Sauckel's labour drives across the continent resulted in the forced conscription of millions of workers. The violent methods employed by his officials aroused enormous protest and spurred on the growth of resistance to German rule. One report of November 1942 gives a graphic picture of how workers were actually recruited:

Men and women, including teenagers aged 15 and above, [are being] picked up on the street, at open-air markets and village celebrations and then speeded away. The inhabitants, for that reason, are frightened, stay hidden inside and avoid going out . . . The application of flogging as a punishment has been supplemented since the beginning of October by the burning down of farmsteads or entire villages as a reprisal for the failure to heed the ordei given to the local townships for making manpower available.

In April 1943 Sauckel's agency head in Warsaw was shot dead in his office; the following month, widespread protest caused forced conscription to be slowed down in western Europe. Even so, foreign labour was vital to the German war effort. As early as 1942 Goering's giant Reichswerke had drawn 80-90 percent of its 600,000 workers from foreign workers and POWs; the rest of the economy followed suit. By 1944 there were eight million, mostly civilian workers, in the Reich, and another two million working directly under German command in third countries. These workers tilled farms and provided a cheap source of domestic servants. They constituted one third of the labour force in the armaments industry by November 1944, and more than one quarter of the

workforce in machine-building and chemical industries. Their presence cushioned the German population and saved the regime from having to establish a comprehensive domestic labour policy, particularly one that would have forced German housewives into paid work. As a Nazi labour scholar wrote: 'How much more we were prepared to endure a temporary increase in the alien element in certain occupations rather than endanger the folk-biological strength of the German people by the enhanced deployment of women in the workforce.'

Sauckel's continental manhunt may have aided the war effort in Germany, but it caused tremendous disruption elsewhere. Faced with the unpredictable threat of being rounded up and sent to the Reich, male workers in occupied Europe often abandoned their jobs and went into hiding. Local administrators sought ways to protect their workforce from deportation; policemen turned a blind eye. The growth of the Maquis in France and resistance in Greece was directly linked to the growing intensity of Sauckel's labour drives. Politicians and civil servants tried to persuade the Germans to change their policy. Their greatest ally was Albert Speer, the Minister for War Production. Speer believed, unlike Sauckel, that economic cooperation with the industrialized economies of France, Belgium and Holland was essential to the Reich war effort. Bringing labourers into Germany by force made no sense if it alienated foreign governments and businessmen, disrupted production and increased resistance to German rule. In France, Sauckel's policy had pushed Laval to the point of desperation: 'It is no longer a policy of collaboration,' complained the French premier, 'but on the French side of a policy of sacrifice and on the German side of a policy of compulsion.' What Speer proposed in effect was to resuscitate the policy of collaboration - as a matter of economic rationality rather than political pride. Speer envisaged a rationalization of production which treated the whole of north-western Europe as a single economic unit. This was very different to the policies of expropriation which had charactenized the early forms of German economic policy and which, in a sense, reached their culmination in Sauckel's exploitation of European labour. Speer's was a cooler, less nationalistic outlook which preferred planning to plunder and the world of business to that of National Socialist ideology. For Speer, the creation of a Europe-wide armaments industry - essential if Germany was to have a chance of winning the war - necessitated the protection of industrial economies outside the Reich, and by extension, the protection of an adequately skilled and motivated labour-force.

Speer's efforts to build up arms production in Poland and the Ukraine ran afoul of the economic havoc created there by earlier policies. But in France, where the ideological stakes were low, Speer's strategy made an impact. He managed to block Sauckel's labour drive and reached an understanding with local technocrats (like Jean Bichelonne, the Vichy Minister of Industrial Production) which allowed industrial output to be planned by committee rather than merely targeted for expropriation. 'It is imbecility if I call up one million men in France,' insisted Speer in criticism of Sauckel, 'I end up with two million workers less there and fifty to a hundred thousand more in Germany.' Not only war production but also consumer goods were going to the Reich. By the autumn of 1943, some 40-50 per cent of French industrial output was being used for German purposes. By this point Speer was thinking in terms of creating giant industrial cartels in coal, cars, aluminium and other goods which could be planned in a tariff-free European zone.

Such visions made Speer look like a pioneer of the industrial arrangements that would lead to the European Coal and Steel Community and ultimately to the Common Market. There is some truth in this view, which is certainly at least as plausible as that which traces these post-war institutions back to the federalism of the anti-Nazi resistance. But the fact remains that the New Order was much more, and much less, than a proto-Common Market. In one way Speer was a realist, for he recognized the impossibility of winning a modern, highly industrialized war on the basis of Hitler's primitive economics of conquest; in another way, though, he was deluded, for without Hitler s politics the Third Reich was nothing. Speer's vision, in other words, of a world where business superseded political conflict - a world strikingly akin to that which did eventually emerge after 1945 - could not be realized in Hitler's Europe. Hitler himself limited Speer's planning and never totally withdrew his support for Sauckel: the victory of rationality over ideology was only temporary. If Europe could not be 'organized', the fault lay largely with the 'organizers' and their concept of 'organization'. With his customary ludicity the philologist Victor Klemperer had quietly noted its Nazi connotations of imposed discipline, of hierarchy and of order which in turn stemmed from its underlying racialism. Its mirror image turned out to be the 'organizing' (i.e. thieving, pilfering and plundering) carried out by the lowest of the low in the concentration camps. Rather than a principle of value-free, managerial efficiency, organization Nazi-style meant the economic subordination of the lesser races of Europe to the Nordic-Germanic *Volk*. Thus, economics could not be separated from ideology; ultimately, race was to be the genuine 'organizing' principle for the continent.

EUROPE AS A RACIAL ENTITY

'Europe is not a geographical entity,' commented Hitler in August 1941. 'It is a racial entity.' The League of Nations had tried to keep minorities where they were, and ensure stability through international law; Hitler, in contrast, had no

faith in law and aimed to ensure stability by uprooting peoples. In pursuit of racial goals, nations were rearranged and millions of people were forcibly driven from their homes, resettled hundreds of miles away in strange surroundings, abandoned, forced into labour camps, or deliberately put to death. It was in this respect, above all, that the Second World War differed from previous conflicts. A vast gulf lay between Kaiser Wilhelm's imperial aspirations of 1918 - with their old-fashioned programme of assimilation through cultural Germanization - and the biological racism of 1939.

This new world of state-sponsored mass murder and cultural extermination gave birth to a new term - genocide - introduced for the first time in 1944 in a study of *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* by a Polish-Jewish lawyer called Raphael Lemkin. After the war, the Nuremberg trials, the UN Genocide Convention, the Eichmann trial and new media interest in what became known as the Holocaust all made people familiar with the idea that the Second World War had been in some measure a race war. Often, however, this was seeen exclusively in terms of 'the war against the Jews' (to cite the title of one famous study). In fact, the Final Solution of the Jewish question emerged out of a broader interlocking set of racial issues which the Nazi regime sought to 'solve' through war.

One consequence of the Nazi conquest of Europe was the extension on to a continental scale of the dialectic of the Nazi racial welfare state - a state, in other words, where police measures to repress 'racial undesirables' were the obverse of policies to safeguard the vigour of the *Volksgemeinschaft.* The New Order in Europe involved, on the one hand, measures to curb the 'threat' which Jews, gypsies, Poles Ukrainians and other *Untermenschen* presented to the Reich, and on the other hand, grand schemes on behalf of *Deutschtum.* This meant, in particular, providing for the welfare and resettlement of the ten million so-called *Volksdeutsche* - German-speakers living outside the borders of the Reich. Expulsion and colonization, extermination and social provision were the two sides of the same imperial Nazi coin.

But the war did not merely expand the geographical reach of Nazi racial policies, it also radicalized and complicated them. War was the great catalyst. For Hitler in the late 1930s, the first resettlement of Germans from the South Tyrol was initially a matter of diplomatic necessity; in Himmler's hands after October 1939 it became the prelude to a much more ambitious vision involving the total ethnic recasting of eastern Europe. Resettlement goals changed several times as the amount of German territory increased and the outlook changed. The same might be said for Nazi policy towards 'racial undesirables Policy moved into uncharted waters as the war progressed.

On the 'Jewish question' new vistas, and new difficulties, opened up as first Poland, then western Europe, and finally large parts or the Soviet Union came under Nazi control. Along the 'twisted road to Auschwitz' were wrong turns like the Madagascar Plan of 1940 (by which Europe's Jewish population were to be shipped to the island and deathly improvisations like the gas-vans used in Serbia, the Ukraine and Chelmno before the Nazi leadership hit upon the idea of industrialized mass murder in the death camps.

The expansion and radicalization of the racial agenda was accompanied by the rapid growth of the SS. Consolidating the security services in the RSHA under Heydrich gave Himmler extensive influence in policing and intelligence throughout much of the occupied territories. Created in 1934, the concentration camp empire (excluding the death camps) expanded its population from 25,000 in 1939 to 714 *000* in 1945 and was administered by another wartime SS office, the WVHA. The death camps themselves did not exist in 1939; in 1942 they killed over one million people. The creation of a new class of German colonists from the hapless *Volksdeutsche* became the responsibility of the RKFDV (see below), established in October 1939. It removed more than one million ethnic Germans from their homes, managed hundreds of resettlement camps, and settled at least 400,000 across eastern Europe. It was thus war that brought the SS close to rivalling the power of the state apparatus created in the Soviet Union for controlling the lives and fates of millions of people.

The centrality of racial thinking - as well as the idea of industrializing mass murder - was what primarily differentiated Hitler's empire from Stalin's. Possessing the power to reshape the human composition of an entire continent, Himmler and the SS came face to face with the ambiguities, dilemmas and limitations of an imperial policy shaped by the premises of biological racism. What, in the first place, was to be the role of the Germans themselves? Were they to be concentrated in the Reich, which was more or less the view which prevailed until 1941 or should some form a frontier class manning the eastern marches as their medieval forebears had done? As a master race were they to lord it over Slavic helots, manning estates of thousands of serfs, or should they till the soil themselves in accordance with the Nazi, view which saw *Blut und Boden* as the ultimate guarantor of Aryan vitality? How, too, was an ethnic German to be recognized - language, looks or genealogy? Bitter doctrinal disputes on such issues took place among Nazi bureaucrats throughout the war. As for the *Unternenschen,* were they a necessary labour force or a biological threat to be exterminated? Such were the dilemmas of *apartheid* as practised on the vast and murderous scale of Hitler's New Order.

THE RACE WAR (1): POLAND, 1939-1941

The Versailles approach to minorities problems in eastern Europe expired at Munich, when Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, secretly promised the Italians that the ethnic German minority in South Tyrol would be resettled in the Reich. Together with the annexation of the Sudetenland, this pledge ended the era of the Minorities Treaties and opened up a more brutal approach to Europe's ethnic tensions. Legal guarantees were replaced by forced population transfers alone the lines of the Greco-Turkish exchange of fifteen years earlier.

Initially this meant a large influx of ethnic Germans into the Reich. Just as Hitler's need for Italian support in 1938 led him to reverse earlier policy and sanction the resettlement of 80,000 Germans from the South Tyrol, so his need for Russian backing in 1939-40 led to a similar sacrificing of the German communities in the Baltic and Bessarabia. In October 1939 the SS was given the task of repatriating around 75,000 Germans from Latvia and Estonia; the following month, a further German-Soviet agreement embraced the 128,000 *Volksdeutsche* of Soviet-occupied Poland. Within weeks, these people began arriving in the Reich and occupied Poland, and questions of where and how to resettle them had to be faced.

Hitler had first intended resettlement to be a matter for the Nazi Party, but Himmler quickly persuaded him to entrust it to the SS. At the beginning of 1940, he established the Reich Commission for the Consolidation of Germandom (RKFDV) to organize evacuations, the racial screening of evacuees and reception camps. The RKFDV was trustee of the property the Baltic Germans had left behind, but it was also responsible for finding new properties for resettlement. This latter task involved organizing the expulsion of the local Polish and Jewish population from property in the conquered territories.

Between 1939 and 1941 the focus of RKFDV activities was Poland, now split into the western territories of Warthegau and Danzig which were incorporated into the Reich, and the rump General Government, ruled as a colony by Hans Frank. Himmler envisaged creating a clear line of demarcation between Germans and the 'racially inferior' population. The ethnic Germans were to be brought into the western incorporated territories, while the local Poles and Jews from those regions were to be expelled eastwards into the General Government, which he envisaged as a reservation for the *Untermenschen.* Such a scheme, however, disturbed other Nazi bureaucrats. It involved, in the first place, a high degree of disruption of local economic life. In the annexed territories, the expulsion of the local Polish peasantry and Jewish artisan class threatened to lead to economic breakdown; at the same time, those administering the General Government were distinctly unhappy at having to receive masses of impoverished and uprooted Poles and Jews. This prospect would make it impossible for them to realize their own ambitions of turning the General Government into an important centre of economic activity. The clash between racial dogmatism and economic interest pitted Himmler, the SS and the Nazi Party ideologues against Hans Frank, the ruler of the General Government, and Goering, spokesman for major economic interests in the Reich.

This conflict was still unresolved when further German-Soviet agreements led to the 'recall to the Fatherland' of 50,000 Germans from Lithuania and 130,000 from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. By the summer of 1941, on the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union, the RKFDV had settled 200,000 *Volksdeutsche* in western Poland, mostly on expropriated farmsteads. Another 275,000 immigrants remained in hundreds of resettlement centres awaiting screening and transportation to a new life. As many as one million Poles and Jews had been summarily expelled to the General Government. Fifty per cent of all commercial establishments were now in the hands of German trustees from the Reich. The Jewish population there had swollen to 1,650,000, the newcomers mostly crowded into disease-ridden ghettos and work-camps. Frank had drafted 600,000-700,000 Polish workers as labourers for the Reich. The treatment of the incoming ethnic Germans by the RKFDV, the Nazi Party and other agencies was remarkably comprehensive and indeed welcoming - a welfare programme on an imperial scale. An American journalist touring the Galatz camp in Romania, which had been set up to cater for returning Bessarabian Germans in late 1940, described how:

Old people sat peacefully in the sun on benches. . -Women with the headcloth of the Germans in these parts of the world gossiped as they did their washing on troughs along the hangars. There were porches, overgrown with green where other women did their pressing and washing. The youngsters marched and sang and heiled under the supervision of SS-men and Volksdeutsche There were more babies and little children here than in French Canada, so it seemed, playing in the care of kindergarten teachers, chiefly young German girls from Rumania and Jugoslavia who were thus doing their voluntary labor service. Now and then a young SS-man fondly picked up a child and carried it around on his shoulders or held it on his lap . ..

It was amazing to listen to these refugees. According to all standards they had suffered a major catastrophe in being forced to leave the lands of their ancestors. Nor did they know yet where and when they would find new homes. Their immediate prospect was other camps, as their final destination had not yet been determined. Yet old and young, rich and poor, expressed a minimum of regret, and a boundless confidence in the Fiihrer's Germany. These prolific descendants of prolific colonists, who spoke the antiquated German of the Wuerttemberg at the time of Schiller, were returning to Hitler's Germany as to the Promised Land ... To have inspired them with such fervent belief was, one had to admit, a great

triumph for Hitler. You could not help being impressed with this triumph. Here the protective state acted really protective in a grandiose manner.

Although it should be noted that Stalin was at least as important an influence on these refugees as Hitler (*Volksdeutsche* outside the Soviet sphere were a lot less enthusiastic about 'repatriation'), it is certainly true that the Third Reich, remaining true to its concern with racial welfare, expended idealism, effort and money on the repatriation effort.

Not all immigrants welcomed being uprooted: significant numbets stayed behind whilst there were plenty who grumbled about wanting to return home. Hapless Lorrainers hardly wished to be settled in Galicia to satisfy Himmler's racial experiments; Latvian Germans wanted to go home once the Baltic states were occupied by the Wehrmacht; the *Volksdeutsche* villagers from outside Athens, whose Bavarian ancestors had settled there with King Otto a century earlier, now found themselves in a camp in Passau where they muttered that 'we don't like it here in Germany, we want to return to Greece'. Nevertheless many were mollified by the eager young girls from the League of German Girls (BDM) who came east from the Reich to welcome new groups, tidying up expropriated farms for their arrival and helping with childcare. Thousands of Hitler Youth teenagers were drawn by the 'mystery of the East' and used their Land Service Year to help the newcomers settle down.

Needless to say, however, the Germans' treatment of Poles and Jews was rather different. From the western territories, the hapless *Untermenschen* were deported by the SS with little advance warning. Allowed to carry a small amount of hand luggage and forbidden to take along valuables or more than a small sum of money, they were directed to the nearest railway station, or simply abandoned in open fields. No provision was made for their future welfare. In a deliberate effort to weaken or obliterate Polish resistance - what Hitler called 'political house-cleaning' - the intelligentsia and other elements of national leadership were targeted for mass murder by SS squads. The faculty members of Cracow University, for example, were deported en masse in November 1939 to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where most of them died. During 1940, villages were burned down and hundreds of civilians killed in a series of reprisals for assaults of German personnel, setting the pattern for a regime of brutality soon to be extended throughout eastern Europe. The 'AB Action' that summer led a further 3,000 notables to be arrested and executed: the German officials responsible were guaranteed immunity from prosecution. On 12 July, Zygmunt Klukowski, a Polish doctor, noted in his diary the 'terrible news about the executions in Lublin of more than forty people ... I have a difficult time believing this is true.'

Two days later, learning that a German forestry official had shot a young Polish boy with impunity, he wrote sadly: 'It is legal for Germans to shoot Poles and Jews.' What made the Polish predicament particularly dreadful was that Soviet forces were behaving with even greater ruthlessness in the zone of Eastern Poland occupied by the Red Army between 1939 and 1941 There too forced settlement was in full swing, while the total of those killed at Soviet hands was many hundreds of thousands. This figure left even the Nazi murder tally at this time far behind. But the Germans in their war of racial conquest, would soon overtake the Communists and embark upon a full-scale 'war of annihilation'. Already, the inmates of Polish mental asylums had been assembled and machine-gunned to death to clear space for SS barracks. In this way, the German euthanasia programme was reaching into the occupied territories. Treatment of Polish Jews was equally alarming. The deportation programme from the western territories had not generally discriminated between Poles and Jews - both were to be cleared from the areas reserved for German settlement. But the SS, through special Death's Head regiments and SiPo/SD *Einsatzgruppen* carried out summary executions of Jewish elders, burned synagogues and looted Jewish property. Lublin was assigned as the destination for the hundreds of thousands of Jews expelled from western Poland.

Nineteenth-century Germanization in Poland had been a gradual process, with culture and language providing for a gradual transmission of German values to the population at large (often indeed via the Jews). In sharp contrast, exclusion, separation and extermination were the guiding principles of Nazi policy. The occupied territories were to be Germanized by force and as quickly as possible. Hitler told his *Gauleiters* that they had no more than ten years to complete the Germanization of their provinces. German replaced Polish in public life, and the cities, in particular, were soon transformed: Lodz was renamed Litzmannstadt; Poznan became Posen. Even in the Gen-eral Government, in central and southern Poland, similar processes were at work. Klukowski noted that 'in Bilgoraj there is more and more Germanization. Everywhere there are new signs in German.'

Germanization involved a fully-fledged policy of cultural denial. Polish universities were closed down (as Czech ones had been earlier) and in accordance with the policy of 'spiritual sterilization' only limited primary and vocational education was permitted. Explaining Nazi education policy in May 1940 Himmler wrote that 'the sole goal of this school should be: simple arithmetic up to 500 at most; writing of one's name; a doctrine that it is a divine law to obey the Germans and to be honest, industrious and good. I don't think reading should be required. Apart from this school there are to be no schools at all in the East.'

Having made a sharp distinction between cultures, the SS still endeavoured

to sift the racially 'valuable' from the 'worthless' elements of the population. But to identify potential Germans among the Slavic population in the ethnically mixed societies of eastern Europe, the pseudo-science of biological racism offered an imperfect guide. The selection procedure was as strict as it was arbitrary. One Nazi official tasted the process at first hand when he was included by mistake in the screening of hundreds of Czechs and was declared racially valueless before he could prove his identity. But this moment of humiliation was insignificant beside the thousands of families which were split up in the effort to conserve racially valuable stock, or the hundreds of thousands of women who were shipped off to the Reich, having been declared Germanizable, in order to learn German ways in domestic service to German households. Eventually, the screening process was even extended to the concentration camps in an effort to reinforce the increasingly depleted stocks of *Deutschtum* with blue-eyed, blond-haired slave labourers.

For the Jewish population, no such escape valve was offered. Jewish culture itself was to meet a 'historical death', and would exist only as a memory. Alfred Rosenberg, the regime's chief ideological theorist, sent out squads of soldiers, bibliographers and art historians to seize thee cultural possessions of Jewish communities across Europe. They were destined for Frankfurt where Hitler had instructed Rosenberg to establish a research centre for Nazi ideologues. By 1943 an administrator was boasting that 'in the New Order of Europe *the* library for the Jewish question not only for Europe but for the world will arise in Frankfurt on Main'.

THE RACE WAR (2): VERNICHTUNGSKRIEG, I941-1945

The murderous dimensions of Nazi policy towards the Jews took time to emerge from out of the overall racial restructuring of eastern Europe. As Himmler's schemes for an *apartheid* state in former Poland ran foul of other Nazi bureaucrats, the aim of using the General Government as a 'reservation' for the Jews had to be abandoned. Hitler himself had come to realize by March 1940 that the idea of herding millions of Jews into the Lublin region was not feasible. In this policy vacuum, the invasion of France gave Himmler a new opening, and in May 1940 he outlined for Hitler a comprehensive new approach to Germany's racial dilemmas.

In 'Some Thoughts on the Treatment of Alien Populations in the East', Himmler suggested that the entire population of former Poland be racially screened: the 'racially valuable' could then be brought to the Reich, while the rest would be dumped in the General Government to serve as a reservoir of cheap labour for the Reich. Touching briefly on the subject of the Jews, Himmler noted: 'I hope completely to erase the concept of Jews through the possibility of a great emigration to a colony in Africa or elsewhere.' The memorandum as a whole raised the possibility of genocide, only to dismiss it: 'However cruel and tragic each individual case may be, this method is still the mildest and best, if one rejects the Bolshevik method of physical extermination of a people out of inner conviction as un-German and impossible.'

The African colony which offered itself following the victory over France was Madagascar, and for some months the 'Madagascar Plan was taken very seriously. It rested, however, upon the assumption that not only France but Britain too would be defeated, and once it became clear that the Battle of Britain had failed, Madagascar faded from Nazi minds. Hitler's short-term response was to override Hans Frank's objections to having to receive more Jews in the General Government. But as Christopher Browning has remarked, the goal of the Final Solution at this stage remained 'the expulsion of the Jews to the furthest extremity of the German sphere of influence'. What transformed Nazi policy towards the Jews was the invasion of the Soviet Union, and the consequent radicalization of the war. In 1940 the Germans killed at most approximately 100,000 Jews; the following year they killed more than one million. With Operation Barbarossa, the war changed; it became a *Vernichtungskrieg* war of annihilation-against the 'Judaeo-Bolshevik' foe, and plans and military orders involving mass murder on an as yet unprecedented scale were drawn up.

The behaviour of the German Army and SS in the initial stages of Barbarossa demonstrated the horrific character of the *Vernichtungs-krieg*. Front-line troops under new standing orders shot captured Soviet commissars in defiance of international law. The upper echelons of the Wehrmacht offered little objection. As Soviet POWs fell into German hands in extraordinary numbers, they were treated quite differently to their French or Belgian counterparts the previous year. They were starved to death or marched into the ground till they looked 'more like the skeletons of animals than humans'. Within six months, over two million Soviet POWs had starved to death in German captivity.

As the front advanced eastwards, it brought violent death to millions of civilians. On the heels of the front-line troops came Heydrich's *Einsatzgruppen* - motorized SiPo/SD death squads - in search of Jews, partisans and communists. Their victims were largely Soviet Jews of all ages: more than 2.7 million lived in the former Pale of Settlement, more than five million in the 1941 borders of the Soviet Union. By mid-April 1942, the four *Einsatzgruppen* had reported the death of 518,388 victims, of whom the vast majority were Jews. A further round of killings took place in the following year, and may nave led to the murder of as many as 1.5 million more: by the end of war, only some 2.3 million Soviet Jews remained alive.

Mass murder on this terrifying scale marked a new stage in the German approach to the *Endlosung,* and showed that the Final Solution was no longer being considered in terms of resettlement. The execution of so many civilians, including women and children, however was also taking its toll on the executioners themselves. In August 1941 Sonderkommando 4a killed the hundreds of adult Jewish inhabitants of the Ukrainian town of Byelaya Tserkov, but left some ninety children under guard. 'Following the execution of all the Jews in the town,' reported a Wehrmacht officer in the area, 'it became necessary to eliminate the Jewish children, particularly the infants.' This was done. Yet afterwards, the reporting officer stated bluntly -to the fury of hardline Field Marshal von Reichenau - that 'measures against women and children were undertaken which in no way differ from atrocities carried out by the enemy'. Such misgivings on the part of some perpetrators did not prevent mass murder, but they complicated it.

It was partly to circumvent such unease, and partly to improve the efficiency of the killing process, that the use of gas in specially designed death camps was developed. The period when this policy was set in motion seems to have been the late summer and early autumn of 1941, at around the time that Himmler personally watched Einsatzkomando 8 carry out a mass shooting in Minsk. The SS had already tried out mobile gas vans in East Prussia and the General Government in 1939-40. And just when Himmler was searching for an alternative to shootings, public outrage forced the euthanasia campaign in the Reich to be wound down. Hitler's Chancellery had kept the T-4 programme under its own control; now it made the personnel, with their expertise in gassing techniques, available for transfer eastwards.

In September 1941, some euthanasia centres received Jewish inmates from the concentration camps, a sign that their function was already being shifted to the mass murder of Jews. At around the same time, a castle at Chelmno, near Lodz, was converted into a rudimentary death camp, and stationary gas vans operated by former euthanasia programme specialists were used to kill off the remaining Jewish population of the Warthegau from December 1941. The *Einsatz-gruppen* started to use mobile vans throughout the East. SS technicians developed two types - the smaller Diamond, with a capacity of twenty-five/thirty people, and the larger Saurer which held fifty/sixty and carefully monitored their performance, especially in bad weather. 'Since December 1941, ninety-seven thousand have been processed using three vans, without any defects showing up in the machines,' notes one report.

The key to the Final Solution, however, was the construction of cnecial extermination centres in the General Government. The SS focused initially on the area of Lublin, which under the earlier resettlement plans had been designated as a dumping-ground for Jews from western Poland. Former euthanasia specialist Christian Wirth was nut in charge of the first death camp, Belzec, and gassing by carbon monoxide began there in March 1942. Exhausted Soviet POWs built the Majdanek camp in late 1941 and the first Jews were sent there from Lublin in December. By September 1942 gas chambers were in operation there too. Other former euthanasia operatives were assigned to the death camps of Treblinka and Sobibor. Gas chambers were constructed at these and other sites, and expanded as problems with capacity emerged."

Auschwitz itself had been growing from its first use as a camp for Polish political prisoners. SS town planners dreamed of turning the Polish Oswiecim into Stadt Auschwitz, a nucleus for German colonization, with orderly streets, modern cinemas and rich fields regained from the marshes which surrounded the town. In addition to the prison barracks, the camp complex housed the giant synthetic rubber factory which IG Farben executives had wanted to build out of the range of Allied bombers. A gigantic new camp at nearby Birkenau housed Soviet POWs in truly appalling conditions, and it was on these that an insecti-cide called Zyklon-B, patented by an IG Farben subsidiary, was tested for the first time on 3 September 1941. A little later on, new gas chambers were built purposely for mass extermination. In 1942-3 Birkenau became the main death camp for Europe's Jews. By 1942, then, the technological prerequisites for industrialized mass murder were in place. Death camps were under construction and cheap poison gases had been tested and were available. Spearheaded by the SS, backed by Hitler, the complex diplomatic, legal and logistical arrangements were now set in train for the extermination of the entire Jewish population of occupied Europe. The subject had been intensively discussed by the Nazi leadership during October and November 1941; its administrative dimensions formed the theme of the Wannsee Conference, originally scheduled for December but postponed until January 1942. By the time that Heydrich, Himmler's deputy, was assassinated in May 1942, the Jews of Poland were being killed in 'Operation Reinhard', and the first trainloads of Jews from Slovakia had arrived at Auschwitz.

In early 1943, SS chief statistician Richard Korherr drafted a report on the progress of the Final Solution for Himmler, in which he noted that 1,449,692 Polish Jews had already received 'special treatment' Himmler rebuked him for using that particular euphemism, and cor-rected the text to read: 'Transportation of the Jews out of the Eastern Provinces to the Russian East: [1,449,692].' But the numbers speak for themselves. By the end of 1943, when the death camps were closed down, approximately 150,000 Jews had been murdered in Kulmhof/ Chelmno, 200,000 in Sobibor, 550,000 in Belzec, and 750,000 in Treb-linka - thus the Jews of Poland were mostly killed in the so-called 'Reinhard' camps. Auschwitz-Birkenau, the giant combined labour camp

and extermination centre, remained in operation for another year. Between March 1942 and November 1944, well over one million people were killed there, mostly Jews from Greece, Hungary, France, Holland and Italy as well as Poland.

The overall impact of the Final Solution was summarized by Korherr in the provisional report he prepared for Hitler in April 1943. 'Altogether, European Jewry must have been reduced by almost 1/2 since 1933, that is to say, during the first decade of the development of the power of National Socialism. Again half, that is a quarter of the total Jewish population of 1937, has fled to other continents.' In fact, the final death toll was considerably higher, since the killing went on, inside and outside the camps, until the end of the war.

By the war's end, between five and six million European Jews had been killed, almost half of the eleven million Jews recorded at the Wannsee conference. In some countries, such as Poland and Greece, almost the entire community was murdered. Other ethnic groups were also decimated, notably between 200,000 and 500,000 gypsies (many of whom were murdered in Belzec and Birkenau), Serbs, Poles, Ukrainians and Russians; but the systematic nature of the Final Solution makes it a case apart. Compared with the primitive techniques employed by other exponents of genocide such as the Croat Ustase (who slaughtered at least 334,000 Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia) and the Romanians (who carried out bloody pogroms in Transnistria), the *Endlösung* demonstrated the superior genocidal efficiency of an operation conducted by a modern bureaucracy with industrial equipment.

We need not assume the complicity of all Germans to accept that responsibility for, and knowledge of, this crime stretched far beyond the ranks of the SS. Propaganda Minister Goebbels referred in a diary entry of 27 March 1942 to the 'liquidation' of the Jews of Poland; by May, Reich Railway Department heads were conferring with the SS over transportation aspects of 'the complete extermination' of the lews. The Army, the Navy and the Foreign Office all played their part. In Salonika, for example, a tiny team of SS 'experts' could not have deported one fifth of the city, nearly 50,000 people, without the active support of the local military administration. As for scientists, doctors and academics, their advice and enthusiastic involvement had been integral to the Nazi racial programme from the start.

When foreign governments were approached for support, their reactions depended upon the prospects for German victory, the nature of local attitudes towards the Jews and the opportunity costs of resistance. They tended to be particularly cooperative in handing over Jewish refugees and other non-nationals, but they were usually more reluctant to allow their own fellow-citizens to be deported. Some governments, notably the French, the Slovak and the Croat, were at least as enthusiastic in their anti-Semitism as the Germans and tesponded warmly to the chance of removing their Jewish population 'to the east'. In Romania and later Hungary where extreme anti-Semitic movements briefly held power, the bloody consequences shocked the Germans themselves. Even where the locals dragged their heels, as in Greece or the Netherlands, cooperation among the various German authorities often ensured that a high proportion of the local Jewish Population was deported. Virtually none emulated the Danes in helping most Jews to escape, though the Italians - for their own reasons - did all they could to obstruct the Final Solution in the areas under their control. And as for neutral Sweden and Switzerland, recent revelations indicate their willingness to turn Nazi racial policy to their own advantage.

The British and American governments, for their part, suffered from no lack of information. Churchill was receiving Ultra decrypts of the *Einsatzgruppen* reports from the East, which summarized the killing totals. Several individuals, including Jan Karski, an astonishingly brave Polish emissary, emerged from occupied Europe to brief London and Washington with eyewitness accounts of the ghettos and even the death camps themselves. But apart from some vague public warnings to the Germans, little was done, and the chance to bomb the camps was passed over. Whether this inaction stemmed from anti-Semitism, from inability to imagine was what taking place, or from the fact simply that the Final Solution was never a central concern of the Allied war effort remains a matter of controversy.

Popular opinion inside occupied Europe is also difficult to gauge. Anti-Semitism was a continent-wide phenomenon with a long history, of course, and in some areas explains an attitude of detachment and even enthusiasm for the Jews' plight. Nor should it be forgotten that genocide always offers spectacular opportunities for enrichment - abandoned factories, shops and properties, furniture and clothes - with which popular satisfaction may be purchased by the occupying power. After 1940, Eichmann extended the 'Vienna model' of 'Aryanization' of Jewish property to Amsterdam, Paris, Salonika and Europe's other major cities, while Rosenberg's agents alone plundered the equivalent of 674 trainloads of household goods in western Europe. Seventy-two trainloads of gold from the teeth of Auschwitz victims were sent to Berlin. If most of this went into German homes or Swiss bank vaults, a considerable sum lined the pockets of unscrupulous collaborators, informers and agents of every nationality. Yet it must be said that approval of the Final Solution was not a common phenomenon. In response to the horrors of occupation, most people living under Nazi control had retreated into a private world and tried to ignore everything that did not directly concern them. With traditional moral norms apparently thrown to the wind, the unusual cruelty or the Germans towards the Jews created a more general alarm among

non-Jews. What cannot escape our attention are German reactions - or the lack of them. There was no public protest inside the Reich to match the furore over the euthanasia campaign. Most Germans appear to have accepted that the Jews were no longer part of their community. Ordinary middle-aged policemen took part in mass executions; university professors, lawyers and doctors commanded the *Einsatzgruppen*. They did not do so out of fear: there is no recorded instance of a refusal to shoot innocent civilians being punished by death. Rather, the letters of concentration camp guards and death-squad killers reveal what ordinary individuals living in Europe in the middle of the twentieth century were capable of doing under the influence of a murderous ideology. Even in the midst of killing, private concerns about girlfriends, wives or children continued to worry them.

When SS-Untersturmführer Max Taubner was tried by the SS and Police Supreme Court in Munich in May 1943 for the unauthorized shooting of Jews in the Ukraine, the court offered a revealing insight into the moral values of the Third Reich. Its judgment stressed that killing Jews was not in itself a crime: 'The Jews have to be exterminated and none of the Jews that were killed is any great loss.' In the court's eyes, Taubner's offence lay rather in killing them cruelly and allowing 'his men to act with such vicious brutality that they conducted themselves under his command like a savage horde'. Even though he had acted out of 'a true hatred for the Jews' rather than 'sadism', he had revealed an 'inferior' character, and a 'high degree of mental brutalization'. 'The conduct of the accused', ran the verdict, 'is unworthy of an honourable and decent German man.'

A similar acceptance of racially motivated killing was evident inside the Reich. The segregation of forced labourers and POW workers, enforced by the Gestapo, became accepted as a normal state of affairs. Denunciations of foreign workers were commonplace. The public hanging or flogging of workers who formed sexual relationships with German citizens seem to have occasioned little protest, as did the restrictions imposed by the police on their movements and activities: Polish workers were, for example, forbidden to use bicycles or to attend church. Nazi views on the inferiority of 'East workers' seem to have been commonly accepted. The inhabitants of Mauthausen grew used to seeing camp inmates shuffling through their streets and the casual brutality of their SS guards. When several hundred Russian POWs managed to escape from the camp, on 2 February 1945, only two local families are recorded as having offered a hiding-place and shelter. Most of the escapees were quickly rounded up or shot like 'rabbits' by local farmers, excited Hitler Youth teenagers and townspeople eager to participate in a terrifying bloodletting.

The death camps formed part of a larger 'concentration camp universe' in which the SS ruled over hundreds of thousands of inmates in a vast network of camps stretching right across Europe. The boundaries of this 'universe' stretched as far north as Norway, as far south as Crete. By the end of the war, some 1.6 million people had been incarcerated, of whom over one million had died (in addition to those deliberately targeted for extermination). In Europe as a whole there were more than 10,000 camps, including - in addition to the eight extermination camps and the twenty-two main concentration camps with their 1,200 offshoots - over four hundred ghetto camps, some twenty-nine psychiatric homes and thirty children's homes where patients were murdered, twenty-six camps in the occupied eastern territories where mass murder was institutionalized, as well as numerous others housing POWs, civilian workers, juveniles or 'Germanizable' east Europeans. Some thirty-three nationalities were to be found among the inmates at Dachau, over fourteen in Ravensbruck. The conditions of work were so oppressive that even many so-called labour camps were regarded by the inmates as centres of extermination. Describing the granite quarry at Gross-Rosen, near Breslau, a French doctor who arrived there from Auschwitz noted: 'Nowhere did I see individual murders carried out with such dexterity as at Grossrosen; murder was practised without qualms, by the kapos, by the Camp police, by the SS and their dogs. With consummate skill they could kill a man with two or three blows.'

The inmates of these camps provided the basis for the main economic activity of the SS, which by 1944 extended from mining to heavy industry, from land reclamation to scientific 'research'. Four hundred and eighty thousand of the 600,000 prisoners in the camps in late 1944 were termed fit for work. Their tasks included sorting the possessions of dead prisoners for distribution to the Waffen-SS or other departments, building, quarrying and mining, as well as manufacturing in the Buna works and other industrial operations. Like the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the wartime Reich became a slave labour economy.

In February 1944 armaments czar Speer enlisted Himmler's help in 'deploying concentration camp inmates in functions that I regard as especially urgent'. This request inaugurated a rapid expansion of slave labour in munitions, in aircraft construction and particularly in building the underground missile works at 'Dora' and Peenemunde. Death rates here were horrendous: 2,882 of 17,000 workers died on the 'Dora' project within a few months: Speer regarded the project as a 'sensational success'. Overall, some 140,000 prisoners were used by Speer while 230,000 were utilized as slave labour by industrial firms in the private sector. By this point the armaments crisis had reached such a point that for the first time anti-Semitic ideology was overridden and Hungarian Jews were moved from Auschwitz as additional labourers.

Barbarossa also extended the range of SS responsibilities in other directions.

Terror replaced the rule of law in the East, and Himmler was authorized to deal with civilians directly without reference to the courts. The Waffen-SS became Himmler's army, growing from around 75,000 men in 1939-40 to nearly 500,000 by late 1944, part-threat part-partner to the Wehrmacht and as such a key instrument for Hitler in his gradual Nazification of the Army. The SS was given responsibility for policing the occupied territories in the East, while SS-Gruppenführer Bach-Zelewski was placed in charge of coordinating anti-partisan operations. Needless to say, such operations resulted in enormous destruction and loss of life. The basic strategy was 'to answer terror with terror'. Reprisal ratios were set for attacks on German life or property. As a result thousands of villages were burned down and hundreds of thousands of civilians killed in the course of 'cleansing operations'. Their impact upon partisan activity was almost certainly counter-productive, driving young men into clandestine activity. Efforts at a more sophisticated counter-insurgency strategy would have to wait several decades: after 1945 European colonial powers, and the Americans, studied and learned much from the failures of Nazi retaliatory anti-guerrilla policies.

While the partisans never really posed a significant military threat to German rule, they did obstruct the process of Germanization. Here, too, Barbarossa had made Nazi thinking more extreme and more ambitious. Following the conquest of the Ukraine and Belorussia, SS town planners lost no time in drawing up proposals for new small German towns dotted across the Ukraine. 'General Plan East' envisaged a massive settlement programme stretching from Lithuania to the Crimea over twenty-five years. At Auschwitz, inmates dug fish ponds and built barns for model farms where Nazi colonists could be trained before heading east.

In the real world, however, certain difficulties with the entire Germanization idea were becoming apparent. One was corruption, for among the Germans from the Old Reich was a high proportion of 'gold-diggers' (or 'golden pheasants', as they were known) and carpet-baggers, attracted by the prospects of quick riches and easy plunder. By contrast, few farmers wanted to make the move. Settlers felt exposed in rural areas where their life and property was endangered by the embittered local population. Ironically - given the regime's obsession with 'living-space' - there did not seem to be enough settlers for the enormous amount of territory which Himmler dreamed of colonizing. 'Well, Kamerad, how are you getting on?' asked the local peasant leader in a Nazi paper of the time. 'Too much land,' is the response, as the unwilling farmer 'looks helplessly into the distance'. 'The proportions between space and people have been reversed,' commented another critic in 1942. 'The problem of how to feed a great people in a narrow space has changed into that of the best way of exploiting the conquered spaces with the limited numbers of people available.'

As the regime cast around for volunteers, the screening of potential colonists threw up some knotty problems for the racial theorists: some Party hardliners were willing to take any suitable-looking candidates, even if their ties with Germany were tenuous; others insisted that knowledge of language and culture was more important than physical attributes. Some even speculated that if the SS brought home too many racially superior specimens from Russia, the inhabitants of the Reich might develop an inferiority complex and start a race war! On the other hand, of the 35,000 unwilling Slovenes who were forcibly brought to Germany, only some 16,000 were finally reckoned suitable for Germanization; as most were the relatives of Slovene partisans, it is surprising that the number was so high. The rest, together with others from Luxembourg and Alsace, had to be kept in detention camps for the duration of the war.

The limits imposed by wartime reality on Himmler's demographic engineering were sharply revealed in the case of Zamosc, a town south of Lublin where a special effort was made to create a planned settlement of *Volksdeutsche*. In this, the only case where the SS brought its colonization schemes anywhere near completion, over 10,000 Poles were removed from their homes to make way for German settlers. Half the Poles fled into the forests where they joined the Underground and raided farms and villages; the rest were screened for racial purity and deported. Twenty-five thousand Germans were brought into an area still inhabited by 26,000 Ukrainians and 170,000 Poles. They were, a propagandist boasted, 'the first German cell of the modern eastern colonization, reawakened by this search to a pulsating German colonial life'. But by early 1944, the local authorities were already trying to persuade Himmler to abandon the colony and evacuate the settlers westwards: assaults on their farms were a regular occurrence and their menfolk were sleeping in fields to avoid being killed by the resistance.

Yet Himmler and Hitler stuck doggedly to their vision of a German empire in the East and left the evacuation of their hardy colonists as late as possible. This lack of contingency planning for withdrawal was but one aspect of the basic unreality in their plans. Their racist colonialism was doomed to failure; it was an imitation of Habsburg frontier policy without Habsburg political flexibility. They had created such hatred among the local population that in the absence of 'an overpowering police machine' the numbers of colonists required to hold vast areas of the former Soviet Union for Germany were beyond the grasp of Berlin. Hitler's long-term policy had been to see '100 million Germans settled in these territories'. But such numbers simply did not exist. The Nazis wanted to turn Germans into peasants, but most Germans refused. Whether, as Himmler believed, the returning war heroes from the front would have welcomed a farmstead in Poland of the Ukraine as their reward must be open

to doubt.

As the Red Army advanced, the resettlement scheme disintegrated of its own accord. Between August 1943 and July 1944, some 350,000 Crimean Germans were evacuated to western Poland; others followed from the Ukraine and Belorussia. The German scorched-earth policy meant that it became impossible for many colonists to remain even had they wanted to. By early 1945, hundreds of thousands of German refugees were trekking westwards towards the Reich in a vast spontaneous exodus.

At the same time an even grimmer series of forced marches betrayed the dark side of the racial dream. In the last phase of the Final Solution, the extermination camps and concentration camps were closed down and, in some cases, destroyed, and the surviving inmates were driven through the snow on long marches in the general direction of the Reich. Of the 714,211 prisoners still in the camps in January 1945 around 250,000 died on these death marches.

A variety of motives lay behind the marches - including the SS's reluctance to allow prisoners to fall into Allied hands as well as the desire to exploit them as slave labourers. But in some cases, journeys on foot or by train were so aimless that it seems the intention was simply to 'continue the mass murder in the concentration camps by other means'. Marchers were starved, beaten and shot, particularly when they became too exhausted to keep up with the others. In addition to the brutality of the guards, the victims often had to contend with the active hostility of the civilian German population they passed through. Instances of help are also recorded. 'In Christianstadt German women tried to give us bread, but the women guards wouldn't permit it,' recorded one former prisoner. 'One German woman with a human heart cried: *"Ihr Elende, Ihr Unglückliche"*. The brutal woman guard yelled: "What are you doing pitying Jews?"' It is worth noting that there are no known instances of German bystanders losing their life for expressing sympathy in the hearing of SS guards. Even so, disapproval and indifference outweighed pity: by early 1945, with the end in sight, many German civilians saw themselves as the prime victims of the war and remained blind to the misfortune of the marchers passing through their midst. In this terminal phase of Hitler's empire, the barriers which had previously existed between the ordered world of the *Volksgemein-schaft* and the underworld of the camps now dissolved. The inmates emerged 'like Martians' into the outside world. Their guards were no longer solely SS men, sworn to secrecy; they included retreating soldiers, civilians, Party officials and Hitler Youth members. Random shootings and massacres took place no longer within the camp perimeter, but by roadsides, in woods and on the outskirts of towns and villages in Germany and Austria.

The ultimate technical problem arising from mass murder practised on this scale was how to dispose of the dead. In the extermination camps, corpses were burned on enormous pyres or in ovens. The random, ubiquitous killing of the final months could not be so easily tidied up. As the Germans retreated from the Lublin region, they made hasty and unsuccessful efforts to hide the traces of genocide. Klukowski noted with horror 'the odor of decomposing bodies from the Jewish cemetery' where mass graves had been dug. The shocked Allied troops who liberated the camps in Germany forced local citizens - at places like Nordhausen, Gusen and Woebbelin - not merely to inspect the mounds of corpses but to bury them, sometimes in the central squares and parks of their old and elegant towns.

Overcome by nausea, an Austrian priest who entered Mauthausen several days after liberation noted: 'A couple of times I was on the verge of throwing up. One indeed comes from civilization. And here inside? . . . What a sad achievement of our arrogant century, this hideousness, this sinking into an unprecedented lack of civilization, and on top of that in the heart of Europe!' But the dead lay outside the camps as well. In the years after the war, their graves dotted the roadsides of central Europe until local committees chose to remove these blots on the landscape by constructing collective memorials instead and disposing of the human remains. A newly sanitized rural landscape was created for the benefit of tourists and locals alike. In 1942. it had been decided to distribute the clothing and personal belongings of Auschwitz inmates as Christmas presents to *Volksdeutsche* settlers in the Ukraine. Later the scheme was expanded and trainloads of goods were sent off to the German pioneers. Genocide and resettlement were inextricably linked, for Hitler's war aimed at the complete racial reconstitution of Europe.

There were no historical parallels for such a project. In Europe neither Napoleon nor the Habsburgs had aimed at such an exclusive domination, but then Hitler's upbringing as a German nationalist critic of Vienna helps explain the contrast with the methods of governance pursued by the Dual Monarchy. In its violence and racism, Nazi imperialism drew more from European precedents in Asia, Africa and - especially - the Americas. 'When we eat wheat from Canada,' remarked Hitler one evening during the war, 'we don't think about the despoiled Indians.' On another occasion he described the Ukraine as 'that new Indian Empire'. But if Europeans would have resented being ruled as the British ruled India, they were shocked at being submitted to an experience closer to that inflicted upon the native populations of the Americas.[76]

National Socialism started out claiming to be creating a New Order in Europe, but as racial ideology prevailed over economic rationality, the extreme violence implicit in this project became clearer. 'Ginger-bread and whippings' was how Goebbels summed up their policy, but there was not enough of the former and too much of the latter. The 'Great Living Space *[Grosslebensraum]* of the European family of nations' promised life to the Germans, an uncertain

and precarious existence to most Europeans and extermination to the Jews. 'If Europe can't exist without us,' wrote Goebbels in his pro-European phase, 'neither can we survive without Europe.' This turned out to be true. The Germans threw away their chance to dominate the continent after 1940 and their defeat led to their own catastrophe. Himmler's original vision came to pass - the Germans were henceforth concentrated inside Germany - but it is doubtful whether he would have regarded the way this came about as a triumph.

6 Blueprints for the Golden Age

The foundations of twentieth-century democracy have still to be laid.
- E. H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace*

For a fleeting moment we have an opportunity to make an epoch - to open a Golden Age for all mankind.
- C. Streit, *Union Now*

The reexamination of values and the heroic effort which might have saved the democracies from war if they had been attempted in time, are taking place and will take place in the midst of the ruins.
-J. Maritain, *Christianisme et démocratie*

The Second World War and the confrontation with the reality of a Nazi New Order in Europe acted as a catalyst inside and outside the continent for a renewed attempt to define the place of the democratic nation-state in the modern world. This chapter attempts to describe the various axes along which the wartime debate took place, a debate whose core concerned the rethinking of another New Europe to rival the authoritarian monster created by Berlin. It goes without saying, of course, that the Nazi New Order was not merely a spur to alternatives, but the very seedbed - in certain areas - of post-war realities; the continuities between Hitler's Europe and Schuman's are visible in economic - especially industrial - Franco-German cooperation, for instance; there are also the obvious continuities of personnel in state bureaucracies and administrations. But in the realm of political values and ideals these continuities were much less important.

Yet the Second World War did not start out - at least so far as London and Paris were concerned - as a war for a new order. The power of Nazi dreams contrasted from the outset with the ideological timidity of the British. 'These people,' fired off an elderly H. G. Wells, 'by a string of almost incredible blunders, have entangled what is left of their Empire in a great war to "end Hitler", and they have absolutely no suggestions to offer their antagonists and the world at large of what is to come after Hitler. Apparently they hope to paralyse Germany in some as yet unspecified fashion and then to go back to their golf links or the fishing stream and the doze by the fire after dinner.'

The arrival of Churchill did not allay such criticism; indeed, following Dunkirk it intensified. At the Ministry of Information, Harold Nicolson contrasted the 'revolutionary war' waged by the Germans with the British 'conservative' war effort and urged that Whitehall respond to the need to ask people to fight for a 'new order'. Conservative Party reformers felt similarly while Attlee stressed the need not to fight 'a conservative war' with 'negative objectives'. Churchill himself disliked any talk about war aims or the post-war order; but the debate - in Addison's words - 'flowed around him'. As talk of a Nazi New Order captivated Europe in the summer of 1940, British policy-makers came under pressure to outline a New Order of their own. The debate that ensued - in Britain and abroad - gave impetus to many of the ideas and values that would form the foundations of the post-war world.

REVIVING DEMOCRACY

By March 1941, one prominent British politician could write that '"everybody" is talking about the new order, the new kind of society, the new way of life, the new conception of man'. According to historian E. H. Carr, 'the point at issue is not the necessity for a new order but the manner in which it shall be built'. Hitler could not win the war**,** in his view, but he would have performed 'the perhaps indispensable function of sweeping away the litter of the old order'. Thus the struggle was 'an episode in a revolution of social and political order'.

At the very heart of this revolution were the preservation and reassertion of democratic values in Europe. 'Democracy! Perhaps no word has ever been more devalued and ridiculed,' wrote the French resistance paper *Franc-Tireur* in March 1944. 'Only yesterday it stood for long-winded committee speeches and parliamentary impotence.' Aware of the deep disaffection with the Third Republic in France, General de Gaulle expressly avoided raising the subject in his early broadcasts. 'At the moment,' he wrote in July 1941, 'the mass of the French people confuse the word democracy with the parliamentary regime as it operated in France before the war . . . That regime has been condemned by events and by public opinion.' It was this wholesale disillusionment with democracy in inter-war Europe which had led commentators like Ambassador Joe Kennedy to predict after the fall of France that 'democracy is finished in England'. 'The necessity for re-stating the democratic idea,' asserted R. W. G. MacKay, author of the best-selling *Peace Aims and the New Order,* 'is the most fundamental question for us all just now.'

Chamberlain's uncertain presentation of the case against Hitler typified for many critics the complacency, passivity and outmoded style of the prevailing 'bourgeois' democratic tradition in western Europe. What was to become the wartime consensus rested upon the belief that in order to survive in Europe, democracy would have to be reinterpreted: the old liberal focus upon the value of political rights and liberties had not been enough to win the loyalty of the masses. 'Democracy', wrote a central European emigre in the USA '... must set

its values against new ideals; it must show that it is able to adapt its psychology and its methods to the new times.' From such a perspective, the Atlantic Charter of August 1941 seemed woefully cautious and even conservative in its promises. 'Nothing in the text suggests that we are in the middle of the greatest revolutionary war of all time... This has the drawback of suggesting that the democracies wish to preserve and maintain the methods of the past, while the totalitarian powers strive for something new and imaginative.' In Britain, even the Charter itself was downplayed, according to a scathing anonymous critic of British propaganda: 'Speakers of the Ministry of Information lecture about the Empire, America, France wartime cookery, the horrors of Nazi rule and Hitler's new order but they do not talk about *our* new order. There is, in fact, no recognition of the war of ideas or of the social revolution through which we are living.'

Suspect as the notion may seem to revisionists today, social revolution hardly seems too strong a term to describe the dramatic changes wrought by the war both in Britain and in occupied Europe. Wartime dislocation and chaos - some sixty million changes of address were registered in Britain alone during the war - collapsed the social distances upon which the rigid pre-war class systems of Europe had rested. The impact of bombing, together with systematic evacuations and the mass panics and flight of millions of people (eight to twelve million, for example, covering hundreds of miles, during the mass panic in Belgium and France alone in the summer of 1940) brought classes and communities together which had formerly remained in ignorance of one another. Rationing demonstrated that government planning could be used for egalitarian ends and was as a result surprisingly popular. Hence the war itself, with the new roles assumed by government in managing the economy and society, demonstrated the truth of the reformers' argument: democracy was indeed compatible with an interventionist state. According to Mass Observation in 1944: 'Public feeling about controls is largely based on the belief that they are democratic, more democratic than the freedoms and liberties which in practice apply only to limited sections of the population.'

In a *Times* editorial of July 1940 entitled 'The New Europe', E. H. Carr asserted that 'if we speak of democracy, we do not mean a democracy which maintains the right to vote but forgets the right to work and the right to live'. This was the message which socialists across Europe had been repeating for years; the war gave it a new urgency and plausibility. Imprisoned by Vichy, the former French premier Leon Blum wrote: 'A weak and perverted bourgeois democ-racy has collapsed and must be replaced by a true democracy, an energetic and competent democracy, popular instead of capitalist, strong instead of weak .. . This popular democracy will be, indeed can only be, a Social Democracy.'

The wartime reformist consensus, however, included other groups than the socialists. Liberal progressives, technocratic planners and newly assertive moderate conservatives were all keen to enlarge the social and economic responsibilities of the modern state. None was happier than Keynes, for example, to seize the chance to assert the primacy of economics over finance and the bankruptcy of laissez-faire. He too had been frustrated by the retrograde nature of the British government's initial attitude towards post-war goals. In the summer of 1940 he had turned down an invitation to broadcast a rebuttal of the economic aspects of the Nazi New Order on the grounds that he found much in them to admire. To Duff Cooper he wrote:

Your letter seems to suggest that we should do well to pose as champions of the pre-war economic status quo and outbid Funk by offering good old 1920-21 or 1930-33, i.e. gold standard or international exchange laissez-faire ... Is this particularly attractive or good propaganda? . . . obviously I am not the man to preach the beauties and merits of the pre-war gold standard. In my opinion about three-quarters of the passages quoted from the German broadcasts would be quite excellent if the name of Great Britain were substituted for Germany or the Axis ... If Funk's plan is taken at face value, it is excellent and just what we ourselves ought to be thinking of doing. If it is to be attacked, the way to do it would be to cast doubt and suspicion on its bona fides?

At the beginning of 1941 Keynes did agree to draft a declaration of war aims in which he emphasized the need to ensure social security and to attack unemployment after the war. Never published, this memorandum marked the beginning of the British government's move towards a commitment to full-employment policies. No less important was the pioneering work he carried out with two assistants in constructing the first official national income statistics. Here were the tools which made possible the post-war Keynesian revolution in fiscal management. The wartime transformation of British social policy was far-reaching. Apart from Keynes's work in economic policy, pioneering reforms were laid down in education, health and town planning. War saw the introduction of free school meals and milk. It brought the 1944 government White Papers on Full Employment and a National Health Service. Above all, it brought William Beveridge, whose 1942 report on 'Social Insurance and Allied Services' laid the foundations of the post-war welfare state. Beveridge himself, converted by the war from a critic of welfare capitalism to a believer in planning for radical social change, even told Beatrice Webb in early 1940 that 'I would very much like to see Communism tried under democratic conditions'.

This, then, was the man appointed reluctantly by the coalition government to investigate what it imagined would be the rather technical matter of social

insurance reform. But Beveridge resolved - with enormous success - to see this work 'as a contribution to a better new world after the war'. His subsequent investigations forced Whitehall to travel further down the road to full-employment policies after the war than it had originally intended. Common to both Beveridge and the government's own White Paper was their insistence on the need for state planning for the social good and their denunciation of the iniquities of pre-war laissez-faire. 'If the united democracies', concluded Beveridge in 1942, 'today can show strength and courage and imagination even while waging total war, they will win together two victories which in truth are indivisible.'

The reception which greeted Beveridge's reports attested not merely to his talent for self-publicity but to the very real public interest in post-war reconstruction. Like Beveridge himself, British popular opinion had shifted to the Left during the war. This could be seen in the interest aroused by a special *Picture Post* issue in January 1941 on 'The Britain we hope to build when the war is over'; it was also reflected in the sales of the Archbishop of Canterbury's best-selling 1942 Penguin Special on *Christianity and the Social Order,* and the emergence of Richard Acland's Common Wealth Party. Beveridge's proposals achieved international circulation through the BBC and underground publications, so much so that in the Third Reich his plan was regarded as 'an especially obvious proof that our enemies are taking over national-socialistic ideas'.

This of course was not entirely fair. Rather, the challenge of Nazism was forcing democrats to look again at the question of social and national solidarity. The process had started already in the 1930s, notably in Sweden where the Social Democrats had pioneered an explicit alternative to the prevailing authoritarian model of coercive population policy. The Swedish welfare state which emerged in the late 1930s was a determinedly democratic programme, combining pro-natalist measures to encourage people to have more children with an affirmation that the decision whether or not to have children was an individual one which the state should respect. Sweden did maintain sterilization of the mentally ill, but it also supported birth control clinics, provided sex education in schools, liberalized abortion laws and protected the rights of working mothers at the same time that it introduced family allowances, universal free medical and dental care and school meals.

For one of the architects of these policies, Alva Myrdal, the Swedish model presented a contrast to the Nazi conception of the relationship between state and individual. It was - she argued in *Nation and Family* - a necessary amplification of the scope of modern democracy. Finishing her book in August 1940, Myrdal looked forward cautiously to a time when 'the present calamity' would be over and 'freedom and progress would again have a chance in Europe'. But, she warned, in what were fast becoming familiar terms.

Such an end of this war, even more than that of the earlier one, will present a challenge to democracy, again reasserted, to fulfill its social obligation. Political freedom and formal equality will not be enough; real democracy, social and economic democracy, will be exacted . . .

Europe will be impoverished. The fiscal structures of belligerent and nonbelligerent countries alike will seem bankrupt when measured by traditional norms of financial solvency. The rich will have seen their wealth taxed away. The masses will be hungry. When the structure of war-time economy breaks down, the dislocations of normal exchange and commerce will be left as enormous maladjustments. The demobilized millions will crave employment and security. Both courage and wisdom will be required to preserve orderly freedom and to avoid social chaos. These circumstances, however, will not prevent the undertaking of social reforms; on the contrary they will force reforms whether we want them or not.

All this formed part of the more general debate about social justice and democracy that the war had provoked. By 1942, Nazi visions of a more egalitarian New Order shielding Europe from the capitalist 'plutocracies' had lost any allure they once possessed. It was their opponents who now stood for a fairer future. In France, for example Leon Blum's impassioned defence of the Popular Front during his trial at Riom in 1942 had won him many admirers. Another indication of disaffection with Vichy was de Gaulle's call that November for a 'New Democracy' against the reactionary regime of Petain; by April 1943, the General was talking about the need to introduce state control of economic affairs and social security.

Evidence abounds for the radicalization of ordinary people across Europe living under Nazi rule. 'The last thing we want is a return to the social conditions of 1939 with their economic chaos, social injustice, spiritual laxity and class prejudices,' wrote a young Dutch lawyer in an underground newsletter in 1942. In Greece, inflation and food shortages had led to 'a veritable social revolution' and 'the veering towards the Left of elements of the public who, before the war, were among the most conservative'.

Resistance and underground movements were naturally responsive to this leftwards shift in popular attitudes, partly because many of their leading cadres were drawn from the Left and partly because resistance itself was an exercise in communal solidarity, whose values lent themselves to an egalitarian and morally elevated vision of the post-war world. After Stalingrad, people's minds turned more and more to the future; 'in the heat of the battle, amid the terror of the Gestapo and of Vichy,' proclaimed *La Revue libre* in late 1943, 'essays, political theses, draft constitutions, programmes are springing up almost everywhere, circulating, being read and discussed.' The most unlikely groups

now tried to expound an 'ideology'. It would be a mistake to insist too strongly upon the similarities of resistance ideologies across the continent: after all, resistance groups were fragmented, localized and poorly informed of one another existence; they were drawn from very diverse political and social elements of the population; above all, they were wartime phenomena, with all the flux, uncertainty and ideological confusion which the conditions of the war produced. In Italy, where twenty years of Fascism had made state intervention in socio-economic affairs less of a novelty than in Britain or France, anti-Fascists stressed the themes of justice and liberty above those of planning; in France, faith in *dirigisme* was combined with a fervent patriotism only perhaps matched in Poland. Such differences of emphasis, however, cannot obscure the remarkable convergence of resistance aspirations. Whether interpreted in terms of nationalization of major industries and banks, of state planning through price and production controls, or of vague and unspecified demands for 'social justice', the goal of a fairer and 'socialized' economy was shared by the vast majority of *resistants.* 'Finance is at the service of the Economy,' declared the plan which Émile Laffon placed before the Conseil National de la Resistance in 1943. This was the dream of Keynes and all those who had seen the prospects for economic recovery in the 1930s sacrificed before the altar of the balanced budget.

Slower to respond to the new mood because of their greater distance from events, the exile governments of Europe also shaped their postwar aspirations to take account of the desire for a new domestic order. Norwegian foreign minister Trygve Lie stated that the war 'has made necessary in all countries a national planned economy under the direction of the State'. The Dutch government was rather reluctant to consider what this might mean, but the Belgians, by contrast, quickly set up a Committee for the Study of Postwar Problems committed to the extensive use of 'national planning'; an 'organized national economy' would allow the state to banish mass unemployment. Beneš's government was - rightly - proud of pre-war Czechoslovakia's enlightened social policies but still envisaged the nationalization of banks, insurance companies and heavy industry and the introduction of a 'planned economy'. What best reveals the extent of the wartime acceptance of radical social and economic engineering were the very similar pronouncements of conservative and traditionally inclined Politicians like Poland's General Sikorski, de Gaulle and the Greek Liberal prime minister Tsouderos. They, too, committed themselves to sweeping reforms when the war was over. For social democrats like Benes or Spaak the cause of economic planning and social intervention was scarcely new; but it was the winning over to such ideas of conservative Europeans - and the consequent convergence of Left and Right - which provided one of the preconditions for post-war political stability.

THE INDIVIDUAL AGAINST THE STATE

If one tendency in wartime thought was to stress the evils of pre-war economic individualism and laissez-faire and the need for greater state intervention in the interests of social harmony, another was to argue that the struggle against Hitler had revealed the importance of human and civil rights. In the legal and political sphere, in other words, the trend was to reassert the primacy of the individual vis-a-vis the state. The wartime rehabilitation and redefinition of democracy moved between these two poles.

Occupation raised the question of individual choice in the most direct and inescapable form. Experiencing the terrors of Nazi rule in Poland led the science fiction writer Stanislav Lem to a theory of chance where individual autonomy and power had vanished: it was mere contingency whether venturing out for food led to a premature death, forced labour in the Reich or a loaf of bread. In Yugoslavia, diplomat turned novelist Ivo Andric saw the onset of civil war in terms of the power of historical forces and collective traditions over the individual. In his prophetic prizewinning novel, *Bridge over the River Drina,* five centuries of Bosnian history dwarfed the individual protagonists.

Yet others reached quite different conclusions: faced with the choice between collaboration and resistance, everything boiled down not to fate but to a stark individual decision. In *Uomini e no,* the Italian novelist Elio Vittorini insisted that both resistance and Nazi brutality were the result of human choices. 'He who falls, rises also. Insulted, oppressed, a man can make arms of the very chains on his feet. This is because he wants freedom, not revenge. This is man. And the Gestapo too? Of course! . . . Today we have Hitler. And what is he? Is he not a man?' 'To render myself passive in the world', wrote Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* (1943), 'is still to choose the person I am.' The experience of occupation had a powerful effect on the development of existentialist thought. Sartre denounced the fatalism of his fellow-intellectuals - men like Drieu, Brasillach or even Emmanuel Mounier - who had chosen to collaborate because - they argued - history and destiny had chosen Hitler's Germany as the way of the future. Writing one of his *Letters to a German Friend* in July 1944, Albert Camus argued similarly: 'You never believed in the meaning of this world and therefore deduced the idea that everything was equivalent and that good and evil could be defined according to one's wishes ... I continue to believe that this world has no ultimate meaning. But I know that something in it has meaning and that is man.' To enter into resistance was often a profoundly personal act. What Alban Vistel called the 'spiritual heritage' of the resistance emerged from the sense that Nazi values were an affront to 'the individual's sense of honour'. For many insurgents this was bound up with

the passionate sense of patriotism and their desire for liberty and led them naturally to stress the importance of individual freedom. 'The ideal which motivates us', declared a founder of the French MRP, 'is an ideal of liberation.' Resistance thus demonstrated that collective action could serve to defend individual liberties.

Inside Hitler's Germany, too, the experience of Nazi rule encouraged a revaluation of the role of the individual on a smaller, more restricted and private scale. After the war, the German-Jewish philologist Victor Klemperer would try to explain to his students in the ruins of Dresden that the Third Reich had devalued the meaning of wartime heroism by turning it into part of the propaganda machine of the regime. The teal hero, he went on, had been the lonely individual, isolated and apart from the adulation of the state. Heroes in the Nazi pantheon were borne aloft on a spurious tide of public acclaim; even activists in the anti-Nazi resistance had had the support of their comrades; for Klemperer the model of true heroism had been his non-Jewish wife, who had courageously stood by him through the Third Reich, despite the misery this had brought her, alone and with no support or recognition for her courage.

To religious thinkers, this reassertion of the individual conscience was perhaps the outstanding intellectual development of the war. At the same time as the Church rediscovered its social mission - whether Anglican in Britain, Catholic or Orthodox - so it reasserted the primacy of the human spirit over totalitarian demands for total loyalty to the state. Emmanuel Mounier's flirtation with Vichy, prompted by the desire to pass from 'bourgeois man and the bourgeois Church' led him and other religious reformers into a spiritual cul-de-sac. Pointing to a way out was Jacques Maritain, a fellow Catholic intellectual. Like Mounier, Maritain believed that social reform was urgently needed; but unlike him he argued that it was possible within a democratic context. In *Christianisme et Democratic* (1943), Maritain insisted that the inter-war retreat from democracy could now be seen to have been a mistake: 'It is not a question of finding a new name for democracy, rather of discovering its true essence and of realizing it. . . rather, a question of passing from bourgeois democracy ... to an integrally human democracy, from abortive democracy to real democracy.'

Here in embryo was the source of post-war Christian democracy, at least in an idealized form. In his 1942 work, *Les Droits de I'homme et la loi naturelle,* Maritain developed the idea that the full spiritual development of an individual demanded contact with society. The person existed as an *'open* whole', and found fulfilment not in isolation but in the community. 'I have stressed . . . the rights of the civic person,' wrote Maritain, 'of the human individual as a citizen.' This conception of social responsibility as an individual duty, and of such behaviour as a condition of political freedom, can be encountered among other religious groups as well. Greek Orthodox Archbishop Damaskinos called for less selfishness and a greater sense of solidarity in the face of the famine in Greece. William Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury, cited Maritain approvingly and echoed his call for a generous 'Democracy of the Person' as opposed to an egotistical 'Democracy of Individuals'.

The new emphasis upon the worth of the individual reached beyond the sphere of moral philosophy and religion into that of the law. Starting with Churchill's bold declaration on 3 September 1939 that the war was being fought 'to establish, on impregnable rocks, the rights of the individual', Allied propaganda emphasized the sanctity of rights. 'In the course of World War Two,' wrote the distinguished international lawyer Hersch Lauterpacht,' "the enthronement of the rights of man" was repeatedly declared to constitute one of the major purposes of the war. The great contest, in which the spiritual heritage of civilization found itself in mortal danger, was imposed upon the world by a power whose very essence lay in the denial of the rights of man as against the omnipotence of the State.'

It was all very well, however, to proclaim a crusade in defence of rights but which rights were at issue and for whom? Quincy Wright was reflecting liberal American thought when he hazarded a definition which focused upon civil liberties, equality before the law, and freedom of trade. But others objected that this ignored the new social demands generated by the war. Nazi occupation, according to the Pole Ludwik Rajchman, 'was a process of levelling down entire populations, which creates a psychological atmosphere for compelling authorities, the powers that will be, to accept very far-reaching reforms'. He argued that hundreds of millions of people were 'thinking today in terms of the future exercise of human rights, which cannot but include the right to a minimum standard of social security'. Thus at the outset we find the debate under way between broad and narrow conceptions of human rights: starting during the war, this argument would gain in intensity during the Cold War and after, as the Soviet bloc and the Third World attacked the minimalist view of the Western powers.

The new commitment to rights raised knotty problems of race and empire. In the late 1930s, lawyers had witnessed the development of a body of Nazi jurisprudence which consciously attacked liberal notions of individual autonomy in the name of the interests of the race and the state. Now they argued that anti-Semitism inside Germany had paved the way for the racist ambitions which led to the Nazi conquest of Europe, as well as to the extermination of millions of Jews discussed openly and in detail by Maritain and others by 1943. Yet Western intellectuals - not to mention governments and public opinion - hesitated to make any connection with the ideas of racial

superiority still very much current in their own societies.

Noting that this was 'an ideological war fought in defense of democracy', Swedish Social Democrat Gunnar Myrdal observed that 'in this War the principle of democracy had to be applied more explicitly to race ... In fighting fascism and nazism, America had to stand before the whole world in favor of racial tolerance and cooperation and racial equality.' Some white Americans were increasingly uncomfortable at the hypocrisies involved in fighting Hitler with a segregated army. Black Americans commented upon 'this strange and curious picture, this spectacle of America at war to preserve the ideal of government by free men, yet clinging to the social vestiges of the slave system'. 'The fight now is not to save democracy,' wrote Ralph Bunche, summing up what was probably the dominant view among African-Americans, 'for that which does not exist cannot be saved. But the fight is to maintain those conditions under which people may continue to strive for realization of the democratic ideals. This is the inexorable logic of the nation's position as dictated by the world anti-democratic revolution and Hitler's projected new world order.'

British attitudes were marked by similar hypocrisies. Dudley Thompson, a Jamaican volunteer arriving in England to join the RAF, was asked: 'Are you a pure-blooded European?' George Padmore, the remarkable journalist imprisoned in 1933 by the Nazis for attacking Hitler's racial policies, spearheaded the efforts of the Pan-African movement to force the British to extend their democratic crusade to the empire. Under Churchill, the archetypal romantic imperialist, this was never likely to happen. Hard though it may be now to credit it, the British government actually launched its own Empire Crusade in late 1940 to whip up support for the war. Whitehall's feeble effort to spread a 'dynamic faith' among the public contrasted Nazi efforts to build a 'slave empire' with the British version: 'The British Empire is exactly the opposite. There has been nothing like it in the world before; it is a commonwealth, a family of free nations - linked together by a loyalty to one king. It stands for progress; it is the hope of the future.'

That the Empire Crusade turned out to be a complete flop may tell us something about the attitude of Europeans to their empires. During the war this seems to have been based largely on indifference, at least in Britain and France (though not perhaps in the Netherlands). In all these countries, domestic matters were of much livelier concern than questions of imperial government. The cause of empire beat weakly in British hearts. But so too did anti-imperialism. Most Europeans seemed scarcely aware that any inconsistency was involved in defending human liberties at home while acquiescing in imperial rule overseas. One examines the resistance record in vain for indications of an interest in the predicament of colonial peoples. In Italy, for example, the retention of colonies was a question of *amour propre*. In France, there was much discussion of remodelling the empire but virtually none of dismantling it; the Left more or less ignored the issue, and their silence at the Brazzaville Conference on imperial reform in early 1944 was entirely characteristic. Queen Wilhelmina simply offered to turn the Dutch Empire into a commonwealth which 'would leave no room for discrimination according to race or nationality'. To the Indian Congress Party's demands for British withdrawal, Whitehall countered by arresting Gandhi and offering Dominion status.

To astute and sensitive observers of the Allied war effort, the ambiguity of European attitudes to race was one of the most striking features of the war. The American anthropologist Robert Redfield remarked on how, faced with Nazi theories, democracy had been forced to a 'self-examination' of the inconsistency between what it professed and practised: 'The ideal is now asserted as a program for an entire world - a free world,' Redfield noted. 'And yet the leaders who announce this program are citizens of the countries in which racial inequality is most strongly applied.' Redfield predicted in the future 'a moderate reaction favourable to intolerance' with a 'corre-sponding postponement of the resolution of the inconsistency'. This was not far from the truth: if the war, with its renewed stress on racial equality and human rights, did eventually contribute to the ending of European imperialism, it did not do so automatically: Europeans (and white Americans) remained largely unmoved by the drama of their own racial problems. So long as colonial subjects were willing to fight on their behalf, they had little incentive to alter the structure of power in a radical fashion. But here too, in ways largely invisible to British French, Belgian and Dutch eyes, the war itself was the catalyst of change: Ho Chi Minh continued the struggle he had begun against the Japanese - against the French; Asian, African and Caribbean servicemen - Kenyatta and Nkrumah among them - returned home from fighting in Europe prepared to continue the struggle which had been started against Hitler.

THE NATION-STATE AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER

In 1944 the international lawyer Raphael Lemkin called for the United Nations, by their victory, to impel the Germans to 'replace their theory of master race by a theory of a master morality, international law and true peace'. But it was not only Lemkin who believed that the revival of international law was essential to any future world peace and moral order. The racial basis of Nazi jurisprudence and Germany's abandonment of the accepted principles of international law had been regarded since the late 1930s as among the principal causes of the breakdown of order in Europe. Nazi aggression had undermined

the very existence of an 'international community'. At the same time, Nazi treatment of the Jews persuaded many people that if the individual was to be protected against the state, the traditional doctrine of state sovereignty in domestic affairs would have to be reconsidered. A revival and reinvigoration of international law thus emerged as the natural adjunct to liberal concern for world peace and, in particular, for the safeguarding of human rights.

'Effective international organisation is not possible,' wrote Quincy Wright in 1943, 'unless it protects basic human rights against encroachments by national States.' Wright observed that, unlike Poland or Czechoslovakia, Germany had not been obliged to conclude a minorities treaty with the League of Nations, with the result that 'there was no formal ground on which the League of Nations could protest against the beginning of the persecutions in Germany. It was a general principle that a State was free to persecute its own nationals in its own territory as it saw fit.'

But the protection of human rights required the existence of a body superior to the state to which the individual could have recourse. The Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen insisted that 'a right consists only in the legal possibility to invoke a court . . . [International law] can confer rights on individuals only under the condition that individuals have direct access to an international court.' His colleague Lauterpacht warned that the international protection of human rights 'touching as it does intimately upon the relations of the State and the individual .. . implies a more drastic interference with the sovereignty of the State than the renunciation of war.' But in his aptly named *Peace through Law,* Kelsen argued that only people who believed in a 'theology of the State' refused to recognize the need for all states to be bound by international law. Sovereignty was simply a red herring. 'We can derive from the concept of sovereignty', he went on, 'nothing else than what we have purposely put into its definition.'

The limits of sovereignty, then, reflected political rather than jurisprudential or philosophical considerations. But who was going to make states acknowledge the supremacy of international law? Liberal thought in the inter-war period had reposed its confidence in the pressure of world public opinion to safeguard human rights. It was obvious that a more effective instrument of enforcement would be required in the post-war period. What complicated matters was the Allies' commitment, as enshrined in the Atlantic Charter, to respect traditional ideas of state sovereignty. The post-war state, in other words, was being asked in some measure to acquiesce in its own weakening. Experienced lawyers like Kelsen and Lauterpacht saw no realistic alternative to persuading individual states to make their international obligations a part of domestic law. The alternative was to push for some form of World State, but this they regarded as Utopian.

An equally serious dispute centred on the question of whether the human rights to be enshrined in the new post-war order should be individual or collective. The League of Nations had chosen the latter in its system of protection for ethnic minorities in eastern Europe Yet despite the obvious importance of safeguarding minorities, strong arguments were advanced in favour of demolishing rather than improving the collective-rights approach. President Beneš and the Czech government in exile denounced the League system on the grounds that experience had shown it had actually jeopardized their national security. 'Every protected minority will ultimately find its Henlein,' warned one observer. In addition, the states of eastern Europe resented the fact that they had been singled out for special obligations towards their minorities whereas the Great Powers including Italy and Germany, had not had to suffer such an indignity. 'In the end,' wrote Beneš in 1942., 'things came to such an extraordinary pass that the totalitarian and dictator states - Germany, Hungary and Italy - persecuted the minorities in their own territories and at the same time posed as the protectors of minorities in states which were really democratic' Rather than attempting to restore the League system, Beneš suggested that the post-war approach to minorities should be based upon 'the defense of human democratic rights and not of national rights'.

On top of this east European opposition, the major Allied powers - Britain, France and the United States - also showed little enthusiasm for reviving a system which had succeeded in internationalizing the most serious source of tension in Europe without finding adequate means of resolution. As the post-war settlement in Europe would show, the main interest of the major powers was in limiting their obligations to minor states, and this meant that they too were happy to bury the League's approach to collective rights. The result was that the United Nations' eventual commitment to individual human rights was as much an expression of passivity as of resolve by the Allies. It was a means of avoiding problems, not of solving them. This fact helps us understand why so few of the wartime hopes for a reinvigoration of international law were to be realized.

The wartime desire to limit national sovereignty by inducing states to surrender some of their powers to a higher authority was not confined to matters of law. One of its most striking manifestations as to be found in the vogue for federalism, which approached fever rch around 194c. In a war which many attributed to the cancerous development of national rivalries, the idea of creating international harmony through federation seemed increasingly attractive. A Dutch resistance leader saw 'this war as the great crisis of the "sovereignty of the state". For one English lawyer 'the alternatives are war once in every generation, or federation'.

In both Britain and France such ideas had been much in the air in the late 1930s. The Federal Union movement was founded in 1938 in London and soon proved extraordinarily popular. Its call for a union of democracies was

based on the view that 'no international order based on co-operation between sovereign States will prove either effective or durable since all sovereign States in the last resort seek their own national self-interest'. In his *Federal Europe,* R. W. G. MacKay described 'a system of government for a New European Order, the establishment of which would enable the peoples of Europe to hope with some confidence that in future they might live and work in peace free from the fear of war, want and insecurity'. The spectacular proclamation in the darkest days of June 1940 of an 'indissoluble union' between Britain and France was the culmination of this vein of thought.

Even though that union was never realized, the federalist idea only slowly loft its allure and remained a striking feature of official and unofficialplanningfor the future of Europe. A plethora of map-makers speculatec upon how the continent might be carved up, and though their fantasies varied the federationist principle was common to virtually all of them. Thus an American geographer, in a 1942. article for *Collier's* called 'Maps for a New World' (heralded by the blurb: "Here's a brave new v/orld redesigned for lasting peace - a world from

which war-breeding frictions are gone, where all nations live secure and unafraid, thanks to the new science of political geography') offered Europe carved up into a 'British-Dutch Commonwealth' alongside United States of Fennoscandia', 'Czechopolska', a German-Magyar state and a Balkan Union'. More serious, though scarcely more accurate, was the frontispiece of Bernard Newman's 1943 book, *The New Europe.* This showed a map which divided Europe into West European, Scandinavian, Baltic, German, Central European Balkan and Iberian federations. Only Italy escaped intact.

British and American officials engaged in post-war planning also tended - as they had in 1914-18 - to see federation as an attractive solution to Europe's border problems. Austria, for example, posed British Foreign Office clerks with no less of a dilemma than the Habsburg Empire had done earlier. Few in Whitehall appear to have believed that Austria could survive as an independent state, but even fewer were happy to allow the *Anschluss* to stand: a surrogate empire in the form of Danubian 'integration' was the answer. Reviving the inter-war Balkan Union, and press-ganging Bulgaria into joining it, was an analogous pipe-dream.

Churchill was drawn to the idea of a United States of Europe, envisaging an arrangement by which Britain could exert leadership on a continental scale. From May 1940, US planners for the post-war world came to believe that a new international organization, far from being incompatible with regional or continental unions, would in fact be more firmly based if they were created first. Indeed Newman's 1943 map was very similar to that envisaged by the US State Department in 1940.

At the same time, though, we should keep these schemes in perspec-tive. Federalism diminished in popularity inside and outside govern-ment as the war went on. One reason was the strong hostility of the Soviet Union to arrangements which seemed intended to create anti-Soviet blocs in eastern Europe. Another was the objection of many small countries which - despite the examples of the wartime Czech-Polish and the Greek-Yugoslav alliances - worried about disappearing into a Europe more than ever dominated by the major powers.

Inside continental resistance movements, the idea of Europe stood for an ethical heritage rather than a specific set of politico-economic arrangements. Asserting the existence of common European values was a way of denying the durability of Hitler's New Order. By talking of the struggle as a *European* civil war, the Italian Partito d'Azione set its struggle for a 'democratic revolution' firmly in a continental framework. High school pupils in Paris in 1943 demanded 'a new European order' to take the place of the Nazi order, and insisted that what they had in mind was not a Europe dominated by one hegemonic state, nor an economic and financial network like the Pan-American union, but 'a cultural and moral community which must be trans-formed by the war into a political and social one', *he Franc-Tireur* announced that 'as one regime collapses, another is being born. It arises from the fire of the struggle of liberation and from the icy cold of prisons, with the mass resistance that has sprung up from the French maquis to the Polish plains, from the factories of Milan to the German forced labour camps, from Norwegian universities to the mountains of Bosnia.'

There were some more specific commitments to the ideal of federation. But in general the strength of the commitment was in inverse proportion to the size of the group concerned. The anti-Fascist' Ventotene Manifesto' of August 1941, for example, reflecting the ideas of British federalists, had only limited circulation during the war. Resistance support for federation was rarely at the head of their programme. Hence, the efforts made by some historians to trace the origins of the Common Market back to declarations of the wartime resistance are in the last resort unconvincing, and one could with equal if not greater justice argue that its origins lay with the Nazis: by 1943 many Axis sympathizers were keener 'Europeans' than their opponents. In general, *resistants* remained motivated - as did most Europeans - by considerations of domestic social and economic policy and patriotism, their horizons bounded by the confines of the nation-state.

For at the same time as giving an impetus to federalism, the war had actually increased nationalist sentiment in Europe. Patriotism, after all, was far more important than 'Europeanism' as a motive for resistance. Intelligence reports coming out of Holland in late 1941 noted that 'the population is . . . ardently

nationalistic. There is even reason to fear an intensification of Dutch nationalism. A bloodbath is imminent.' British pride at the country's stand against the Third Reich may help explain why support for federal union faded away as the war ended. France saw a resurgence of the 'idea' of the nation. When Polish resistance groups agreed that 'the Polish Republic will be a member of the federation of free European nations', this was less an expression of federalist faith than a desire to ensure the security of an independent Poland after the war. In traditionally nationalistic countries like Greece, internationalist sentiment never took hold. There, as in Poland, Albania and Yugoslavia, a virtual civil war within the resistance led both Left and Right to insist on its nationalist credentials. In general, conservative and right-wing resisters to the Germans were more hostile to the idea of surrendering national sovereignty than were socialists or Christian Democrats; but even the latter tended to attach greater importance to the cause of reform at home. Federalism remained, in other words, a relatively weak element of the wartime consensus.

THE NEW CONSENSUS: LIMITS AND CONTRADICTIONS

In 1944 the emigre Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek published a small book entitled *The Road to Serfdom*. 'If we take the people whose views influence developments, they are now in the democracies all socialists,' bemoaned Hayek. 'Scarcely anybody doubts that we must move towards socialism.' This prospect he found deeply alarm-ing. Why, he asked, had the West gone to war against Nazism if it was prepared to stamp out freedom at home? *The Road to Serfdom* argued incisively that freedom and what Hayek preferred to call 'collectivism' were incompatible. According to Hayek, the idea of 'democratic socialism' was simply a confusion of terms; any attempt to achieve such a synthesis would tilt society inexorably towards totalitarianism. Those, like H. G. Wells, who argued that economic planning and the protection of human rights could coexist were deluding themselves; planning required dictators and reduced parlia-ment to impotence. Denouncing 'the totalitarians in our midst', Hayek called for people to turn away from the mirage of 'the great Utopia and to return to what he termed 'the abandoned road' of economic liberalism.

Some four decades would pass before Hayek's ferocious polemic succeeded in gaining an influential audience, and then it would become the new bible of the Thatcherite laissez-faire revivalists in their assault on the post-war social order. But in 1944 Hayek was a voice in the wilderness. His insistence that Western planning was equivalent to Soviet collectivism fell on deaf ears, as did his assault upon the notion of democratic socialism. The Austrian neo-liberal tradition found a readier audience in the United States.

Far more in keeping with contemporary European opinion was the expatriate Hungarian-Jewish sociologist Karl Mannheim, who argued (in *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (1940)) the contrary view to Hayek's. For Mannheim, the age of laissez-faire was over. He argued that in a modern industrial society 'there is no longer any choice between planning and laissez-faire, but only between good planning and bad'. In a discussion which anticipated Isaiah Berlin's *Two Concepts of Freedom,* Mannheim insisted that there are different conceptions of freedom, and that the libertarian's insistence upon 'freedom from external domination' leads him to neglect the other forms of 'freedom as opportunity' which certain types of planning create in society. For Mannheim, democracy needed to come to terms with planning if it was to survive; the enemy to beware was not the planner but the bureaucrat. As he puts it: 'The problem of the democratic constitution of a planned society mainly consists in avoiding bureaucratic absolutism.'

In retrospect what is striking is the lack of debate on these issues in most of Europe. The two countries where economic liberalism was most in evidence after 1945 were West Germany and Italy; there, the idea that state planning was associated with totalitarianism had a plausibility borne of bitter experience. Yet not even in those countries could there be a return to Hayek's 'abandoned road'. Elsewhere the principle of state intervention - either for a mixed economy as in western Europe, or for a planned and controlled economy, as in eastern Europe - was accepted with surprisingly little resistance.

Behind this development lay the memory of capitalism's inter-war crisis, the prestige which the Soviet system won in the war gainst Nazism as well as the sense produced by wartime state controls and rationing that state intervention could increase social *fairness*.

It was also questionable whether economic planning was compatible with the new internationalism. It was, after all, the Left and the social reformers who tended to be in favour of *both* abandoning laissez-faire at home, and creating new international institutions with enlarged powers. E. H. Carr, for example, proposed the creation of a European Planning Authority 'whose mission will be nothing less than the reorganization of the economic life of "Europe" as a whole'. With a characteristic blend of realism and idealism, Carr did not blanch at the idea of taking advantage of the 'centralized European authority' that Hitler had established while abandoning the nationalist premises upon which it was based.

But how could national planning, which Carr also advocated, coexist with planning at a continental level ? What if national economic interests did not mesh with those of Europe as a whole? In general, there was little awareness on the Left of such a potential conflict. But here the critique from economic

liberals was penetrating. Hayek insisted that *international* planning was a nonsense:

One has only to visualize the problems raised by the economic planning of even such an area as western Europe to see that the moral bases for such an undertaking are completely lacking. Who imagines that there exist any common ideals of distributive justice such as will make the Norwegian fisherman consent to forgo the prospect of economic improvement in order to help his Portuguese fellow, or the Dutch worker to pay more for his bicycle to help the Coventry mechanic, or the French peasant to pay more taxes to assist the industrialization of Italy?

Hayek insisted that Carr was wrong; such planning could not be democratic in scope, but must always rest on 'a naked rule of force like the Nazi *Grossraumwirtschaft*. Reviewing Carr's book, C. A. Manning enquired: 'If the Nazi way with small sovereign states is indeed to become the common form, what is the war about?' Hayek argued that the notion of European planning implied 'complete disre-gard of the individuality and of the rights of small nations'.

Other liberals agreed with Hayek that international federation was, in principle, desirable. But in their view, it could only remain democratic in so far as it eschewed the idea of supranational planning nd based itself upon the creation of free-trading areas. 'Federal government can only work under a free market economy,' stated von Mises, another Austrian neo-liberal. He suggested that, though it was unlikely to happen, the Western democracies should aim at removing barriers to trade as well as abandoning *etatisme* at home. Rather than pursuing Utopian and unrealizable schemes for 'world planning', politicians should work towards the more modest goal of international economic agreements and regulations. The eminent Italian liberal economist, Luigi Einaudi, was thinking along similar lines. In *Per una federazione economica europea* (For an economic federation of Europe), issued in September 1943, the future President of the Italian Republic advocated free trade and economic federation as a realistic means of bringing harmony to Europe. States, he argued, would not surrender their political independence at a stroke to some new international federation; but they might be prepared to relinquish certain economic powers for the sake of greater security.

In this debate, the liberals were ultimately more successful than they were where domestic reform was concerned. This was partly because they had logic and, for once, political realism, on their side. But it was also because their message had powerful supporters. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull was committed to the cause of free trade; the post-war planners in his department followed his lead and stressed the importance of eliminating economic nationalism in Europe through tariff reduction and the introduction of convertibility. It did not hinder matters that the US also stood to benefit from such policies, finally, the liberal argument won the day not least because the econ-omic planners preferred to exercise power at a national level. As a result, the post-war economic 'miracles' would be based on a delicate blend of *etatisme* at home and liberalization of trade.

UTOPIAS AND REALITIES: THE EXTENT OF THE ACHIEVEMENT

During the war, cautious commentators had warned against Utopian expectations. 'How *new* will the better world be?' asked historian Carl Becker. 'Many people are saying that what we have to do to make a new and better world is to "abate nationalism, curb the sovereign state, abandon power politics and end imperialism,"' he noted, adding, 'Maybe so. But if so, then I think we have an impossible job on our hands . . . Making a new and better world is a difficult business and will prove to be a slow one.'

In England, Mass Observation reported that pessimism at the prospects of any far-reaching change after the war was growing. Following Beveridge, people hoped for full-scale reform but did not believe it would happen. They now believed that post-war unemployment was avoidable but would occur nonetheless. 'I think it will be like after the last war, dreadful unemployment,' said an older man. Increasing cynicism and uncertainty led people to dream of emigrating or living off the land. The return to civilian life provoked a sense of unease and anxiety among soldiers and their families.

Inside occupied Europe, the *'résistants'* expectations of a better future were tempered by the fear that just as their activities and values had emerged during the war, so too they would disappear when the war ended. This uncertainty was evident in Italy where members of the Partito d'Azione worried that the demise of Fascism might lead in turn to the end of anti-fascism. As one put it, '"Antifascist" may one day become as useless and irritating a word as "fascist".' What, then, would happen to the ideals and aspirations of the resistance? Would the world return to power politics and business as usual?

From the resistance perspective, these fears were given added weight as it became clear that political power was slipping from their hands. Across Europe, former resistance leaders were being marginalized as the war came to an end. In Italy, Ferruccio Parri gave way to Alcide de Gasperi in December 1945; in Poland, the Red Army backed the Lublin Committee, who had been parachuted in from Moscow. In France, de Gaulle ordered the demobilization of the Maquis. Across Europe exiles and refugees returned to take power and policies were imposed from above. The most striking case of all was Greece,

where the British-backed royalist government actually fought with the left-wing EAM/ELAS in Athens in December 1944, crushing the main wartime resistance movement there.

We will examine in the next chapter the extent to which pro-Nazi and collaborationist elements in society and the state bureaucracy were purged after the war. In general, however, these purges left intact the same structures of power through which the Germans had ruled Europe: local civil servants, police, business organizations and the press. There may have been good reasons for this, but many former partisans and members of the underground were left with the feeling that they and their cause had been betrayed.

A later generation of historians has echoed their complaint. A recent collection of studies of the experience of women during the war describes what happened as a retreat in peacetime from the gains made during the war itself. We should compare this critique with a very different school of thought which sees the war as a forcing-house for social change. On the surface they appear incompatible; but are they really?

Looking back at the way visions of the post-war world emerged during the struggle against Germany, what must surely strike us is the extent to which a genuine consensus of ideas concerning domestic reform - political, economic and social - was attained and lasted well into the post-war era. Consensus, in other words, was a reality not merely a wartime propaganda myth, as some recent scholars have argued. The Labour government's creation of a National Health service, together with its commitment to educational reform, nationalization and full employment rested upon the studies carried out during the war and survived the changeover of power in 1951. elsewhere in western Europe too the mixed economy and welfare state became the norm, despite stops and starts as liberals tried to halt the growth of public spending or swam briefly against the *dirigiste* current. There was, to some extent, an 'emulation effect' as, for example, France followed the British and Belgian lead in reforming social security. Under Soviet rule, eastern Europe moved towards economic planning and the development of a social security system-given the acceptance of such measures by exile governments during the war, it seems likely that not dissimilar developments would have taken place even without Soviet pressure. Across Europe, in other words, the repudiation of laissez-faire was complete. As a result, the idea of democracy was resuscitated, fitfully and abortively in eastern Europe, but with much greater success in the West.

However, in other areas of reform, advances were less durable. Women's rights had been promoted by resistance movements during the war; this was part of what many regarded as their 'dual war of liberation' - against the Germans and against the 'reactionaries' at home who opposed social reform. Moreover, the war itself had pro-foundly altered traditional gender roles, disrupting family ties and providing women with new tasks and challenges outside as well as inside the home. Liberation did bring some enduring changes, notably the extension of the suffrage in France, Yugoslavia, Greece and other countries where women had formerly been excluded. But just as after 1918, the ending of the war revived more traditional relations between the sexes. Governments tried to get women to withdraw from the workforce and return to the home, both in order to give employment priority to returning servicemen and to encourage the production of babies. In countries like Greece and Italy, this trend was blamed by the Left on capitalism, but as it was also occurring in such uncapitalist environments as Tito's Yugoslavia, other explanations for 'the reassertion of patriarchy' must be sought.

Part of the answer lies in the new post-war pro-natalism, based on the old concerns about the birth rate and population decline - natural enough in the aftermath of the greatest bloodletting in Europe's history. But the answer may also be found in ordinary people's reactions to the war; the feeling of sheer exhaustion after years or fighting, and the desire to retreat from the world of ideological strife contributed to an idealization of domesticity. With this nostalgia for the home, many men and many women looked forward to settling down and starting a family. 'After the war I shall get married and stay at home for ever and ever,' said a twenty-year-old, working on the day shift. 'I'll get right out of it when the war is over,' said another, older married woman. 'Straight out of it. I've been here about fifteen years now. I was married six years ago. I suppose I'll go on for a time till rny hubby gets settled, and then I'll go home and increase the population.' 'For better or worse,' concluded the Mass Observation team, 'the larger number of opinionated women *want* to return to, or start on, domestic life when the war is over.'

In the case of attitudes to race, one can scarcely talk of a retreat from wartime radicalism. European attitudes to race were slowly changing anyway before the war; the war itself appears hardly to have accelerated the process. Anti-Semitism did not disappear from Europe after 1945: to the contrary, it intensified across the continent immediately after the war ended as Jewish survivors returned home to find their property inhabited by others and their goods plundered.

There were also few signs in 1945 that the European powers intended to do anything other than cling on to their colonies. Being subjected to Nazi violence appears to have made them more rather than less inclined to inflict imperial violence of their own: French forces killed up to 40,000 Algerians in the aftermath of the Setif uprising in May 1945, and left perhaps as many as 100,000 dead in Madagascar in 1947. Decolonization, for all the efforts of the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, remained off the European political agenda until forced back as nationalists raised the costs of hanging on to the

colonies. In so far as the European imperial powers had been humiliated by the war and were now overshadowed by the anti-imperialist superpowers, they felt more rather than less inclined to reassert their authority overseas. It was hardly a coincidence that it was the one imperial power which could have been said to have 'won' the war - Great Britain - which first accepted the need for decolonization. The vision of a united Europe flickered on fitfully as the nation-state reasserted itself and adjusted to the exigencies of the Cold War. Early efforts to force the pace led to the creation of such bureaucratic drones as the Council of Europe, a far cry from the idealistic visions of 1943. At the start of the 1950s, the failure of the EDC (European Defence Community) marked the end of the federalist dream for three decades, making NATO rather than any purely European organization the watchdog over the newly sovereign German Federal Republic. There-after, the Europeanists were a chastened but more realistic cohort, following Einaudi's advice and adopting a gradualist programme which, beginning with the ECSC in 1951, led in turn to the Common Market and the European Union.

As to the revival of international law, the realization of wartime dreams was also patchy and unsatisfying. The United Nations' commitment to human rights was as weak as its overall position in power politics. From the doctrinal point of view, human rights were given priority over economic and social rights in the Charter. But in terms of the protection of minorities the UN Charter represented a step backwards from the League. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 did symbolize the new status of the individual in international law, and lasting mistrust of the Nazi doctrine of state supremacy, but it contained no provisions for enforcement and remains little more than a pious wish.

More far-reaching in its implications was the Genocide Convention of the same year - passed after a remarkable one-man crusade by Raphael Lemkin, who had been disappointed at the refusal of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to judge acts committed by the Nazis before 1939. Lemkin and others had seen the war-crimes trials as an opportunity to secure world peace by increasing the powers under international law to take action against individuals as well as states. The Genocide Convention added an important new crime to those recognized under international law, and imposed obligations upon ratifying states to act to prevent or punish its commission. But the Convention's potential has been entirely ignored by the international community and there has been little evidence to back the UN's confident assertion that 'the feeling will grow in world society that by protecting the national, racial, religious and ethnic groups every-where in the world we will be protecting ourselves.' For four decades, a series of genocides went unpunished outside Europe; in 1992. that indifference extended to Europe itself.

7 A Brutal Peace, 1943-1949

Now that the United Nations are beginning to reconquer Europe from the Nazis, the 'democratic' phase of colonial policy comes into effect . . . What (the Europeans) used to refer to with a certain disdain as 'native politics' is now being applied to them.

- Dwight Macdonald, 'Native Polities', 1944'

The Second World War - the culmination of nearly a century of growing violence between the European powers inside and outside the continent - was really several wars in one. It was, first and foremost, a military conflict, fought out by armed forces, prompted by Hitler's imperial ambitions. But it was also a war between races, religions and ethnic groups - a bloody reopening of accounts by extreme nationalists wishing to revise the Versailles settlement by force. Thirdly it was, in many areas west and east, a class war in the broadest sense, whether of landless *braccianti* against pro-Fascist landowners in northern Italy, or poor hill farmers against the urbanites. Finally, as resistance movements burgeoned in 1943-4 and provoked bitter reprisals by collaborationist militias, the war became a civil war of extraordinary ferocity stirred up by German arms and funds whose roots stretched back to 1919, and even - in France - to 1789. This polarized atmosphere was intensified by the approach westwards of the Red Army and eastwards of the Allies.

The death toll of approximately forty million easily outweighed not only the thousands killed in the Franco-Prussian, the Boer or the Balkan wars, but even the millions killed in the First World War and the Russian civil war. The proportion of civilian dead - perhaps half of the total - was far higher than ever before. They included, apart from between five and six million Jews, millions of Poles, Germans Russians and Ukrainians. The war of annihilation in the East was the scene of the greatest slaughter; this was destruction on a different scale and conducted according to different rules, from that experienced in western Europe. British and French military casualties, for instance, were less than one tenth of the enormous German losses. But even these were dwarfed by the Soviet Union, which lost-in addition to well over ten million civilians-three million POWs through starvation, and another 6.5 million men on the Eastern Front.

The intensity of suffering and destruction which struck civilians over six years profoundly transformed European societies. Nazi exter-mination policies had threatened entire ethnic and national groups; much of Poland's military and intellectual elite had perished at German and Russian hands. Policies of genocide were but the most extreme forms of a war which targeted civilians, and the very structure of pre-war society. Reconstruction after 1945 was, therefore, a very different enterprise from that of the 1920s: this time, there could be no thought of going back. Wartime losses tore gaping holes in the social and physical fabric; they provoked bitter memories and angry emotions, but also new challenges and opportunities.

How could conflicts of such intensity stop suddenly in 1945? The German surrender is a convenient marker for historians, but little more. Indeed it is positively misleading in so far as it suggests the ending of one epoch and the start of another. There was, in reality, no Year Zero, no clean break between hot and cold war, and the post-war regimes which emerged in the latter had their roots in the social experiences of wartime. The transition to the post-war era may be said to have begun in 1943, when the Allies invaded Italy and the problems of occupation and reconstruction began. Six years later the division of Europe was almost complete (only Austria and Scandinavia holding out against the tide) and wartime enmities had been transmuted under the pressure of the Cold War. As Nazi occupation gave way to more enduring modes of subordination - the East to the Soviet Union, in the West to the United States - the post-war reinvention of democracy in Europe ceased to be a project defined against the threat of fascism and became instead an arena for Cold War competition. By 1950, the winners had emerged: in the West, anti-communist Social and Christian Democrats, in the East, communist People's Democracies. Each saw the other as the successor to Hitler, themselves as his true opponents. Stalin turned out have been right. 'This war is not as in the past,' he remarked as the war came to an end. 'Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.'

DISPLACEMENT AND SOCIAL CRISIS: 1944-1948

Wars invariably displace populations. But this war had been waged specifically to establish a New Order through extermination, incarceration, deportation and transfer. Hitler had wanted to redraw the ethnographic map of Europe, while Stalin, for his part, also deported hundreds of thousands of class and ethnic 'enemies', including Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Chechens. Germany's defeat brought imprisonment to German POWs and liberation for millions of camp inmates, slave labourers and foreign workers. Although there had been some wartime planning to deal with refugees, the sheer scale of the humanitarian problem took the Allies aback. Those uprooted - through flight, evacuation, resettlement, use as forced labour - numbered some forty-six million in east central Europe alone between 1939 and 1948, dwarfing the refugee movements of the First World War. Some of these movements were temporary and voluntary, but the majority were not. The main reason for them, in retrospect, is clear enough: after the inter-war era's unsatisfactory experience

with minorities in the new nation-states, people were being moved in order to consolidate political boundaries.

Liberation revealed that there were over eleven million Displaced Persons, ten times as many as after the First World War. Some wreaked their revenge on the Germans, looting freely and threatening civilians. On 4 May 1945, for example, Elena Skrjabina watched a group of fellow-Russians loot the German house she was staying in. They burst in and threatened the owner with a revolver, accusing him of being a Nazi and a 'Hitlerite'. 'They dispersed through the house, telling us that German property by right should go over to them ... In about half an hour it was impossible to recognize the house. All the trunks and suitcases had been smashed, the closets were wide open, and our countrymen were disappearing down the path with huge sacks on their backs.' The DPs had borrowed a Nazi phrase for this sort of behaviour: they called it 'organizing'.

Having being forcibly removed from their homes and exploited and humiliated in Germany, these *Ostarbeiter* were not inclined to show much respect for property or person. In time, they were to become a considerable headache for the occupation authorities. Yet there were surprisingly few acts of revenge. The overriding priority of most DPs was to return quickly to home and family. In the summer of 1945 the roads of Europe were packed with long lines of civilians straggling out of Germany in all directions. By the autumn most had left Germany; UNRRA alone had helped some six million. Yet 1.5 million remained in DP camps and as late as June 1947 the camps still housed around half a million who were unwilling for various reasons to go back.

Some repatriations, however, were far from voluntary. Under the terms of the Yalta agreement, the Allies were bound to hand over all Soviet citizens to Stalin. It is arguable that they had little choice in this matter, since they were anxious to secure those of their own POWs who had fallen into Russian hands during the Red Army's advance. Indeed, this was the main reason why Russian NKVD personnel were permitted to establish interrogation centres to screen Soviet repatriates. As fears of post-war communism spread, increasing numbers of east Europeans in Allied-occupied Germany resisted repatriation. One year after VE-Day these included 380,000 Poles, 115,500 Yugoslavs and 187,000 Balts, among them collaborators and former members of Waffen-SS and other German detachments. Eventually, they would profit from the anti-communist mood of the late 1940s and be allowed under special programmes to emigrate to Britain, the Commonwealth and the USA.

As for Jewish survivors, they too by and large proved unwilling or unable to go back: their pre-war homes were generally occupied by others, their possessions gone. In fact the numbers of Jewish refugees swelled after the war, as around 220,000 Jews from eastern Europe moved westwards. Anti-Semitic pogroms in Poland during 1946, with dozens of dead, accelerated this movement; Zionist organizations assisted it. West European anti-Semitism barred doors to Jewish DPs that were opened to Baits and East Europeans. Thus the numbers of Jewish refugees on the continent continued to increase until 1948 when the creation of the state of Israel and the US Displaced Persons Act allowed most of them to leave Europe. Half a million Palestinian Arab refugees during the 1948 Israeli-Arab War paid the price for Europe's reluctance to absorb its diminished Jewish population. Europe itself became less central to Jewish life, and the striking intensification of anti-Semitism after 1945 suggested that while the Germans might have carried out the genocide, its socio-economic and cultural repercussions were exploited more widely across the continent.

Not surprisingly, feelings of intense bitterness and 'morbid hatred' against the Germans were widespread when the war ended. As late as 1948, a traveller to Holland observed that 'the Dutch do not even want to hear the word "Germany", since the Germans had caused them so much grief during the war'. In eastern Europe, where the threat posed by sizeable German minorities to the new nation-states had just been amply demonstrated, the mood was vengeful. The two largest minorities in inter-war Europe had been the Germans and the Jews, and their fates turned out to be intertwined in more ways than one. Once the Jews had been important transmitters of German culture in eastern Europe; now their mass murder became the prelude to the destruction of German life outside Germany. For the war did not only lead to the Final Solution of the Jewish Question; it led, in a different way, to the ending - or at least the transformation - of Europe's German Question too. This too was Hitler's legacy. His dream of consolidating *Deutschtum* was realized in a nightmarish fashion, and tolerated by the Allies in the interests of ethnic homogeneity and future security in Europe. The issue which had triggered off the Second World War was definitively, if brutally, solved through the largest single refugee movement in European history. In 1944-5, five million Germans fled from the eastern parts of the Reich in the face of the Red Army. Between 1945 and 1948, post-liberation regimes in Czechoslovakia Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Hungary expelled another seven million members of their German minorities. It would not be too much to say that in western no less than in eastern Europe, the memory of this violent convulsion has, until very recently, been almost entirely repressed. Yet its effect upon Germany's place in Europe was at least as profound as that country's division, and perhaps - in the long run - more important still.

The first phase of panic and flight in the face of the advancing Red Army occurred between the autumn of 1944 and the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. Hundreds of thousands of Germans fled East Prussia by land and sea;

later they were followed by others from Silesia and Pomerania. Mass rapes and massacres at the hands of the Red Army created a widespread atmosphere of terror. 'The Russians entered every shelter, cellar and basement, and under menaces, demanded and took watches, rings and other valuables,' ran a report from Danzig in early 1945. 'Nearly all the women were raped - among the victims were old women of sixty and seventy-five and girls of fifteen or even twelve. Many were raped ten, twenty or thirty times.' Those who did not flee were thrown into labour or detention camps and deprived of their possessions. Many were forced to wear marks of identification - first large painted swastikas on their clothes, then badges. In these ways, the German population was collectively paid back for the racial humiliation which Nazi policies had inflicted earlier upon the *Untermenschen*.

In Czechoslovakia, following liberation, hatred of the Germans was widespread, especially as many seemed unrepentant and 'sullen and dangerous'. President Benes had already won Allied support for his plans to expel the 'disloyal' among them, but expediency rather than justice turned out to be the motive for what followed. In Brno, for instance, on 30 May 1945, young National Guards expelled the town's entire German population, roughly 25,000 people, and herded them towards the Austrian border. Discriminatory measures such as being banned from public transport, or being made to wear 'badges of defeat', added pressure on those that remained. By July 1945, several million Germans had fled or been expelled from their homes and driven into camps or herded across the border. In part, this was an act of revenge by the east Europeans for their sufferings of the previous six years; but we should not ignore the fact that running parallel with this popular anger was a more carefully thought-out official policy by the new authorities in the region. 'We must expel all the Germans,' the Polish communist Gomulka emphasized, 'because countries are built on national lines and not on multinational ones.'

At Potsdam, the nature of this policy became clearer. The Allies accepted the principle of the mass expulsion of millions of Germans, including not just *Volksdeutsche* but also those who were citizens of the pre-war Reich, now living under Soviet or Polish occupation. The Allies' primary concern was to control the flow of refugees so that they could be received properly in Germany itself. Thus a temporary suspension of the transfers was agreed. In fact, the expulsions continued, especially from the former Reich territories now administered by Poland. Only during the winter of 1945-6 were more 'orderly transfers' arranged; but by then the temperature had dropped and many died in the cattle cars which brought the refugees westwards. In all, some twelve to thirteen million Germans were 'transferred', by far the largest such population movement in European history. The numbers who died en route must have been at least in the hundreds of thousands; some sources put the final tally as high as two million. The disappearance through expulsion or killing of east Europe's Germans and Jews formed part of a still vaster process of demographic turbulence and instability in the wake of the war. More than seven million refugees from other ethnic groups (mostly Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Ukrainians and Balts) were evicted from their homes and resettled. The result was the virtual elimination of many minorities eastern Europe - falling from 32 per cent to 3 per cent of the population in Poland, 33 per cent to 15 per cent in Czechoslovakia, from 28 per cent to 12 per cent in Romania. The German *Volk* was now more closely aligned with the boundaries of the (divided) German state; so, too, the Ukrainians. War, violence and massive social dislo-cation turned Versailles's dreams of national homogeneity into realities.

A total of close to ninety million people were either killed or displaced in Europe between the years 1939 and 1948. Adding together military and civilian casualties, POWs and civilians forced to move whether permanently or temporarily from their homes during and after the war, we find that these groups amounted to no less than half the total population in extreme cases such as Germany or Poland, but even to one person in five in the case of comparatively less afflicted countries like France. In Poland's Western Territories well over half the population by 1950 comprised recent settlers and migrants from other regions. Here were, in embryo, the origins of the 'new reality of an integrated national community being formed in the crucible of socialist change', which Polish sociologists analysed in the post-war period.

We cannot hope to understand the subsequent course of European history without attending to this enormous upheaval and trying to ascertain its social and political consequences. The years of Nazi occupation, followed by the chaos of the immediate post-war period, had sundered human ties, destroyed homes and communities and in many cases uprooted the very foundations of society. The thousands of ruined buildings, mined roads and devastated economies were the most visible legacy of these years; but alongside the physical destruction were more intangible wounds which lasted well after the work of reconstruction had been completed. Changing moral and mental perspectives changed individual behaviour, and thence society and politics.

One of the most obvious of these changing values was the erosion of respect for property rights. Put simply, across much of central and eastern Europe a lot of people ended up living in other people's homes and enjoying their goods. Much of the Germans' property, as had that of their victims before them, passed abruptly into the hands of new owners. The expulsions - not unlike the earlier deportations of the Jews - provoked a 'lust for booty' on the part of onlookers. 'The German peasant had scarcely left his farm and house and been taken off to the station by the police, when robbery and plunder were in full

swing,' recalled an ethnic German from Hungary. 'Former have-nots were stealing by day and night. A rabble would arrive from the town in lorries and plunder everything that came to view and that they could lay their hands on. There were bandits too among the police.' Just as there had been, of course, a few years earlier among the German police battalions and Waffen-SS units stationed in eastern Europe.

Places changed their identity and composition. Towns reverted from their German to their Polish, Czech or Hungarian names. Across eastern Europe, synagogues, mosques, Lutheran and Uniate churches were bulldozed, or converted to secular use, becoming barns, stables, warehouses or, later on, cinemas. Those houses which were not rendered unsafe by the wholesale looting stood vacant until new owners moved in. Owing largely to the initial plundering of unoccupied buildings, many areas of settlement remained deserted for many years. The town of Glogau, for example, met a fate shared by others in Silesia: its pre-war population of 33,500 had shrunk to some 5,000 by the early 1960s. 'To all intents and purposes Glogau no longer exists,' reported a visitor in i960. 'Here a grotesque looking ruin, there a deep hole, then a hillock overgrown with sparse grass.' Even in 1966 the population of the city of Wroclaw was only 477,000 - only three quarters the 1939 size of its former incarnation, Breslau.

In Poland, because there were often too few settlers to replace the expelled Germans and Uniates, the local authorities advertised for newcomers. We read for example, from a 1953 brochure entitled 'Moving to New Farms', how an early settler was told that 'in the county of Rzeszow, in the district of Sanok, you'll find land in abundance, houses and barns; and if you think it sounds too good to be true, anyone can check it out with his own eyes and the railway will cost him nothing.' Sanok lay in a formerly Greek Catholic area, depopulated since the population transfers of 1945 and the anti-Partisan sweeps of 1947. The role of officials in directing this violent exchange of property made its mark on popular attitudes towards authority. Nazi rule had already left many people with the feeling that force was all that mattered. Now they saw, and indeed participated in, the forceful expulsion and looting of fellow-villagers or townspeople under the eyes of the new political authorities. Partisans, policemen and the courts all partook of the opportunities. This experience confirmed a widespread growing cynicism about politics which fed apathy and conformity and undermined efforts to challenge the holders of power. For the new authorities and their Soviet backers, no small part of the rationale for the expulsions was to purchase political popularity and, more pertinently, to expand the level of political dependency. By distributing Jewish possessions to their non-Jewish neighbours, the Nazis had created a web of complicity that weakened resistance; after 1945, the expulsion of the Germans allowed Communist officials to follow a similar strategy. Thus considerations of social justice and national security were often a cover for more practical concerns. The new settlers were beholden to the regime for their new station in life; uncertain of the validity of their legal claims to their new homes, anxious for protection against those families who tried to get their property back, they were from the outset a dependent class.

FAMILY AND MORALITY

Derrick Sington, one of the very first British soldiers to enter Belsen, had noted how 'in the summer of 1945, after the terror of starvation and the gas chamber had been lifted, the thoughts of those thousands of survivors, healthy enough to reflect and hope, turned to the wives or sisters, parents or children, who had been snatched from them months and even years before'. They sent letters, and relatives started turning up. The British initially sent a car through the camp with a loudspeaker calling out lists of sought-for people; then they began to compile a central registry.

Wartime and post-war displacement broke up innumerable families across the continent. By 1947 there were some 50,000 orphans in Czechoslovakia. In Yugoslavia the estimate was closer to 280,000 and at least 10,000 children had survived the war hiding in the woods in conditions of complete destitution. In Holland, some 60,000 children required help, including those of imprisoned collaborators; in Bucharest there were 30,000 homeless. UNRRA was caring for some 50,000 unaccompanied children in Germany alone, many of whom had forgot-ten who they were or where they came from. Tracing services were quickly set up by the Red Cross, national governments and UNRRA. The Central Tracing Bureau employed interviewers and researchers in twenty countries, while the US Central Location Index eventually contained more than one million entries. For years afterwards, national radio and press services carried long lists of missing persons. But the number of individuals reunited with relatives was always outweighed by the number of those still untraced. UNRRA, for example, in its first year was able to solve only about one sixth of its cases. As late as July 1948, over 4,000 children being cared for by the UN as displaced persons were still unidentified.

Studies of war orphans revealed a range of traumas which many had suffered as a result of their experiences. The children were depressed, unduly serious for their age and highly nervous. They seemed cynical, despondent and distrustful of authority. To many it seemed that the war had produced a generation of anti-idealists. 'We have to realize,' one young Czech woman told an English friend, 'that the occupation produced cowards as well as heroes. During the years when young people were growing up, morals were inverted; evil was

often shown to be more profitable than good and lies more profitable than truth. Those who grew used to whispering cannot speak out naturally now; they either shout or whisper ... It is not easy to expel fear from the hearts of the people from the Continent.'

Orphaned children were suspicious of signs of affection and prone to violence, often dangerous. Their 'emancipation from the rule of moral law' might manifest itself in crime, in sudden, uncontrollable rages or in brutality towards younger or weaker children. But their casual attitude towards violence also revealed itself in play. English nurses were astounded at the strange behaviour of a group of Jewish children who had survived the camps. Living in a self-contained world which excluded all outsiders, they appeared to expect no assistance or support from grown-ups. If a child went missing from the group, the others would say, quite matter-of-factly: 'Oh, he is dead.' Many such patterns of behaviour were eventually overcome by sustained attention and love. There were relatively few psychoses, as a result of wartime experiences, among either children or adults observed; the majority of problems - such as the sexual difficulties experienced by many former partisans as a result of the enforced abstinence of the war years - seem to have disappeared with time. In the longer term, it seems that the psychological impact of wartime suffering upon survivors and their children depended heavily upon the interpretation that could be placed upon that suffering - Holocaust survivors (who found it hard to heroize their experiences) and former political prisoners (for whom this was easier) thus found themselves in different situations. In the short term, such differences were less apparent and one can see how the emotional attitudes reported in wartime survivors underlay some broader social and political responses among the population at large.

Cynicism towards authority and a concomitant willingness to get by were especially evident, for obvious reasons, in the ravaged lands of eastern Europe. A Polish writer summed up the mood: 'The Bolsheviks are in the country, the Communists are in power, Warsaw is burned to the ground, the legitimate London government is abandoned. Nothing worse can happen to us, we lost the war and should look after ourselves.' In 1972, another observer of the Polish scene remarked upon the 'demoralization left in the wake of the brutal occupation of World War II'; among the results were 'present-day cynicism' and 'a heightened yearning for material goods and gadgets, rather than for more idealistic values'.

Even in countries less devastated than Poland, the war's end was welcomed by many people as a chance to leave behind the madness of a world torn apart by political struggle. In Germany, Franz Neumann summarized the popular mood as 'the deliberate rejection of politics and parties, ironic and sarcastic attitudes towards Nazism, denazification, democracy and anti-fascism and concentration on finishing one's education as speedily as possible, and on a position, money and consumer goods'. The greatest believers turned into disillusioned cynics. 'He who loves unduly a god, forces others to love him, ready to exterminate them if they refuse,' wrote Romanian emigre Emil Cioran in his manifesto of pessimistic indifference, *Précis de décomposition,* in exile in France in 1949-the same Cioran who had worshipped Hitler and Codreanu in the 1930s with messianic fervour for their 'cult of the irrational'.

After 1945, then, politics turned into something to be endured, while intimacy and domesticity became more important than ever as stabilizing factors in people's lives. Elio Vittorini's classic novel of reconstruction in post-war Italy - *Le donne di Messina,* first published in 1949 - describes a world in which ideology has lost its magical powers of persuasion and the search for privacy beckons. The need for human warmth extends to Uncle Agrippa, whose entire life is spent on trains passing up and down the country looking for his daughter, and to the anti-hero, Ventura, once a Fascist fanatic and an ideologue, now rooted to the land and his lover, desperately keeping his past at bay.

It was the family, above all, which became a refuge from wartime and post-war anxieties. 'As in an experiment,' noted the anthropologist Vera Erlich, 'the tendency to preserve family life became evident among the survivors of German concentration camps.' Erlich noted the speed with which these people sought not casual affairs but marriage. 'With marriage they changed completely. Only then did they begin to return to life.' Affection and intimacy were thus essential in reviving the self-described 'ghosts' after their return from captivity. Erlich observed: 'When a child was born to them, many found some mental equilibrium. Their passionate desire for married life had appeared spontaneously, as had their wish to have children. To the babies they showed extreme tenderness, and even tended to pamper and spoil them.' The more troubling psychological consequences of this sort of relationship between camp survivors and their children often only emerged ten or twenty years later. This new attachment to the family did not appear only among survivors of the camps. It was very widespread, and contributed in no small part to the remarkable and almost entirely unforeseen baby boom of the post-war period. As a result of the new upward trend, which had begun in many countries even during the war, the gloomy prognoses of population decline, so commonplace in the West before 1939 and still encountered into the 1950s, turned out to be unfounded.

The results of wartime and post-war dislocation and upheaval were therefore paradoxical. On the one hand, in many countries the new political authorities were confronted with a *tabula rasa* upon which to imprint their own social vision. To this end they could count upon the support of a radicalized

population that had moved to the Left during the war and demanded reform and reconstruction. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the overwhelming feeling was one of exhaustion. 'We are tired out by History,' wrote an eminent Greek novelist, 'tired and uneasy.' In Sarajevo in 1946, the writer Ivo Andric observed the exhausted faces and white hair of prematurely aged passers-by. Weary of conflict, suspicious of ideology and politics, people wished to remake and sometimes retreat to a secure private world of family stability and adequate living standards.

The outcome was a popular mood which was both radical and conservative at the same time. People looked forward to building a new world, but they did not wish this process to be disruptive. Hence an underlying propensity, once the anger and excitement of the first moments of liberation had worn off, to opt for social calm. In eastern Europe, the extraordinary turmoil of the years from 1939 to 1948 was an important factor, therefore, in helping understand popular adaptation to the imposition of communist rule. But in western Europe, too, one sees how the social and psychological consequences of the war years laid the foundations for a social consensus based upon commitment to welfare, mass consumption and the recovery of the family.

THE POLITICS OF OCCUPATION, 1943-1945

In May 1943 Anthony Eden advised the British war cabinet that the only alternative to total Russian domination of eastern Europe at the end of the war was to create an 'inter-Allied Armistice Commission', with a rotating presidency. Through this the Big Three would determine policy jointly towards the territories which fell under their control. The Russians welcomed Eden's idea. So when, a few months later, they learned that they were being shut out of Allied negotiations for an Italian surrender, they protested forcefully. In Stalin's words: To date it has been like this: the USA and Britain reach agreement between themselves while the USSR is informed of the agreements between the two powers as a third party looking passively on. I must say that this situation cannot be tolerated any longer. Churchill, however, signed the Italian armistice terms before replying. Allied actions spoke louder than words: by the autumn of 1943, before the Red Army had pushed the Wehrmacht back into Europe, it had been made clear that there were limits to the extent of Big Three cooperation. As Italy was the first ex-combatant to drop out of the war, a precedent had been set.

How conscious were the Allies of the implications of the Italian armistice for cooperation with the Russians? The Americans, in so far as they devoted much thought to post-war Europe, shied away from anything that smacked of power politics and preferred to envisage European problems being solved amicably through the new post-war United Nations Organization which they hoped to create. On the other hand, they expected to demobilize rapidly when the war ended, a prospect which necessarily undermined the persuasiveness of their arguments.

The likelihood of being left alone without American support concentrated minds in Whitehall: idealism was a luxury the overstretched British could ill afford. De Gaulle offered a potential prop for London in post-war Europe. But even if an Anglo-French understanding materialized, the fact of overwhelming Russian power remained. Hence, the British Foreign Office attached much importance to ascertaining Russian wishes, and was prepared, if necessary, to acquiesce in Soviet domination of eastern Europe. 'It is better that Russia should dominate Eastern Europe than that Germany should dominate Western Europe,' was the superbly ruthless calculation of Sir William Strang in May 1943."

As for the Soviet Union, this was far from planning the swift takeover of Europe which Cold War warriors came to fear. Rather, its post-war planners envisaged a 'breathing spell' of decades in which time the borders of 1941 would be confirmed and wartime devastation made good, Germany would be nullified as a threat, and the USSR, would become 'a centre of gravity for all truly democratic medium-sized and small countries, particularly in Europe'. European stability would be assured preferably by continuing the wartime Grand Alliance, and if not by at least exploiting the rivalries that were believed likely to emerge between the USA and the UK.

There was thus much common ground between the Big Three and while the war was on, the understanding between them remained intact. When Stalin broke off relations with the Polish government in exile, the weak Allied response can only have encouraged him to assume that he had their support for his efforts to ensure a pro-Soviet regime in Poland after the war. Was there not then, at the highest levels, a tacit quid pro quo here regarding Poland and Italy? At the Teheran conference at the end of 1943, the Allies agreed to shifting Poland's borders westwards, a move which astute observers realized must inevitably turn Poland into a client state of the Soviet Union since it meant taking territory from Germany. By 1944, Strang's precept seemed to be underlying Western policy towards Poland, at least.

Once the British and Americans decided not to invade the Balkans from the Mediterranean, it became clear that nothing could stop the Red Army's march into eastern Europe. During the Romanian armistice negotiations in September 1944, the British and American ambassadors to Moscow watched silently as Molotov agreed terms with the Romanian delegation which gave the Soviet High Command sweeping political powers in the occupied country. The following month Anglo-Soviet talks in Moscow allowed Churchill and Stalin

openly to discuss spheres of influence. The two men's so-called Percentages Agreement, followed by some surreal bargaining between Eden and Molotov, clarified the balance of power in the region: Stalin s demand for a free hand in Romania was balanced by British control in post-war Greece. Soviet predominance was also conceded in Hungary and Bulgaria. We should not, however, make the mistake of assuming that the Great Power carve-up of the continent was necessarily intended at this stage to be comprehensive. There could be little doubt by the end of 1944 about Soviet intentions in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, just it was obvious that Stalin was conceding Italy to the Allies and following Churchill a free hand in Greece, where British fighter planes were strafing suburbs of Athens in order to defeat a communist-led uprising. Yet in Hungary, Stalin's tactics were very different and intended to form a reassuring contrast with Soviet policy towards Poland. In both France and Italy, the Communist Parties - which had accumulated considerable military power as a result of their leading role in the resistance - were under strict instructions to pursue a legalist policy. In Italy, the result was that the PCI agreed to support the largely discredited monarchy ahead of most other parties. By December, Communist Party secretary Togliatti was one of two vice-presidents in the government and more insistent than ever – in view of the rift which had opened up in Greece between the Left and the British - upon abstaining from revolutionary temptation.

The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe - with its promise of a dawning era of liberty and democracy - must be evaluated in the light of this emerging Great Power understanding. Just prior to Yalta Roosevelt had indicated that: 'The Russians had the power in Eastern Europe, that it was obviously impossible to break with them and that, therefore, the only practicable course was to use what influence we had to ameliorate the situation.' Yalta's lofty commitment to free elections across the continent could hardly be squared with the real-politik of the Percentages Agreement of three months earlier, when Stalin and Churchill secretly carved up eastern Europe into spheres of influence. None of the Big Three could have believed that Yalta would have much effect upon Soviet attitudes towards Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, countries which Stalin regarded as keys to Russian security. Strikingly, both the Polish communists and their opponents interpreted Yalta as a victory for Stalin. By the spring of 1945, the Red Army was rounding up and deporting thousands of Home Army guerrillas, forcing others into the forests to take up arms. At the same time, the Polish Workers' Party launched an immense and highly successful recruitment drive to build up a mass base. Thus in Poland, as in Romania and Bulgaria, the twin bases of Soviet domination - massive repression of the opposition combined with membership drives into local Communist Parties - were in evidence even before the German surrender.

Yet in 1945 we are still some way from the polarization of three years later. In Poland itself communist tactics shocked Western public opinion and provoked forceful if largely ineffectual protests from Churchill and Roosevelt. Moreover, the spheres of influence tacitly confirmed at Yalta left much of Europe untouched. Austria, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania and eastern Germany formed what Geir Lundestad has called Moscow's 'middle sphere'. In this area Stalin could not count upon Western toleration, nor indeed was he convinced that countries like Yugoslavia or Hungary were ready for revolution. So keen were the Russians to play the parliamen-tary game according to the rules in 1945 in the areas outside their own sphere of influence that in at least two cases - Austria and Finland - Communist Parties entered elections, did poorly and were effectively marginalized from politics.

The future of Germany remained the key issue. It would be quite inaccurate to assume that partition was a foregone conclusion as early as 1945. On the contrary, the Big Three were all genuinely committed to preserving the unity of the country. Thus when the war finally ended and Europeans began to tackle the problems of social and political reconstruction, they found themselves in a situation of grow-ing tension but not deadlock between the Powers. Nor, in 1945, was polarization common in domestic affairs. Across Europe coalition governments were the norm, pledged to embark upon the sweeping socio-economic reforms required for a renovation of parliamentary democracy. For later generations, the years 1945-6 came to represent a moment of promise, before the Iron Curtain dropped.

A NEW START?

On 18 September 1944 the first High Court trial of a collaborator in Rome was disrupted when a key witness, Donato Carretta, former director of the city's main prison, was attacked in the courtroom. Spectators, led by a woman whose son had been shot by the Germans a few months earlier, seized Carretta and amid shouts of 'Paris, let's imitate Paris!', dragged him out of the building and eventually killed him - His battered body was left hanging, by the feet, outside his former prison.

All over Europe, the withdrawal of the Germans left large numbers of people vulnerable to the charge of collaboration or treachery. Their existence was a shameful reminder of the Nazi New Order; their removal from public life - sometimes from life itself - seemed vital to establish a break with the past. Occupation had revealed disturb-ingly deep fault-lines in the unity of the European nation. It was hard to imagine a genuine democracy flourishing anew without the punishment of its enemies, hard too to see a revival of

independent nation-states without their purification of those who had betrayed them to a foreign power. However, the legal anarchy and diffusion of power which characterized the first days of liberation allowed a number of very different conceptions of punishment to emerge.

The first was that evident in the death of Carretta - a spontaneous, popular demand for revenge which manifested itself in instant executions, lynchings and public humiliations. Emerging out of the internecine war of 1943-4, this vengeful mood was most evident in countries like Italy, France and Belgium, which had seen high levels of repression by collaborationist squads under German rule. In Italy, above all, liberation offered a chance to turn the tables on two decades of Fascist domination. One partisan recalled an episode where 'a guy who'd been made to drink castor oil seized a Fascist and told him: Now you go home and don't appear in the village for a week." And he did. They did to the Fascists what they had done to them for twenty years. But often the mood was more violent and attacks upon snipers soon turned into a wider wave of killings. In Bologna 'the people . . . roamed the streets on their hunt' and 'justice was meted out with a certain freedom to anyone in trouble with the partisans . . . Some people certainly paid for personal animosities or for quarrels over women.'

The random and brutal nature of such killings served in the long run to help discredit the whole idea of punishing collaborators at all; but in the short run they raised the spectre of outright civil war and prompted resistance movements to intervene and assert their own authority.

The second response, then, was that of the organized resistance which steered a difficult course between the passions of its rank and file and the restraint and legalism of its leadership. During the fighting, resistance movements had singled out collaborators for 'liquidation'-their commitment to punish traitors after the war was one of their main weapons in demoralizing their opponents. In France, for example, the Conseil National de la Resistance instructed its local leaders to prepare 'immediate measures to purge and neutralize traitors'. Of course, defining involvement in Vichy as treason also helped to assert the legitimacy of the de Gaulle government in the eyes of the Allies. But the resistance was well aware of the need to control the 'people's desire for revenge'. The ad hoc field courts martial which partisans throughout Europe had employed during the war persisted into the first weeks of liberation; in addition, they set up rudimentary internment camps to secure and sometimes protect suspected collaborators from mob justice. Inside the resistance itself there were bitter disputes about what sort of justice to mete out. Thus, from northern Italy: 'Some partisans said it would be better to chuck a pair of grenades into the room where the prisoners were kept and exterminate them there and then, but the commander and others decided to send the prisoners to the prisons at Rovigo for a regular investigation.'

Within a decade of the end of the war, anti-communist accounts of this phase would talk darkly of the excesses of *résistentialistne,* and the horrors of 'class justice'. This was sheer exaggeration. 'It was astonishing that the Liberation happened as it did,' the wartime SOE (Special Operations Executive) agent Francis Cammaerts reminds us. 'All you hear about is shaving women's heads, personal vendettas and so on. But I had a lieutenant who came up to me and said: "I've got 300 German prisoners. What do the international conventions say about how much food and exercise they are entitled to every day? And those were Germans who had strung up resisters and their families. There was something extraordinarily civilized about the Liberation.' However, it is true that an aura of shame surrounded the whole subject (which resistance organizations mostly preferred to forget) and the number of dead in the first wave of purges was cerrtainly high in comparison with the slower pace of official justice that followed-perhaps 10,000-15,000 victims in Italy during 1943-6, 9,000-10,000 in France (with another 40,000 or so held in detention). The third source of power, which eventually asserted itself over these 'improvisations of authority' (in de Gaulle's phrase), was that of the new political authorities returning from exile, backed up by some degree of foreign recognition. Here the desire for revenge was milder, the concern with public order and due process of law stronger. In many countries tensions quickly emerged between the slow pace of official justice and popular expectations. This was true, especially while the war was still going on, for both the Allied-backed Italian government, whose relationship with Fascism remained equivocal, and even for the Free French, whose modest initial efforts to try Vichy officials in Algiers in late 1943 led to harsh criticism inside France. But by 1945-6 a pattern was beginning to emerge. Coalition govern-ments responded to the call for a new start by embarking upon sweeping judicial investigations of collaborators with show trials of senior politicians, writers and actresses. (Businessmen usually got off lightly.) Multi-tiered systems of courts were established and new crimes were defined where necessary. Yet few trials ended with severe punishment, and by 1946 disillusionment with the whole process was growing in certain sectors of society. The first amnesty laws were introduced, to be followed by others. By the early 1950s, most judicial investigations had been wound down. In Norway, for example, the entire membership of the pro-Nazi Nasjonal Samling - some 55,000 people - was brought for trial. But few of these were sentenced to more than five years in jail. Only twenty-five death sentences were carried out and by 1957 the last life Prisoner had been released. In the Netherlands, over 200,000 cases were investigated, resulting in some forty death sentences actually carried out. Again, most prisoners were released by the early 1950s. Although French courts tried

over 300,000 cases, and sentenced over 6,700 to death, the actual numbers executed or jailed were relatively low. A series of amnesties reduced the numbers in prison from 29,000 in 1946 to fewer than 1,000 in 1954. Much more important in France and elsewhere was the loss of full citizenship rights: the charge of 'degradation nationale' or 'incivisme' was important in symbolically distancing post-war regimes from the memory of collaboration and reaffirming the democratic essence of the nation. . Even more fraught with ambiguity were the purges of state adminis-trations, police forces and armies. On the one hand, new political elites desired to govern on the basis of post-Fascist principles; on the other, they needed to ensure effective and orderly government as rapidly as possible to cope with the horrendous socio-economic prob-lems which the Nazis left in their wake. In Italy, or for that matter Austria, the impracticability of a clean sweep was obvious. By July 1946, Chancellor Figl was telling the Allies that the Austrian administration was now 'free of the National Socialist spirit'; some 70,818 out of 299,000 civil servants had been dismissed - not enough for anti-Nazis, too many for the bulk of the population. In Italy, the violence of the initial 'wild purges' led to an even swifter backlash: the administrative purges were wound down as early as the autumn of 1945. Only 6,500 out of 850,000 civil servants were dismissed in France, mostly in the Interior Ministry, but outside the police and the army officer corps, little was done, and de Gaulle insisted there could be no question of 'sweeping aside the vast majority of the State's servants'. In the Netherlands, perhaps because there had been much less violence at liberation itself, the purge went deeper, with 17,500 civil servants dismissed and another 6,000 disciplined.

Overall, west European governments opted for continuity rather than prosecution. Some civil servants were disciplined. But the bastions of state power, notably the police, remained mostly immune to investi gation. De Gaulle's creation of a new republican police force, the CRS, was unusual; more typical in western Europe were the cases or the Italian *carabinieri* or the Greek National Guard, whose personnel simply changed uniforms between 1943 and 1946. Other key areas or society - the judiciary, education and business - escaped with little more than perfunctory investigation. If the Nation was to be reborn, the state machine remained largely the same. Within the post-war coalition governments, Christian Democrats and conservatives preached the benefits of amnesia and charity. 'We have the strength to forget! Forget as quickly as possible!' urged *Il tiopolo* in April 1945. Fears of 'Jacobin improvisations', intensified by the Greek civil war, contributed to this position as much as any electoral calculation. Conservative anti-communism helps explain the emergence of determined resistance to the idea of any wholesale purge. But so does a more basic popular desire in 1945-6 to see governments focus their energies upon rebuilding the economy and raising living standards, assuaging political passions instead of arousing them.

Inside the resistance such attitudes appeared scarcely comprehensible. Often the very policemen who had persecuted resisters in 1943 were still telling them what to do five years later. In late 1944 fighting broke out in Athens and Belgium, in part because of resistance fears that there would be no substantial turnover of personnel by incoming exile governments. Elsewhere, partisan forces were demobilized with extraordinary difficulty only on the basis of pledges of genuine reform. Now it appeared that resistance fears of betrayal had been justified all along. They had been outflanked and found themselves helpless before 'the continuity of the State'. Such resentments were highly dangerous and occasionally spilled over into acts of violence. Greece was the extreme case where the temporary truce of 1945 turned into a civil war lasting three years. But the threat was always beneath the surface in Italy too and emerged for one brief, frightening moment in the insurrection which followed the shooting of the communist leader Palmiro Togliatti in July 1948. But by this date, the Cold War had changed people's perceptions: now the radicalization of the war years had vanished, and with it, the public support for revolutionary violence.

In eastern Europe, too, there were extensive purges after the war, but they served a very different purpose and followed a different course to those in the West. They were not based upon the judicial investigation of individual misdeeds but upon a more sweeping attribution of collective guilt derived from social position or ethnic attribution. This reflected the key difference behind the two social projects, West and East. The philosophy underlying the purges in western Europe separated the punishment of guilty individuals from questions of socio-economic reform, and regarded the latter as matters for demo-cratic debate. In eastern Europe, on the other hand, purges against 'Fascists' and 'war criminals' became a central part of the construction of society on something approaching the Soviet model.

'Anti-Fascist' campaigns targeted entire social categories for dismissal, deportation, expropriation or worse. In Hungary, for instance, Moscow insisted upon the need to purge 'Fascist elements' during the negotiations which preceded the formation of a provisional government in December 1944. It quickly emerged that this was meant to encompass not merely the pro-German Arrow Cross extremists who had seized power in October, but also the 'full liquidation of feudal structures' and measures against 'reactionaries' in the state and society.[43] During 1945 over 3,000 local committees were set up to imprison and try suspected collaborators. They also formed special police units drawn from workers and farm labourers. At the same time, 'People's Courts' were set up to try high-profile political cases: public executions of war

criminals drew large crowds. Though at first these trials focused upon the Arrow Cross, over time the definition of 'enemy of the people' broadened. By April 1945, communist papers were criticizing the courts for their moderation, asserting that 'the Democracy is behaving too humanly towards these fascist beasts'. Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest that the judicial process ran into the same difficulties in Hungary as it did in western Europe, and produced the same low rate of guilty verdicts.

In Yugoslavia, Tito ordered the massacre of thousands of members of Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian collaborationist formations who were handed over by the British in April-May 1945. He saw this, according to Djilas, as a 'pragmatic solution' since he feared the courts could not cope with so many individual investigations. Overall estimates of the numbers of quislings and collaborators killed in post-war Yugoslavia are highly controversial, but as many as 60,000 may have lost their lives in this way. In Greece, the December 1944 fighting saw the communists conduct mass shootings of 'people's enemies', often identifying them solely on the basis of their status as 'bourgeois'. Meanwhile, on the Greek Right, nationalist guerrillas killed hundreds of Chams (Albanian-speaking Muslims) and drove the remaining 15,000 into Albania on the grounds that they had aided the Axis.

Russian-backed regimes in eastern Europe developed this kind of ethnic cleansing more systematically. Anti-communist underground armies, stay-behind teams and sabotage units, in many cases equipped by the Germans in 1944-5, constituted a thorn in the side of these new regimes and prompted them to respond with both repression and expropriation. In Romania, for example, where the Waffen-SS was parachuting paramilitaries into Transylvania late in 1944, the Soviet authorities acted swiftly and harshly to stamp out any potential resistance. On 7 January 1945, nearly 100,000 *Volksdeutsche* were deported for forced labour to the Soviet Union. The reform decree of March 1945 - yoking together wartime, class and ethnic enemies -expropriated the farms of those who had collaborated with the Germans, of war criminals and of anyone who held more than ten hectares but had not farmed it themselves.

In Hungary, the land reform decree of the same month singled out the 'enemies of the Hungarian people', thus again targeting both the class enemy - the large landowners - and the ethnic foe - the German minority. Such measures, introduced under a communist Minister of Agriculture, were enormously popular among the peasantry. In the words of an impartial source: 'It was a social revolutionary measure of supreme importance that ruined the powerful landowners and released a pent-up energy which enlivened the countryside some time after.'

Confiscation of German property took place on an even vaster scale in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Large estates and thousands of urban properties were abandoned and became available for resettlement, a means for incumbent governments to purchase popular backing by appealing to nationalist sentiment as well as economic interest. Some-times, the expulsion of the Germans formed part of a more concerted scheme for eradicating minorities from the country. Following bitter internecine struggles during the inter-war years and under the German occupation, the Poles also took their revenge on the large Ukrainian minority, forcing 480,000 to leave for the Soviet Union; in 1947, some 150,000, who had escaped the earlier deportations, were forcibly resettled in the west of the country.

Such examples indicate the contrasting nature of the purges in western and eastern Europe. In the former, they were limited in scope rapidly brought under the control of the courts, and quickly scaled down as the Cold War developed. In the latter, judicial activity formed only part of a variety of measures against 'war criminals' and 'enemies of the people'. Post-war purges became an instrument for a total economic and ethnic reshaping of society. As such they were a means for post-war regimes to mobilize genuine popular support (just as bourgeois governments had used land reform after 1918 in much of eastern Europe), and allowed left-wing figures to claim leadership of the nation. As before in the Soviet Union so now in eastern Europe, social revolution went hand in hand with national assertion.

THE DIVISION OF GERMANY

'Already it is clear,' wrote Basil Davidson in 1950, 'that the drawing of a frontier line down the middle of Germany has meant as well the dividing of Europe.' In retrospect there can be little doubt that even in defeat Germany held the key to Europe's fate, and that it was partition which finally divided the continent. What, however, is far from obvious is at what point partition became inevitable and as a result of whose actions. After all, the Big Three were all agreed in 1945 on the need to keep Germany together. How, then, did partition happen? Was it the result of Soviet intransigence? Was it rather, as Davidson argued, the result of Western policy? Or did it flow from the basic incompatibility of the ideologies of the occupying powers, an incompatibility which some observers believed had revealed itself even before May 1945 in the very first steps taken by the military governments that the Allies and the Red Army set up in the territory they had conquered? The Allied policy of 'unconditional surrender', first announced in 1943, finally prevailed. Hitler's successor, Admiral Dönitz, authorized the signature of surrender on 7 May 1945 and his government led an increasingly controversial half-life until he and the remainder of thte German High Command were arrested two weeks later. His efforts to win Allied support for a rejuvenated Third Reich standing

against rhe Bolshevization of Europe were belatedly rejected, and central political control in Germany passed into the hands of the conquerors. The victors shared many basic goals at the start. All were agreed upon the need to eliminate Nazism for the sake of European security; all were pledged to punish German war criminals. The Yalta Declaration alluded to the possible 'dismemberment' of the country, but also made reference to central German institutions. Both the Russians and the Americans accepted the desirability of sweeping economic reform through decartelization and land reform in order to break the power of those interests which were believed to have backed Hitler. Finally, all were agreed upon the need to 'democratize' Germany. Such goals amounted to nothing less than a social and political revolution.

This common ground formed the basis for the declarations which followed the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. Drawing a distinction between National Socialism and the German people, the agreement talked of preparing the latter 'for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis'. At the same time Potsdam skated over the widening areas of Big Three disagreement. Yet none of these was of such immediate significance in the summer of 1945 as the position taken by the French, who were not invited to Potsdam at all, but who had been given their own occupation zone. De Gaulle was the prime opponent of a united Germany. He doggedly opposed the idea of a central German administration operating under the control of the Control Commission, and wanted to annex German territory and break up the old central state. Ultimately the French would fail in their territorial ambitions. But by then their veto had obstructed the chances of German unity, and in the meantime, the policies being pursued in the different Occupation zones created increasingly divergent social and political regimes. In small but far from meaningless ways, the repudiation of the Nazi regime took similar forms across the country. Street names were changed (once more), Nazi literature was cleared out of public libraries and in general visible signs of the old regime were erased. But beyond such measures, the differences of approach became more obvious. In the Soviet zone, de-Nazification was regarded as a means of destroying the economic and social bases of reaction. There was no systematic search for Nazis or war criminals and their life was often easier there than in the Allied zones. Lumping together Nazis with other 'enemies of democracy' the authorities focused upon a swift and far-reaching administrative purge, extending into the judiciary and the teaching profession, and set up short training courses to create new cadres. As in eastern Europe, anti-Nazi slogans became the justification for sweeping economic reforms. Large landed estates were confiscated in 1945, bringing into being a new class of smallholders tied to the new regime. Banks and heavy industry were expropriated. The dismantling of industrial plant proceeded rapidly, despite the fact that it caused tremendous wastage and threw thousands out of work. Soviet policy reflected two key considerations. One was the prevail-ing communist analysis of Nazism itself. Walter Ulbricht argued in 1945 that 'Hitler fascism' had emerged from the reactionary nature of German capitalism; hence it was necessary to destroy capitalism and socialize the economy if German authoritarianism was to be eradicated. But even more important than this was the overwhelming Soviet concern to exploit German resources to the hilt to rebuild their own shattered economy and to take full advantage of the reparations provisions agreed with the Allies. In the long run these two goals -the creation of a pro-Soviet Germany and high levels of reparations - were incompatible, but this was not clear in 1945.

De-Nazification in the Western zones took the form of judicial investigation on a case-by-case basis. This satisfied Western conceptions of fairness but proved increasingly impracticable, especially as the scope of the purges *increased* in 1945 following publicity over a number of de-Nazification failures. The infamous *Fragebogen* (ques-tionnaires), a basic element in the investigations, accumulated m enormous numbers - over 1.6 millions in the US zone alone by June 1946 - and as a result the whole de-Nazification process turned into a bureaucratic nightmare. By late 1946, with more than two million cases still to be dealt with, it was already being wound down. A case study of the town of Marburg under US occupation concludes unambiguously that de-Nazification was a failure: it neither excluded former Nazis from office, nor made for a more democratic life. The more pragmatic British and French reached a similar conclusion early on. Several million Germans were affected by the purges but German public opinion believed that they had targeted the lesser fry while allowing big fish to swim free. In short, Allied procedures were not obviously superior to those adopted in the Eastern zone.

Just as in the Soviet case, so in the Western zones de-Nazification practices reflected more general theories of the nature of the Third Reich. Rather than seeing Nazism as a socio-economic phenomenon (requiring drastic intervention in the economy for its eradication), the Allies were more inclined to see it as a dictatorial regime imposed from above. This suggested that the conscientious removal of former Nazis would simply release the natural democratic urges of the German people. Social reform was therefore less important than juridical surgery.

Unfortunately, German attitudes to defeat did not bear out this rosy view. As they monitored public opinion, the Allies were increasingly concerned at what they found. On the one hand, the resistance to occupation which many had feared failed to materialize: the Were-wolves proved toothless and the Alpine redoubt a fantasy. Total defeat, following the SS violence of the final apocalyptic months of the war, seemed to have discredited Nazism. Unlike

1918, no one had been left in doubt about the scale of the catastrophe. Yet the Allies expected more than this: they hoped to see signs of repentance for the events of the past six years, and some kind of desire for democracy's return. The initial reports from Germany were disheartening. People seemed dazed by the total and sudden collapse of the Reich. They were apathetic and individualistic, concerned about food rather than democracy. 'Without me' was the stock response to thoughts of grass-roots political activism. Having once feared the prospect of class revolution, the Allies now worried more about political passivity. When they circulated a film about the death camps, most Germans who watched it regarded it as propaganda. Nazi patterns of thought outlived the fall of the regime, often manifesting themselves in the most incongruous ways. Saul Padover one of the first US intelligence officers to assess the popular mood in Germany, describes meeting the Social Democrat who advocated stern measures against the Nazis, stating that: 'Nazi blood is something unclean, biologically unhealthy and incurable . . . Those with Nazi blood cannot be redeemed. They must be made permanently sterile.' And there was the Burgermeister of Hamborn, who greeted Padover with an instinctive Hitler salute before stammering: 'It's an old habit. One has to stop oneself.' Few Allied officers realized that the ugly term *Entnazifizierung* (de-Nazification) itself replicated the pattern of Nazi jargon.

Slowly seeing that de-Nazification alone would not change mentalities, the Allies embarked upon an ambitious peacetime extension of psychological warfare targeted at the German public. 'Re-education' - a propaganda campaign to democratize an entire society - turned into one of the most extensive such ventures of the twentieth century. School books were rewritten, schools and universities restructured and exposed to new theories and interpretations. And whereas de-Nazification was painful because it looked back to the past, 're-education' offered the promise of a brighter future.

The British remained the least optimistic about its chances of success; as late as 1952. a senior civil servant observed gloomily that 'it is unlikely democracy will develop in Germany in the near future'. The French, by contrast, attached far more importance to it and focused with some success on German youth. De-Nazification, after all, was not really the issue for the French; they were concerned about Germans not Nazis, and felt that transforming German culture was the key to peace. Their travelling exhibition 'Message from French Youth' was visited by 120,000 Germans, and their teacher-training reforms and exchange-visit programmes were highly successful. The American effort was more wholehearted than the British, and resulted in a purge of German universities in 1946. Yet like the British, the Americans found their efforts to reform the school system ran into vocal German opposition. They too were forced to retreat, though it took them longer.

Thus in both de-Nazification and re-education the Allies reaped meagre returns for massive outlay. In the Soviet zone, by contrast, substantial educational reforms took place - notably the establishment of a comprehensive school system - largely because the sources of opposition which were so important in the Western zones were silenced. But this reflects the basic divergence in the occupation regimes: in the West, de-Nazification took place without radical social reform, while in the East, it provided the opportunity for this. Back-pedalling from their earlier policy commitments, the Allies were reluc-tant to countenance sweeping social and economic change. They vetoed land reforms, for example, and allowed Ruhr industrialists to escape the vigorous decartelization which was envisaged in 1944. The main reason for this social conservatism during 1945-6 was not so much anti-communism as the Allies' reliance upon existing interest groups in their zones and their fear of adding to the food shortages and economic difficulties which were currently the chief political concern throughout the country.

This was also why they reacted with growing hostility to the Russian insistence on dismantling German industry, as had been agreed at Potsdam. There is no doubt about the wastefulness of much of the Soviet dismantling effort. (A good example was provided by the dismantling of the Meissen china works: the benches and kilns were smashed, while the iron fragments were sent to a Russian china factory near Leningrad where they rusted away for several years.) Intensified by bureaucratic competitition, the plundering of German resources - not just in the Soviet zone - created enormous confusion and unemployment. Yet it is striking that economic conditions in the Eastern zone in 1945 were no worse than in the West and quite possibly better, thanks to the rapid implementation of economic planning. Despite the high level of reparations shipments, industrial growth started relatively early. Perhaps because of the land reform, the Population in the Eastern zone was relatively well fed, at least until 1947. Reparations, however, became the issue which led most directly to the collapse of Four-Power government. The Potsdam agreement had Provided for the Soviet Union to receive 15 per cent of usable capital equipment from the Western zones 'as is unnecessary for the German peace economy'. During the winter of 1945-6, however, food shortages forced rations down dangerously low and the prospect of mass starvation loomed. Relief problems were exacerbated by the millions of refugees entering Western zones from the East. As the Western military governments coped with this manifold social crisis, they began to insist upon the need for a new approach to German reconstruction. On 27 May 1946 they halted reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union from the American zone until such time as a general agreement was reached on the German economy as a whole. With the Soviet authorities refusing to scale down their reparations demands, economic traffic

across zonal boundaries quickly dwindled. Just as after 1918, reparations threatened to tear apart the understanding among Germany's conquerors.

The dispute over reparations was stimulated in the first place by the appalling food shortages and economic dislocation of the immediate post-war period. But behind the American-Soviet rift lay the great gulf in their wartime experiences. The Soviet Union had borne the brunt of the German war effort and had suffered enormous damage as a result. By 1945 over twenty million of its citizens were dead and much of its territory was devastated. It was natural for Moscow's policy to be guided above all by the desire to exploit German economic resources for its benefit. The United States, in contrast, had seen its economy boom as a result of the war. It had suffered few casualties at German hands and there was in its relations with the Germans none of the racial antagonism with which the Nazis had invested their *Vernichtungskrieg* in the East. In Washington, policy towards Germany had been split between those who argued for a punitive peace and those who wanted - as they saw it - to avoid the mistakes of 1918 and favoured a more supportive and less radical approach. Up to Potsdam, the first group exerted the upper hand; by late 1945, however, they were losing ground as the scale of the economic crisis became more widely known. The reparations quarrel should also be seen in the context of political developments in Germany. Just a fortnight after the formation of the Soviet Military Administration, the Communist Party was officially registered in the Eastern zone. Shortly afterwards, the Soviet authorities registered several other political parties. The Western authorities were far more cautious, only permitting parties to act on local basis until much later. They thereby rebuffed many groups keenest to cooperate in reforming existing structures, preferring to rely on more conservative, ostensibly apolitical administrators. The strict control of Communist Party activities in particular suggested much uncertainty about the loyalties of the electorate.

The Soviet political strategy for Germany became evident as early as 15 July 1945, with the formation of a four-party anti-Fascist bloc. By pressing at Potsdam for a common Allied approach towards party activity - a policy resisted by all the others, most notably by the French - the Russians were permitted to present themselves as sponsors of those forces in Germany that wished Germans to be granted a greater measure of political responsibility. The Communist Party underlined its commitment to a parliamentary democracy for Germany through a 'bloc of antifascist democratic forces'. Nationalism and parliamentary democracy was a persuasive combination in the after-math of defeat: at this time it must have seemed to many Germans that the Soviet Union was no less likely than the Western allies to provide it.

With the emergence of SPD activity in the Western zones during the summer and autumn of 1945, Soviet policy switched from urging the creation of several separate parties to insisting upon the unification of the SPD and the KPD (the Communists). The poor performance of Communist Parties in elections in Austria and Hungary may have prompted this shift. So undoubtedly did the increasingly independent and assertive line taken by the SPD leadership. At the end of February 1946, the fusion of the two parties was announced. Social Democrats in Berlin protested, and when the new Socialist Unity Party (SED) held its first rallies in April in the Eastern zone, it failed to carry the entire SPD with it. As a result relations in the Western zone between the SPD and the SED were frosty, while the Allies became increasingly suspicious of Soviet tactics.

In the following eighteen months relations between the Soviets and the Allies worsened. A public dispute between Molotov and his American counterpart Byrnes over the Polish-German frontier was followed in October 1946 by elections in the Eastern zone and Berlin which revealed the strength of feeling against joining the SED by SPD members. Just over a month later, the US and British zones were fused, and pressure was applied to the French to join. The Four-Power Control Commission had more or less stopped working, unable to agree on much more than the abolition of the state of Prussia. Against this background, it is not surprising that the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in March-April 1947 failed to agree upon a basis for a German peace treaty. That failure, which coincided with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, marked the start of a more decisive and openly anti-communist policy by Washington towards Europe. It also marked the beginning of the Cold War.

Suspicion of *Germany* was with surprising speed ceasing to become the defining factor in post-war international relations. The 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk, signed by the Benelux countries, France and the United Kingdom, had been directed against Germany, which was still regarded as the main threat to peace in Europe. But the Treaty of Brussels signed the following year was less specific about the potential aggressor. East-West relations followed a dialectic of suspicion. Russia regarded the Marshall Plan as an attempt to subvert its rule in eastern Europe. The British and Americans were alarmed by the establishment of the Cominform in September. But probably the key event which turned Russia in Western eyes into the main threat to European security was the Communist *coup d'etat* in Prague in February 1948.

Events in Prague pushed the French and the Americans together. In return for pledges of US military and economic support, the French gave up their dreams of obtaining part of the Rhineland. The French zone was merged with Bizonia and the Allies began to plan for currency reform and economic reconstruction within the framework of the European Recovery Plan. The Russians walked out of the Control Commission, which never met again, and

blockaded the Western sectors in Berlin. At the height of the Berlin crisis, a separate municipality was created in the Soviet zone. The division of the city antici-pated the division of the country. On 23 May 1949, the West German constitution was signed in Bonn; one week later, a rival constitution was adopted by the People's Congress in Berlin. The German Democratic Republic was officially declared in October.

THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE

The Cold War brought a brutal stability to an exhausted continent and ensured that the revival of political life would take place on the terms permitted by the international balance of power. Contrary to Nazi expectations the Second World War was not succeeded by war between the members of the Grand Alliance. Stalin would scarcely have demanded the Allies invade Europe to form a Second Front if he had aimed then to get them out. Soviet losses - after suffering the greatest wartime destruction in history - and the American nuclear monopoly both made Stalin shy away from belligerence. For their part, both the British and the Americans reluctantly and privately accepted the reality of their partnership with the Russians. They could not help recognizing Soviet military predominance in eastern Europe, and its genuine security interests there. The dissolution of the Comin-tern in 1943 had been Stalin's way of signalling the abandonment of world revolution. If the establishment of its successor, the Cominform, in 1947, marked the deterioration in Moscow's relations with the Allies since the war, it just as importantly - though it was little noticed at the time - signalled a Soviet policy of conservative consolidation behind the Iron Curtain. For the Americans, too, containment was an essentially defensive doctrine. Dulles's talk of a 'roll-back' of communism in the 1950s was not meant seriously: the Western reaction to the 1953 riots in East Germany or 1956 in Hungary demonstrated how uninterested the West was in challenging the prevailing balance of power. Fear of actual hostilities proved unfounded; despite the tension in relations, especially in 1948, neither side seriously considered using military force to intervene in the other's sphere of influence. The most dangerous flashpoints were where the Iron Curtain frayed - Trieste, for example, in 1945 (and that largely because of Tito's belligerence), Hungary and Greece. One consequence of this division of the continent was that remaining border disputes and minority issues within each Power's sphere of influence no longer threatened international stability, as they had done earlier in the century. In the West, the Americans sorted out French claims to the Val d'Aosta and to western Germany. It had been decided at the post-war Peace Conferences that quarrels between, say Czechoslovakia and Hungary, were to be left to the two countries concerned to hammer out. There was to be no repeat of the League of Nations' attempt to solve minorities problems by internationalizing them. Neither the Peace Treaties with the defeated Axis partners, nor the United Nations, devoted much attention to minority rights. In a divided Europe, such problems appeared to be of secondary importance. Security from the sorts of border disputes which had plagued the continent in the past was obtained by its subordination to the Superpowers.

There were, of course, high costs to be paid for such stability. The struggle between the Superpowers was henceforth conducted not on the battlefield, but through forms of warfare more compatible with the overwhelming perils of the nuclear era. The covert, psychological and underground warfare which both sides had developed in the struggle against Hitler were now turned upon each other. The spy became the characteristic Cold War warrior. The 'gospel of national security' led to the expansion of vast state organizations for surveillance and espionage. Intelligence activities were no longer regarded as appendages to military operations; they developed their own bureaucratic interests. In western Europe vetting was introduced on the American model, offering a new arena for spymasters to prove their indispensability. The 'stay-behind' networks, set up in the late 1940s by American intelligence, determined not to be caught napping by a Soviet invasion, formed malignant anti-communist nuclei in the body politic. Only in the 1980s with revelations about the Gladio ring in Italy would the extent of their activities become appreciated.

The predominance of Cold War anti-communism, combined with the signs of growing popular political disillusionment, gave the demo-cratization of the West a highly conservative cast which troubled liberals and those on the Left in the late 1940s. 'The burning question for one concerned with the future of democracy in Europe,' wrote the historian Carl Schorske in 1948, 'is the extent to which the loyalty of the middle class to democracy will continue.' In Italy, France and western Germany he noted the rightward thrust of politics since the war and the 'signs of a return to anti-democratic authoritarianism' under the pressures of the Cold War. Writing about Germany a year later another observer was equally gloomy, noting that 'the promised democratisation has not yet been effected'.

Anti-communism in western Europe threatened to make deep inroads into civil liberties and to prevent the social reforms which many had looked forward to. In 1946-7, Communist Parties were pushed out of government. By 1948-9 the state was drawing upon paramilitary units to stamp out resistance on the Left. The struggle for democracy was now couched in Cold War terms: thus from the Left came accusations that conservative administrations were making anti-Fascism suspect and succouring Fascists, while Christian Democrats responded by arguing that the real threat to democracy came from the

communist attack on freedom. In 1951 Unesco mounted an inquiry into the meaning of democracy in the post-war world. It concluded that although everyone professed to want it, a vast gulf in understanding separated the two halves of Europe.

By 1949 the forces of the Free World had triumphed in the West. In Italy and Greece, where violent resistance to the post-war regimes lasted longest, suspected Leftists entered the prisons as collaborators were released. Following the critical Christian Democrat victory in Italy's 1948 elections Mario Scelba's paramilitary assault units, armed with grenade launchers and flame-throwers, threw hundreds of partisans and workers into jail. A decade after the end of the Spanish civil war, Franco's police were still mopping up left-wing resisters in the hills. In Greece, the American-trained royalist army, backed by napalm, overcame the communist Democratic Army and interned thousands of suspected sympathizers in makeshift camps. In eastern Europe, of course, the resistance to the Cold War order was met by an even harsher repression. In Yugoslavia, Mihailovic's Chetniks had been rounded up by the time of their leader's arrest in early 1946. But n Poland and the Ukraine, NKVD and native pro-communist troops conducted ferocious anti-partisan sweeps of the forests late into the 1940s. Perhaps the most tenacious resistance struggle took place in the Baltic states. There Soviet policy - deport-ations and collectivization - drove many men into the forests from early 1945. The Forest Brothers, as they were known, attacked Russian troops, disrupted elections and killed collaborators. They were encouraged by their belief that there would soon be war between the West and the Soviet Union. In Latvia and Estonia their numbers were dwindling by the end of 1946, but in Lithuania the movement was more organized. By 1948 the authorities needed 70,000 troops as well as special death squads, infiltrators and regular Red Army divisions.

There are some striking cases of individuals who rejected the post-war structure of power for several decades. Tadeusz Konwicki's night-marish novel of Poland in the 1960s, *A Dreambook for Our Time,* shows what ghosts from the war still lurked in the forests. An Estonian Forest Brother, August Sabe, was discovered by KGB agents as late as 1978 and drowned himself rather than surrender. Similarly, after the fall of the Colonels' Junta in 1974, a Greek partisan was reportedly discovered hiding in the White Mountains in Crete, reluctant to return to normal life. A French woman was discovered living as a recluse in 1983 in a town in the Auvergne: at liberation she had been accused of collaboration and her hair had been shorn; she had not been seen for thirty years and had gone mad.

People like this who had refused to make their re-entry into post-war society were very much the exceptions. Most Europeans accepted the division of the continent and the post-war balance of power, and therefore participated in the social projects which developed on either side of the Iron Curtain. The wartime alliance preserved its basic understanding, and the brutal peace of the Cold War brought the continent the most precious commodity of all - time - which allowed an extraordinary and largely unexpected regeneration of its economic life and a sweeping transformation of its political habits.

8 Building People's Democracy

We have chosen our own Polish path of development which we call the path of people's democracy. Under the present conditions no dictatorship of the working class, and even less the dictatorship of one party, is necessary or intended. We believe that the government in our country can be carried out through all democratic parties cooperating one with another.

- Wladyslaw Gomulka, 1947

Every change in the social order is an historical process accompanied by difficulties, unsolved problems, shortcomings and, inevitably, mistakes.

- from the Report of the Dubcek Government Commission of Inquiry into the Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1968

Eastern Europe has been the unfortunate laboratory for all three of the century's ideological experiments. The first, that of the liberal democratic victors of 1918, lasted little more than a decade, before collapsing in the aftermath of the world depression. Hitler's New Order lasted only half as long. Nazi defeat opened the way for Stalin to make a third attempt, and his creations - the People's Democracies - were to prove more durable than any of their predecessors. In the early 1950s, as Stalinist terror reached its apogee in a series of bizzarre and terrifying show trials, Western political scientists developed the theory of totalitarianism, which emphasized the similarities between communism and fascism. In both cases, they argued, political power resided essentially in coercion. At a time when the labour camps were filled with hundreds of thousands of prisoners and the secret police were in the ascendant such views were highly plausible Today, however, the limitations of the theory of totalitarianism are more obvious. If we wish to explain why Russian rule lasted so much longer than German in eastern Europe, the differences between Nazism and communism are no less important than their similarities. Both relied upon military and police to subdue a basically hostile population but in varying degrees and at different times. More important, in their ultimate goals and political strategies, the Russians and the Germans diverged sharply.

For the Nazis, as we have seen, the goal of occupation was defined entirely in terms of *German* interests. This was the principal reason why the dissatisfaction many Europeans felt with pre-war liberal (or 'bourgeois') democracy could not be satisfied by a Nazi New Order. It also explains Berlin's reluctance to give any power to non-German political groups, its basic vision of eastern Europe as a source of land and foodstuffs worked by Slavic helots for the benefit of their racial superiors, and the miserable failure of German *political* warfare among the Slavs.

Soviet Russia, like Germany, sought imperial security through control of eastern Europe; like Nazi Germany, it regarded the system of independent states set up at Versailles as hostile to its interests. However, its policy was shaped not by racial nationalism but by the philosophy of socio-economic transformation known as communism. This ideology was inclusive rather than exclusive, and all the more powerful for it. The Russian empire, unlike the Nazi one, depended upon local elites, and accommodated - if not without difficulty - east European nationalism: this explains both the limits and the durability of Soviet control. Hitler's vision of a feudal, ethnically purified farming belt was succeeded by that of an urbanized, industrial Utopia: unlike Hitler, Stalin and his successors aimed at a total modernization or the region. In its own way, this happened: the rapid growth of cities and industry after 1945 dwarfed any previous changes. Communism profited from these extraordinary developments; later they helped cause its demise. Industrialization changed society in ways the Party had not anticipated: society raced ahead while the Party stagnated.

ESTABLISHING POLITICAL CONTROL

Soviet takeover, or social revolution? Today most people would unhesitatingly plump for the former to describe communism's emergence in post-war eastern Europe. In the 1940s, however, well-informed and impartial observers saw things rather differently. They remembered the inter-war legacy of failed democracy, economic depression and ethnic strife - grim memories which weakened opposition to communism inside and outside the region. The British scholar Hugh Seton-Watson underlined the harsh, chauvinistic and corrupt rule of earlier regimes, and spoke of a widespread 'desire for violent change, and distrust of everything said by the ruling class'. The Masaryk Professor of Central European History at London University, R. R. Betts, referred to 'the revolution in central and eastern Europe' which was taking place, and stressed that 'much of [the achievement, for good and evil] is native and due to the efforts of the peoples and their own leaders'. 'It is clear', he went on, 'that even if the Soviet Union had not been so near and so powerful, revolutionary changes would have come at the end of so destructive and subversive a war as that which ended in 1945.'

Such commentators may have felt later that their views were coloured by wishful thinking. Seton-Watson confessed in 1961 that the years after 1945 brought not a New Deal of liberty and social justice but a totalitarian tyranny and colonial subjection to the Soviet Empire'. But the illusions, beliefs and

hopes which he later castigated were to prove no less important an instrument of imperial rule than force of arms itself; as for the social revolution, that was a reality. Soviet prestige may have been boosted by the military achievement of defeating the Germans, but the wartime Red Army was never envisaged as a permanent force of occupation, except perhaps in Germany itself: demobilization diminished its military strength from twelve million in 1945 to around three million three years later; in Germany itself, Soviet troop strengths dropped from some 1.5 million at the end of the war to 350,000 by July 1947. This was slower than the astonishingly rapid American demobilization but striking nonetheless. In fact, troop strengths fell quickly in all countries and the Red Army pulled out of Czechoslovakia in keeping with its international agreements. Stalin reminded the Hungarian Communists: 'Soviet power cannot do everything for you. You must do the fighting, you must do the work.' For the Kremlin it was clear that Germany must never again be allowed to threaten the Soviet Union, and that eastern Europe must form part of its own sphere of influence; both objectives, however, were conceived in primarily political rather than military terms.

For action against the Germans in the final stages of the war, as also against the opposition that emerged to communist control in the forests of the Baltic states and Poland, the Carpathians, and along the Albanian-Yugoslav frontier, reliable local armed forces needed building up. Reconstructed armies loyal to the new regime were quickly pulled together around a core of pre-war officers, resistance fighters and POWs 're-educated' in Soviet captivity. Some of these armies were purged of many former career officers as early as 1945 -a necessity in the case of an army like the Romanian which had been fighting the Russians a year before - but others kept much of their pre-war character. The Polish Army was a special case, as thousands of its pre-war officers had been seized by the Russians when the war began, and shot en masse in the Katyn forest and elsewhere. More reliable instruments for the new masters were the various security, police and paramilitary formations that emerged very rapidly under Soviet guidance, and played a vital role in policing elections, and targeting opponents of the new order. They were recruited not from reliable Party cadres, since these did not exist in any numbers, but from a strange mix of former partisans, collaborators, criminals and others. In Romania, for instance, the paramilitary Patriotic Combat Formations, directly under the orders of the Party, grew to 60,000 strong by March 1945. Overall, within a year of Russian 'liberation, hundreds of thousands of East Europeans were serving in military, policing and paramilitary formations under Soviet control.

There was little domestic military resistance. Anti-Soviet armed bands and resistance units continued their doomed struggle into the late 1940s, but they were systematically repressed - shot, imprisoned in camps (often taken over from the Germans, as at Majdanek) or deported - and never seriously threatened communist plans. Of the estimated 100,000 anti-communist partisans fighting in Poland between 1944 and 1947, the vast majority laid down their arms in two government amnesties. The Serb Chetnik leader Mihailovic was captured in 1946. Apart from the Baltic states, opposition was scattered and ineffectual.

The really serious challenges to Soviet predominance were not military; they came, instead, from the various parties that re-emerged after the Occupation. If the chief arena in which the struggle for power took place in post-war eastern Europe was political, the main question facing communist activists was how to obtain the ascendancy from a position of domestic weakness. In most countries, the Party membership at liberation was tiny. State repression and public indifference in the inter-war era had kept the communist movement small; Stalin's purges in the 1930s had made it even smaller. Now the survivors were hurled into the spotlight. How should they act?

The obvious revolutionary option was to seize power as soon as possible. The paradox is that this only happened where the Red Army was *not* in control - in Yugoslavia where Tito, backed by his partisans, installed a one-party state within a year of liberation, and in his satellite, Albania. The idea appealed to many communists outside Yugoslavia, but Tito was the one communist leader in a position to ignore Stalin's wishes, and Stalin clearly had other tactics in mind which would be more compatible with his evident desire not to alienate his wartime Allies. For as Molotov later recalled: 'It was to our benefit to stay allied with America.'

During the war, the Department of International Information of the Soviet Communist Central Committee had publicized the path ahead: cooperation with other democratic forces, not communist revvolution. Eastern Europe, it decreed, was not ready for socialism. Rather the residues of feudalism must be swept aside, and the abortive bourgeois revolution of 1848 completed. There would be elections, in which workers and peasants would have a new voice. Not surprisingly, many communist cadres apart from Tito found it hard to take such advice seriously.

Thus in defeated Germany, Stalin and his henchmen were furious with the old-time sectarian communist cadres who went around shouting 'Heil Moskau!', hanging red flags or painting the hammer and sickle on requisitioned cars. From Moscow's point of view, bloodthirsty declarations of imminent revolution, preaching dictatorship of the proletariat, tearing down statues of Luther and erecting monuments to Lenin - all implied a complete misreading of the situation. It showed that pre-war communists had learned nothing, and would only disturb the administration of the country. As early as 10 June, and with bewildering speed, the Soviet Military Administration issued an order

permitting the creation of other parties and trade unions; the German Communist Party's own manifesto explicitly ruled out the idea of 'forcing the Soviet system on Germany' and called for the establishment of a parliamentary democracy.

All this indicated that from Stalin's perspective in 1945, other parties would be tolerated and parliamentary elections would be held. The model for eastern Europe was to be the Popular Front of the mid-1930s not the Leninist revolutionary elite of 1917. Fascism's triumph between the wars, according to Moscow's theorists, had showed the necessity for unifying progressive forces under the banner of a broad anti-Fascist coalition, winning over the masses by a gradualist programme of land reform (not collectivization), expropriation of the elites and state-led economic controls. But even the theory itself was not so important as it would later become. The situation was, in fact, highly fluid. It is a striking reflection of the improvised character of east European politics at this time, and of the pragmatic character of Soviet attitudes, that not until early 1947 did there appear any official interpretations of the meaning in Marxist theory of People's Democracy, and only in December 1948 was it identified unambiguously with the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fact was that until this point Soviet policy was focused upon the question of creating a friendly Germany and there was no overall strategy for eastern Europe.

Time was required, meanwhile, to build up what were in effect new parties, since communism had been effectively crushed through-out most of the region in the preceding three decades. Just as in Russia earlier, so now in eastern Europe, it was necessary to make the transition from the small conspiratorial organization which had struggled in opposition to a party capable of wielding power. Only in Czechoslovakia had the party remained legal and popular. Membership of the Polish Communist Party, renamed a more palatable Polish Workers' Party, grew from 20,000 in July 1944 to 300,000 in under a year; in Hungary it grew from 2,000 in late 1944 to 864,000 by the end of 1947; the Romanian party grew similarly. When we examine the ballooning party membership figures for the early post-war years, it would be easy to write off most of those who joined as opportunists or time-servers. It was not difficult to recognize the new realities, and many 'realists' adjusted their expectations, swallowed hard and compromised with the new masters and their Soviet backers. Others were simply too worn out by the years of war to struggle further. But there was also genuine enthusiasm underlying the rise of the party after 1945.

In part, this was enthusiasm for the Soviet Union and respect for its achievements. The enormous prestige which had accrued to the Red Army in defeating the Third Reich was not immediately dispelled by its soldiers' ill-disciplined behaviour. Moreover, the defeat of the Third Reich did not allay traditional fears of German power: on the contrary, the experience of half a century, and especially the previous six years, persuaded many that Russian protection was more than ever a necessary insurance against future German expansion.

At home, memories of the war generated a widespread suspicion of collaborators and underlined the ambiguous status and doubtful performance of most pre-war political parties. Zdeněk Mlynář, for instance, who was later to play a leading part in the Czech Spring, recollected the vehemence with which, as a teenage recruit into the party in 1946, he had criticized the 'pusillanimous prudence of our parents' generation that had made collaboration with the enemy so excusable'. Growing up through the war had given the young a 'Manichean view of the world' and a 'primitive radicalism'. 'We were children of the war who, having not actually fought against anyone, brought our wartime mentality with us into those first post-war years, when the opportunity to fight for something presented itself at last.' But this struggle was not merely, in Mlynář's words, 'a holy struggle against the infidel'. Sweeping away the past was necessary in order to construct a better future. The general radicalization which occupation had stimulated across Europe manifested itself after liberation in a widespread desire for socio-economic change. The Hungarian elections of 1945 -the first in the country's history under universal suffrage - demonstrated that this desire extended far beyond communist voters. Many looked eastwards for inspiration. 'In 1945,' writes Mlynář, 'deification of the Soviet Union and Stalin did not necessarily exclude one from the general excitement felt . . . concerning the prospects of establishing freedom and justice as the cornerstones of the new state. On the contrary, it was part of that excitement. .. The Soviet Union was, in that sense, a land of hope for all who desired a radical departure from the past after the war and who also, of course, knew nothing of the real conditions in the Soviet Union.'

Even among non-communists, who were much less inclined to idolize Stalin, Party policy in the first two or three years after liberation encouraged their hopes by its relative flexibility and gradualism. 'Though the nation did not want to accept the alien system of rule imposed by Stalin,'Jacek Kurczewski has argued in the case of Poland, 'civil war in the first post-1945 years was rejected by the majority in favour of reconstruction of homes for the people and of the country as the home for all.' In central-eastern Europe, communist energy and dedication in the work of reconstruction could win people over. A striking illustration is provided by the anti-communist Hungarian refugees who gave credit for the reconstruction drive to 'the communists, who handled economic reconstruction with enthusiasm and even a touch of genius'. Gero 'the Bridge-Builder' was the leading Party official who as Minister of Transport was hailed for the swift rebuilding of the Danube bridges.

The basic point is that social justice and economic efficiency were for many higher priorities than a return to - or creation of - party or 'bourgeois' democracy. Communism, which had swept away the remnants of feudalism and held out the promise of Soviet industrializ-ation to contrast with the capitalist stagnation of the inter-war years, offered a way forward, especially through the palatable compromise of people's Democracy. If no less a figure than Czech President Beneš could publicly reject a 'purely political conception of democracy in a liberalistic sense' in favour of a system 'in the social and economic sense also', is it surprising that many less sophisticated thinkers should be ready for effective rather than necessarily representative government? This was the legacy of the inter-war crisis of liberal democracy in eastern Europe. But the sharing of power in the People's Democracies through coalitions and bloc-building was more easily reconciled with Soviet security concerns in some countries than in others. In Romania and Poland - countries where both communism and Russia were historically unpopular, and whose anti-Russianism, incidentally, was heartily reciprocated in Moscow - the strains became apparent early on. Foreign Minister Vyshinsky had to come to Bucharest in February 1945 to order King Michael to appoint the prime minister the Russians wanted. Moscow's man, Petru Groza, was not a communist, though his secretary-general, Emil Bodnaras, was not merely a communist but an NKVD officer. It is significant that there was no Western response to the King's appeals for help, perhaps because Churchill was not behaving very differently in Greece at about the same time. When Michael ordered Groza to resign, the prime minister simply ignored him and then went to Moscow to meet Stalin. 'We talked', Groza recollected, 'as a small pupil to an old teacher.'

The Poles put up greater resistance than anyone else to Russian domination; unfortunately for them, Poland was the most important country in eastern Europe to the Russians, especially while the fate of Germany remained undecided, and Polish public opinion of little consequence to Moscow. As the West acknowledged this fact, Stalin could use a greater degree of force there than elsewhere. Yet even there the politics of the initial phase of communist rule also aimed to garner support. The pro-Soviet 'Provisional Government' was a coalition, led by a socialist prime minister, and the West put pressure on genuinely independent political figures to cooperate with the Russians. Added pressure came in the form of show trials of anti-Soviet public figures in the summer of 1945. And as in Romania, so in Poland, the Soviet Union gained enormouw leverage over domestic politicians by its ability to readjust international borders at the peace table. Regaining Transylvania from, Hungary was the carrot for the Romanians; taking over the vast and prosperous formerly German 'New Territories' along the Oder-Neisse line the incentive for the Poles. The result in both cases was that nationalists had every incentive to placate Moscow as the guarantor of their new lands.

Although the rhythms differed across eastern Europe, the sub-sequent pattern looked similar in retrospect: government by coalition in which the Communist Party played an influential and dominant part; then, marginalization and outright repression of those parties and splinter groups which remained outside the coalition. Finally elections, which gave the Government Front 89 per cent in Poland, 98 per cent in Romania (up in 1948 from 91 per cent in 1946!) and 79 per cent in Bulgaria. By 1947-8, this process had succeeded in crushing the agrarian and socialist parties which were the most serious threat in a democratic setting to communist hegemony; some of their leaders had been executed or forced to flee, while others had led splinter groups into government.

Was this a Machiavellian strategy carefully planned in advance? Some contemporary observers had no doubts. Hugh Seton-Watson discerned a pattern of three stages: genuine coalition; bogus coalition; the 'monolithic' regime. Yet in a curious way, this series of stages mirrored the emerging Soviet view which also saw the region moving by stages to communism. Both perhaps were trying to see a logic and a tidiness to events which did not exist. The actual course of events suggested - at least before 1947 - a far more hesitant and uncertain Soviet Union than Seton-Watson implied. The 1945 elections in Hun-gary, for example, resulted in a humiliating defeat for the communists and a 57 per cent triumph for the Smallholders. Some coalitions (Poland, Yugoslavia in early 1945) *were* mere showpieces from the start, disguising communist control; others were genuine coalitions for several years (Hungary, Czechoslovakia); Romania and Bulgaria fell somewhere between the two. Nor should one forget the vital case of Finland in this context: Finno-Soviet diplomacy resulted in an agreement which satisfied Soviet concerns while preserving Finnish autonomy of action. It is also important to remember that an impatience with pre-war party politics and a desire to solve the immediate problems of the post-war era in a spirit of national unity made coalition government popular right across the continent: democracy - it was widely felt - must be made to work the second time around, by sinking party differences if necessary, especially on the Left. As this spirit frayed under the pressure of the Cold War, coalitions West and East fell apart. Thus the emergence and disappearance of coalition governments was not solely an east European development, nor only explicable as a Soviet conspiracy.

The communists also profited from several factors in addition to Soviet backing. One was the weakness and lack of cohesion of many of their rival parties: although some could only be crushed through police terror, others - like the Hungarian Smallholders - were friable and splintered easily, especially

in the absence of Western support. Marxist Social Democrats were often as drawn to the Soviet example as repelled by it. And anyway, outside Czechoslovakia and East Germany social democracy had weak roots in the region. The historical memory of the Left's fatal split in the 1920s added weight to the communists' demands for unity.

More fundamentally still, the rival parties' commitment to the principles of democracy had to be understood in the light of their own pre-war political traditions and experience. For many this included both the lack of a legacy of successful parliamentarism, and a familiarity with the idea of large governing coalitions operating - as in inter-war Hungary and Romania, for instance - in an authoritarian context. Outside Czechoslovakia, the memory of inter-war parliamentary government conjured up ambiguous associations. Pre-war 'bourgeois democracy' found few supporters; sociologically and ideologically its old constituencies had shrunk, fled or been killed. In Poland, the war - thanks to both Germans and Russians - had more or less wiped out the liberal intelligentsia; in Romania it was largely tainted with collaboration. Liberal, Catholic and peasant politicians were uncertain about whether to move to total opposition or some kind of compromise with the new order. Advocates of intransigence placed their hopes in the outbreak of a Third World War, and this led many to wait indefinitely for salvation from the West. In the Balkans, noted Elisabeth Barker, 'There were many in the Opposition who had little interest in the peasants or in constructive programmes. The one question which obsessed them, and which they often put only to foreigners was: "When do you think the war against Russia will start?" . . . They let the expectation of war become the assumption on which most of their thinking was based. So they tended just to wait passively with a strange mixture of hopelessness and hopefulness, for the outbreak of the war.' They were understandably misled by the warlike tone of Cold War rhetoric on both sides. 'The final stage of preparation for war is under way,' insisted a Lithuanian partisan bulletin at the time of the Truman Doctrine. The Korean War gave a further boost to the surviving believers. Only Western passivity over Hungary in 1956 killed off their dreams for good.

At the same time, the ambiguity of communist policy towards nationalism further confused matters, and disorientated opponents. By expelling the ethnic Germans, communist regimes claimed to be turning countries like Poland into nation-states at last. By forcibly resettling members of one ethnic group in another part of the country - Ukrainians in western Poland, Banat Serbs and Macedonians in eastern Romania, Bosnian peasants in the Yugoslav Vojvodina -the regime weakened old local and regional ties and asserted the authority of the centralized state. The contrast is striking with the Soviet policy pursued in the Baltic states, where it was precisely the dominant national group which was targeted for deportation. But then the Baltic states faced a far worse fate than the rest of eastern Europe: they were to be absorbed within the Soviet Union itself, and subjected to a conscious policy of Russification.

Building up a ruling Party was one thing; controlling the administration was another, for that required an obedient state machine. In western Europe, occupation gave British and American policy-makers enor-mous influence over the internal affairs of both former enemies like Italy and Germany, and of former allies like Belgium and Greece. Soviet advisers intervened as much if not more, and took steps to consolidate their influence over the bureaucratic apparatus of the various east European states. Both West and East, most civil servants had wartime pasts to live down, and willingly conformed to the wishes of their new masters. In many cases, too, political control of the civil service was nothing new, and the communists simply inherited wartime and pre-war instruments of domination.

The independence of the judiciary, where this still existed after years of authoritarianism and wartime occupation, was almost immediately undermined by decrees making judges subordinate to the Ministry of justice. It was not necessary after this sort of measure to force pre-war appointees to resign: in Poland, for instance, some 60 per cent of judges as late as 1950 had begun their careers on the bench before the war. It was a similar story in the military, where pre-war generals took their orders from the new Higher Political Administration, which ensured a pro-Soviet line.

Culture, education and the media, formerly censored by domestic right-wing regimes or by the Germans, now came under Moscow's influence: some conservative papers were closed (on the grounds that they had served the 'Fascists'); others were controlled through a licensing system and the distribution of paper and newsprint. Censorship gradually extended from 'anti-Soviet' material to more sweeping definitions of what was harmful to the state: by 1949 some 8,000 previously published works were banned in Romania, and similar lists grew elsewhere. By 1949 at the very latest, formal censorship systems had been established which effectively placed all literary and journalistic output under Party control. It took longer to bring the universities into line, and the rhythm and rate of success varied enormously from east Germany, on the one hand, where the old order was swept away almost at once, to Poland, where it remained tolerated by an uncertain Party for years. Most important of all, there were the security forces. Military intelligence was subordinated to GRU, the Soviet military intelligence agency. Virtually from the moment of liberation, the KGB made control of internal security a priority. Prompted by the Russian security services, Party apparatchiks both infiltrated the regular police forces and outflanked them by creating new special security units - like the Bulgarian People's Militia - under Party control. In

Czechoslovakia - the last country to fall under communist control - the reorganization of the police became *the* critical political question, prompting a struggle " between the communist-controlled Interior and the non-communist Justice Ministry.

The police - like civil servants generally - were in a weak position to resist communist pressure. Many of them had worked through the war for the Germans and were vulnerable to being purged; they found it awkward to act against politicians backed by the forces of liberation. They also had to watch for their jobs as politically reliable youngsters were being drafted en masse. Sándor Kopacsi, a future police chief of Budapest, recollected that 'all underground fighters of the Mokan group [a Leftist wartime partisan outfit] were rearmed and became part of the law-enforcement apparatus of the new Republic of Hungary that was just being born. That's how I became a cop.' Yet such inexperienced novices could hardly be relied upon from the start. In the police, as elsewhere, high percentages of officers remained in post from the old force, and simply bowed their head to the new realities, trading their professional expertise for job security.

TOWARDS STALINISM

The turning point in what Mastny calls the *Pax Sovietica* came in 1947: in the face of increasingly decisive Western anti-communism, the foundation of the Cominform that September revealed a shift in Soviet policy from gradualism to embattled militancy, from an acceptance of divergent national paths to socialism to an insistence upon bloc uniformity. Stalin used the Yugoslavs to attack other Communist Parties for their 'fetish of coalitionism'. Humiliated just the previous month in national elections, Hungarian cadres were criticized for admitting that their government was a 'mixture made up of elements of the people's democracy and bourgeois democracy'. A year earlier Gomulka in Poland and Gottwald in Czechoslovakia had stressed the need for each country to find its own path to socialism. Henceforth, this line was abandoned. In economic planning, politics, architecture - across the board came an increased subservience to Moscow.

In 1948 it was the Yugoslavs' turn to be the whipping boy: the Tito-Stalin split, unforeseen and undesired by Tito, essentially came about because the Yugoslavs would not accept the kind of Soviet domination of their internal affairs which was becoming routine throughout the region. Meeting Soviet officers in Romania, Milovan Djilas was shocked by 'this attitude of a "superior race" and the conceit of a great power'. Djilas and his colleagues, proud of their wartime record, resented the need to publish Soviet books on demand, or to subordinate their own economic development to the needs of the Soviet Union; in foreign policy, Tito's intervention in the Greek civil war and his evident ambitions in the Balkans angered Stalin, just as the Yugoslav attempt to take Trieste had done two years earlier. The breach opened up rapidly, and became the means for Stalin to impose his authority even more powerfully upon the rest of the bloc. For the next five years, until his death, the region experienced a wave of show trials, police terror and forced industrialization - in a word, Stalinism.

'We study and take as an example the Soviet system,' Tito had stressed to Stalin, 'but we are developing socialism in our country in somewhat different forms.' After Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, cadres in other countries hastened to distance themselves from accusations of 'national communism'. The gap which had opened up in the Soviet bloc was attributed to 'despicable traitors and imperialist hirelings', 'traitors to proletarian internationalism', 'gangs of spies, provocateurs and murderers', and 'dogs tied to American leashes, gnawing imperialist bones, and barking for American capital'. The need to reconfirm the infallibility of Soviet authority led not merely to purges and mass expulsions, which cut deep into the Party and state apparatus but also - notably in Hungary and Czechoslovakia - to a series of show trials. The effort to demonstrate loyalty to Moscow by unmasking 'enemy agents' spread the terror like a virus into the heart of the Party. In August 1948 Romanian minister Lucretiu Patrascanu was arrested; another 'nationalist deviationist', Wladyslaw Gomulka, was removed as secretary-general of the Polish party the following month. Senior figures in the Albanian and Bulgarian leadership were arrested and tried. The Hungarian Interior Minister, László Rajk, was transferred to Foreign Affairs in August 1948, and arrested the following May.

Reflecting the paranoid atmosphere in the Kremlin in Stalin's last years as well as real fears over the extent of Soviet control in eastern Europe, the show trials turned into a visible demonstration of Party loyalty which extended even to the victims themselves. According to bugged tapes of a private dialogue between Interior Minister Kádár and Rajk, the chief defendant in the first Hungarian trial, Kadar told Rajk: 'We *know* you're not guilty; we'll admire you even more for this sacrifice. Not even your life - we won't kill you; just moral sacrifice and then we'll spirit you away.' Rajk initially resisted this line, but worn out at the trial, complied. He was then executed.

When the Hungarians started the Rajk trial they warned the Czechs that some Czech names would come up. Why hadn't they arrested them? Accusations of 'Titoism' led to an acceleration in the Czech investigations. Moscow sent security advisers to Prague to uncover the 'Czechoslovak Rajk' and his links with Western imperialism. Hastening to prove his own loyalty, former Secretary-General Rudolf Slánsky warned: 'Nor will our Party escape

having the enemy place his people among us and recruiting his agents among our members .. . We must be all the more vigilant, so that we can unmask the enemies in our own ranks, for they are the most dangerous enemies.' In 1950 Slánsky himself was among those senior Party figures arrested on the grounds that they were Trotskyist-Zionist-Titoist-bourgeois-nationalist traitors, spies and saboteurs, enemies of the Czech nation, of its People's Democratic order and of Socialism'.

Cold War spy fever was an epidemic which afflicted the East even more than the West. In Czechoslovakia alone, there were monster trials of former Socialists, Catholics and Social Democrats - 'the leaders of a terrorist conspiracy' - as well as the notorious 'Trial of Vatican Agents' which took place in early 1950. Among the victims were wartime opponents of the Party, soldiers, intellectuals and religious leaders. But they also included suspect Party members like the 'Spaniards' (activists who had fought in the Spanish civil war and were often thought to be dangerously independent), ethnic minorities deported to work camps, and, of course, 'class enemies'.

The victims of these few years numbered tens if not hundreds of thousands. More communists were killed in Hungary as a result of the purges than Horthy had managed in twenty-five years. The secret police rose to power (as their backers were doing under Beria's leadership in the Soviet Union), but were themselves riven by suspicion, informers and feuds. Nevertheless, they managed to superintend the elaboration of a sprawling network of work camps - at least seventy in Bulgaria, holding perhaps 100,000 inmates (mostly in the infamous 'Little Siberia'). Those arrested numbered some 2.00,000 in Hungary, 136,000 in Czechoslovakia, 180,000 in Romania, an incredible 80,000 in Albania. Only Poland, nearing the end of its own civil war, escaped repression on this scale.

The Stalinist terror cannot, in the final analysis, be separated from the ultimate justification for the Party's existence - its role in the transformation of society. Despite the large numbers killed, the majority of those arrested were sent to labour camps. As in the Soviet Union earlier, work became both punishment and means of redemption, both a right and a duty, through which enemies of the 'working classes' could rejoin society in the great task of Socialist Construction. In other words, the Stalinist terror of 1948-53 was bound up not only with Soviet efforts to stamp out heresy or independence within the Party but also with the grand project of state-driven industrialization. Terror accompanied the Party's march towards modernity.

The model for eastern Europe's development was to be the forced industrialization of the Soviet Union in the 1930s through five-year plans. Although the region was more advanced economically than the Soviet Union had been, the effort to create a modern industrial sector still presupposed a profound social upheaval. The communists aimed to transform society completely through an industrial revolution, and the only way to finance growth domestically on the scale required was by squeezing both the agricultural sector and consumption: but this was impossible without coercion by the state. Hence, as one émigré put it: 'The essence of the situation in the countries of eastern Europe is the communist police state and the industrial revolution ' Eastern Europe's basic economic problem had been evident for over a century. As western Europe industrialized, the region fell further and further behind. For the newly independent states created after 1918, the challenge had been how to respond. Peasant parties had traditionally argued that the answer lay not in imitation of the West but rather in support for the independent smallholder and agricultural development. This message carried tremendous emotional appeal but cooler heads realized that it offered no lasting solution to overpopulation and low agricultural productivity.

The chief alternative in the inter-war period was that urged by east European urban elites: gradual industrialization financed by capital inflows from the West. For roughly a decade this policy had actually been tried, and produced rapid but patchy industrial growth. The trouble was that it handed over investment decisions and ultimately ownership of key industries to foreign capitalists without ensuring growth high enough to solve the problem of rural underemployment. Economic nationalists hated the results and felt vindicated when the world slump terminated the experiment. After the failures of inter-war liberalism and thepeasantist movement, the socialist strategy of forced industrialization organized by the state and financed out of domestic savings looked increasingly appealing.

The world depression of the 1930s had already popularized the idea of state-led industrial growth. In the wake of the catastrophic failure of market capitalism, *etatisme* became fashionable: in eastern Europe technocratic planners and army officers (in Poland and Bulgaria) agreed that the state should expand not merely into labour relations and social services but into planning and directing investment. The crisis of 1929-32 had led to new public-sector control of banking, allowing the state greater control over monetary policy and industrial investment. The state's economic reach extended further after 1939 as the Germans expropriated key businesses and introduced war-time controls on production and pricing. Often - in economics as in politics - the Germans' successors simply took over the new tools of control.

After liberation, the new vogue for planning and the repudiation of liberalism spread right across the continent. Enlarging the welfare state, greater intervention in the economy, control of heavy industry and banking all formed part of the accepted wisdom of the day. The key issue in the years 1944-7 was not whether or not to plan, but whether to follow the social democratic or the

communist variant of planning.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, there were powerful pre-war traditions of state planning, and in 1945-6, socialist planners seemed to be winning the ear of local communists in arguing for a mixed economy, private trade and non-collectivized farms. But after the formation of the Cominform and Stalin's refusal to allow East European countries to participate in the Marshall Plan, Stalinist orthodoxy took over. Communists criticized the 'so-called primacy of consumption'. Poland's Central Board of Planning, which had called for a mid-course between the 'heroic road' of forced savings and 'middle-class' demands for an immediate gratification of consumer desire, was wound up. It was replaced in early 1949 by the Party-controlled State Commission of Economic Planning for whom 'the struggle for the planned economy is a class struggle waged on the political, economic and ideological fronts'.

Between 1948 and 1951 every country behind the Iron Curtain introduced a Five - or Six-Year Plan. These were very different from the shorter reconstruction plans which had been introduced after liberation. By this point pre-war levels of output had been regained in most countries, while nationalization had delivered industry into the hands of the state. These new Plans set out highly ambitious targets for heavy industry and power generation. Far less attention was paid to consumer goods, and Party experts - ignoring the signs of social exhaustion - warned that in this 'heroic' phase of development, living standards would remain depressed as resources were ploughed back into investment. Czech premier Zápotocký attacked 'any fond illusions that a rise in the standard of living may be regarded as a necessary corollary, or even ought to precede the successful implemen-tation of the Plan. The exact opposite is the truth: in order to make it possible that our material and cultural level might be raised, it will first be necessary to fulfil the Plan ... so that we might henceforth live better, more contentedly and more joyfully!' Eastern Europe observed the UN, was aiming at 'an industrial revolution far more radical than anything seriously attempted in western European countries'.

. A vigorous propaganda drive hyped the results. The J. W. Stalin steelworks in East Germany, the Klement Gottwald steelworks in Ostrava, the V. I. Lenin iron and steelworks in Bulgaria were the cathedrals of the new era - their monumental entranceways, their very creation, a testimony to the power of man and science to conquer nature. Petru Dumitriu's painting *The Light of Lenin in the Mountains of Romania* celebrated the building of the hydroelectric plant at Bicaz. The 'light of Stalin shines on Albanian soil', was Hoxha's slogan in 1952.

But it was certainly not all propaganda. Growth rates in certain sectors, starting from a low base, were spectacular. Industrial production and employment both grew at least as quickly as in western Europe - perhaps faster - in the 1950s and early 1960s, despite the fact that there was no east European Marshall Plan; indeed the Soviet Union was actually *extracting* resources from the region, not putting them in. 'A revolutionary transformation of the industrial structure has been carried out,' noted the Economic Commission for Europe from Geneva. 'East European governments have on the whole planned successfully.' Very high investment ratios - twice as high as in western Europe - delivered fast rates of growth in favoured sectors such as mining and iron and steel production.

Yet this pattern of development was storing up innumerable problems for the future. The use of a labour-intensive Soviet model was not illogical in an area where capital was scarce and labour relatively abundant; but it did lead east European countries to favour industries reliant on outmoded technologies. While in the world economy the number of miners was falling during the 1950s, in Hungary, for example, it doubled. Large numbers of workers were being funnelled into problem areas of industry, making for economic and political turmoil in the future once the region became more exposed to international competition.

Perhaps politically most serious of all was the problem of agriculture. After nearly two decades in which farmers had enjoyed an advantage over urban dwellers, the late 1940s ushered in a period in which the city took its revenge. In the Baltic states, where collectivization was introduced several years ahead of the rest of eastern Europe, hundreds of thousands of 'kulaks' were deported, just as they had been in the Ukraine in the 1930s: a staggering 3 per cent of the total population went in a mere ten days in March 1949. Because communism had little support among the peasantry, the Party else-where had initially denied any interest in collectivization and tried to win favour through land reform. Now, this policy was thrown into reverse throughout the region. Stalinism placed the burdens of development on to the agrarian sector by introducing collectivization drives, raising taxes, and cutting back loans and credits for farmers. Like a sort of internal colony, the countryside was to provide both food and labour for the growing cities. But state control of the land turned out to be a disaster, just as it had earlier in the Soviet Union. While industrial output soared, agricultural production barely attained pre-war levels. Indeed as late as the early 1960s, per capita output remained depressed and 'meatless days' testified to the depletion of livestock herds..

As the authorities tried to secure the harvest by force, farmers resisted with every means - arson, deliveries of damaged grain, sabotaging machinery - at their disposal. In Romanian Transylvania, peasants burned the new cooperative farms; after one incident in July 1949, security forces only restored order by shooting twelve peasants on the spot and making mass arrests. Party efforts to terrorize the peasantry into submission led to widespread unrest and the inevitable accusations of 'sabotage' by 'well-off peasants'. These 'bitter enemies

of the new order' were 'capable of any crime to ruin Socialist construcction' . The typical 'kulak' 'fails to deliver his quotas, sabotages agricultural production and even resorts to murder'. In fact, the resistance was on an enormous scale, as was even indirectly admitted occasionally the official press. 'How can one talk about the proper ideological attitude of such members as Mikula from Mosina in Czluchów?' demanded the *Green Banner,* the official journal of the Polish United Peasant Party in November 1951. 'He has said that he will not sell grain or potatoes to the State, and that if the surplus is taken from him by force, he will hang himself and let the Western radio know about it.'

Peasant rebellions were a traditional part of the political landscape in eastern Europe and the new state authorities suppressed them much as their predecessors had done, through the militia and army. At least 80,000 peasants were deported or tried in Romania alone, 30,000 in humiliating public show trials. Others had their homes ransacked by the militia, their produce and livestock requisitioned, their families beaten up or threatened. In Hungary, thousands of farmers languished in internment camps, further disrupting the rural economy.

Although these rebellions - even when, as in Transylvania, they obtained the support of anti-communist partisans in the mountains - did not threaten the grip of the Party directly, they did reveal the extent of peasant dissatisfaction. Moreover, as one of the causes of food shortages, they constituted an indirect threat to communist power. Hardliners might try to blame the shortages on the surviving private smallholders, but Party critics increasingly realized that collectivization was a folly which threatened the entire industrialization effort. From as early as 1951 (in Romania) the policy was modified, to reduce the elements of coercion and compulsion. 'The ideal collective farm is a socialistic form too far ahead of present conditions,' ran the new rationale, 'A lower form should be used in this intermediate period.' Hardly a message likely to quieten peasant fears!'

Other 'class enemies' were also being created by the industrialization drive. As millions of young peasants flocked into the cities, the regimes tried solving a looming housing shortage by clearing out 'bourgeois property-owners. These 'unproductive people' were now to pay the price for the slow rate of housing construction (four times slower in East than in West Germany, for example). Operation 'B' in Czech cities in the early 1950s led to mass evictions of 'class enemies'- As far back as last November,' ran a report from 1952., 'rumours started circulating in Romania that a mass deportation of "unnecessary city dwellers" was slated for the near future.' Thousands of residents were deported from Bucharest, Budapest and elsewhere. Bulgarian police took advantage of the 1948 'Measures against Socially Dangerous Persons'. Official permission was now required to reside in an increasing number of 'workers' cities'.

The victims went to swell the armies of slave labourers used on uch high-profile construction projects as the Danube - Black Sea canal (involving 40,000 prisoners). Kept behind barbed wire fences, they lived in the open until they succeeded in building reed shacks and digging wells for water. Food shortages and poor sanitary conditions led to high rates of suicide. This forced labour - sometimes institutionalized as in the Romanian Directorate of Labour Reserves, or the Bulgarian Labour Army - played an important part in helping the bureaucracy aim for the fantastic targets set under the Plan. In Bulgaria there were 100,000 slave labourers compared with an industrial work-force of 361,000.

Even ordinary workers - supposedly the favoured class of the new order - found themselves hemmed in, and urged on, by restrictions and pressures which they had not anticipated. 'To fight mercilessly against the enemies of the working people' - as, say, the Romanian Party was committed to doing - meant attacking the workforce itself. The authorities not only banned strikes and work stoppages; they restricted labour mobility and tried to clamp down on 'absenteeism'. In Bulgaria the 'arbitrary quitting' of one's job was punishable by 'corrective labour'. Workers needed to register with the local police to obtain ID and work cards, and faced prosecution for 'violations of labour discipline'. In the absence of wage rises or convincing incentives, the low living standards, shortages of food and other consumer goods, increasingly strict labour discipline and unmasking of 'saboteurs' and 'agents' alienated the workforce. Yet outright resistance was difficult as the unions were extensions of the state, while workers were encouraged to police themselves. 'The tightening of labour discipline', insisted a Hungarian paper, 'must be achieved by pillorying [loafers and idlers] at production conferences, by reporting their nefarious activities ... by visiting them in their homes, and if all else fails, by expelling them from the ranks of honest workers.'

In midst of this extraordinary turmoil came Stalin's seventieth birthday. The end of 1949 saw roads, monuments, buildings and entire towns dedicated to the Soviet leader. New cities emerged – like Stalinstadt in East Germany, Sztalinvaros in Hungary - as symbols of 'the great construction projects of Communism'. In Prague, the State Commission for Coordinating the Celebration of General Stalin's Seventieth Birthday commissioned a monument thirteen metres high overlooking the city. These edifices were intended to mark 'Man's triumph over nature and the social forces that have fettered him'. Instead, they were soon to reveal the fragility of the Stalinist system itself.

In December 1949 Frankfurter Allee in the Soviet sector of Berlin was renamed 'Stalinallee'. 'The first socialist street in Germany' - as it was hailed - was to be flanked by ambitious building projects. Just as the street was supposed to symbolize the achievements of the communist regime, the

workers building it symbolized the 'new men' who were making it possible. Otto Nagel's painting of the *Young Bricklayer of Stalinallee* depicted one of these heroes against a back-drop of scaffolding and flags. Yet shortly after the completion of this picture, these very same building workers downed tools in the first serious internal challenge to communist rule.

The workers' uprising in East Berlin in the spring of 1953, coming soon after Stalin's death, marked the end of the initial industrialization drive across the Soviet bloc. Similar discontent - which quickly took on an anti-Russian character - was manifest in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. Angered at wage cuts (masquerading as 'higher work norms') the 'Heroes of socialist construction' were, in reality, alienated from the regime that glorified them. Eventually, the street placards on Stalinallee were quietly removed: part of the street reverted to its old name, while part was renamed 'Karl-Marx-Allee'.

REFORMING COMMUNISM

Stalin's successors followed a rather hesitant 'New Course' in the mid-1950s that was supposed to allay this discontent by slowing the pace of industrialization. Collectivization came under attack and where it was reversed - as in Poland and Yugoslavia - the 'socialist sector' shrank with extraordinary speed. Taxes were lowered as were the compulsory crop deliveries demanded by the authorities. At the same time, it was announced that more consumer goods would be made available, and that the housing shortage would be tackled. The harsh labour discipline of the 'heroic' phase of Stalinism was replaced by a more conciliatory approach.

Politically, too, there was a change of course. Just as Stalin's death led to an emphasis on 'collective leadership' in Moscow, so too in eastern Europe the 'little Stalins' were challenged. In East Germany, from where nearly one million (mostly young people) had fled in the years after 1945, Ulbricht came under fire, and there was a row provoked by such pseudo-Stalinist follies as the creation of a Commission for the Preparation of Comrade W. Ulbricht's Sixtieth Birthday. One by one, the 'little Stalins' were toppled; few foresaw that they would be succeeded by others.

More crucially, the departure of the Stalinist leadership was accompanied - as in the Soviet Union - by the discrediting of their chief instrument of power, the secret police. Once the security forces had been above the party; now they were disorientated and uncertain. 'The sad ones', as they were known, were thrown on to the defensive. Never again would they be so sure of themselves, or so reliable an instrument of repression. It was the end of what one victim called 'the dictatorship of the party within the party'. When Hungarian Party Secretary Matyas Rakosi tried addressing a meeting of secret-police officers in June 1956 he was roundly booed.[37] The victims of the purges were thus rehabilitated, their persecutors purged. The party managed to pin the blame for Stalinism's excesses on agencies which had escaped its control: rehabilitating former party leaders like Rajk, Gomulka and Pauker became paradoxically a way of reasserting communist control of the state. In this way, de-Stalinization made any future clampdown far more awkward for the authorities to contemplate and facilitated a new openness and debate. Police powers were restrained by new laws (or by a greater willingness to observe old ones), as the party emphasized the need to 'return to socialist legality'. Labour camps were shut down and tens of thousands of prisoners returned home. In Poland, for instance, some 30,000 prisoners benefited from an amnesty in April 1956 which coincided with a purge of the upper echelons of the security services.

But what did liberalization within a communist system mean? To some it meant independence from Moscow; but as the example of Romania (and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia) showed, 'national communism' was compatible with one-man rule of the harshest sort To others, among them many shocked and guilty party cadres it meant recapturing the 'original purity' of the movement. Thus as the People's Democracies emerged from the 'heroic' phase of the immediate post-war years, uncertain party cadres had to confront the question of how the Party itself should react to de-Stalinization. This debate was fought out between Stalinists and liberalizers in an atmosphere punctuated and to some extent shaped by explosions of popular protest in East Germany (1953), Poland and Hungary (1956). The liberalizers argued that such events demonstrated the need for a change of course; the Stalinists retorted that they were triggered off by rising expectations which had been stimulated by the signs of panic and division in the highest echelons of the Party after Stalin's death. But powerful forces were behind the liberalizers: Khrushchev, in Moscow, for one, who publicly accepted the idea in 1955 of 'several roads to socialism', and tried to mend his fences with Tito. Even the occasional returns to a hard line - after 1956, for example, and again after 1968 - never approached the paranoiac excesses of Stalinism, except perhaps in the Zhivkov, Hoxha and Ceausescu dynasties in the Balkans.

De-Stalinization raised in particular the question of the rule of law under communism, and the relationship between law and ideology (as expressed by its watchdog, the Party). On the one hand, none other than Stalin himself had reasserted the significance of the law; and yet his most important theoretician, Andrei Vyshinsky, had insisted that 'if the law lags behind life it needs to be changed'. According to the 1950 Polish Judiciary Act (a typical expression of the Stalin era) judges were instructed to behave as 'revolutionary constructors of a socialist society'. Throughout the empire, in fact, post-war constitutions had followed Vyshinsky in explicitly rejecting the 'bourgeois principle of a

separation of powers'. Instead, all authority converged in the hands of the Party, even in those cases where Party was not mentioned in so many words. So was the Party above the law? If it was, what was to prevent the re-emergence of a police state especially in a case where - as in Bulgaria for instance - Party theorists insisted that 'to speak about vested rights in socialism is the same as to favour counter-revolution'? The aftermath of the show trials saw party bosses trying to square the circle. To the throng gathered before the grave of László Rajk - in a setting of multiple and tragic ironies - a senior Hungarian party official proclaimed: 'Many are asking themselves: what guarantee do we have that illegalities, offences against the law such as these, will never again take place in the future? - It is a justified question. It is a question to which we are obliged to give our people an answer. The guarantee is the party. We communists are the guarantee.' An unsettling reassurance! Trying to distance himself from the old days, János Kádár insisted: 'A whole nation cannot be suspect.' Or, in another pithy reversal of Stalinism: 'He who is not against us is for us.' Yet even under Kádár, there was no real move towards judicial independence. The Party retained its control over the security apparatus; it was just that the Party became more moderate.

At the heart of these debates was the question of the character of the Party itself. In his controversial 'Anatomy of a Morality', Tito's fiery colleague Milovan Djilas charged that the ideological purists of the revolution had been replaced by a 'new class' of self-aggrandizing time-servers. The 'heroes' of the partisan war had turned into corrupt 'practical men' married to grasping wives. But, if this was true - and even Tito's spreading waistline gave support to Djilas's criticism - what was to be done? Djilas himself talked about building a genuine multi-party democracy and doing away with the Party's monopoly on power. Later, but in like vein, Czech reformers argued for a separation of the Party and state. Such a revival of the postulates of 'pure bourgeois democracy' was anathema to most cadres. Perhaps there was another way. Tito's favourite theorist, Edvard Kardelj, argued that between 'classical bourgeois democracy' and Soviet 'socialism of the apparatus' lay the 'direct democracy' of workers' self-government and the realization of Marx's dream of the 'withering away of the state'. Workers' self-management sounded wonderful in theory, and attracted the attention of curious foreign economists (who showed less interest in the millions of Yugoslav workers who preferred employment as migrant workers in the capitalist West). But though brilliant as propaganda for foreign consumption, Kardelj's theories - as modified by reality - turned out to involve little more than a very pragmatic response to calls for reform. Tito, after all, was hardly going to preside over the dismantling of the Party apparatus he had fought a war to bring to power. Nor, of course, would the Soviet Union acquiesce more generally in the Party's demotion: liberalization would have to take place under its gaze.

If a certain decline in the Party's ideological influence did take place it was due to pressures less easily evaded than Djilas's broadsides. A new technical intelligentsia was indeed coming to dominate the Party machinery, ousting the pre-war 'heroes'. These cadres were economic pragmatists not ideologues, and they recognized the need for scientists, managers and specialists to spearhead the reforms without which the Party must eventually be doomed. Their ideology was that of technocrats everywhere in the late fifties and sixties - a belief that science, technological progress and a state run by experts held the answers to modern life. They sought a depoliticization of the system on the grounds that the modernization of the economy now required not ideologues but administrators.

What made such arguments plausible was the Soviet insistence in the 1950s that capitalism and communism were competitors in a race towards a material Utopia. Khrushchev, in particular, liked to boast that communism would soon demonstrate its superiority to the West by overtaking it in the production of consumer goods: 'Within a period of, say, five years following 1965, the level of US production per capita should be equalled and overtaken. Thus by that time, perhaps even sooner, the USSR will have captured first place in the world both in absolute volume of production and per capita production, which will ensure the world's highest standard of living - His Master's Voice, Ulbricht, talked of 'overtaking and surpassing' West Germany. Strange and implausible as such boasts may sound today they were not dismissed by the West. This was, after all, the Sputnik era. 'Can Moscow match us industrially?' asked one leading American commentator in 1955. His conclusion: the possibility could not be ruled out.

THE NEW SOCIETY

If such boasts were taken seriously, it was because people were struck by the dramatic social changes which communism had brought to eastern Europe. In less than two decades the region became a predominantly urban society. More than twenty million people moved into the war-ravaged towns and their abandoned apartments. New cities emerged; old ones were ringed by estates of high-rise apartment blocks; even villages acquired industrial workforces. In the late 1940s the urban population of the region stood at 37.5 million - some 36 per cent of the total workforce - figures which had remained unchanged for a decade. Twenty years later, the urban population had grown to some 58 millions and nearly half the labour force now lived in the towns. In the recession-bound 1980s, places like Hoyeswerda, Nowa Huta and Dimitrovgrad were shabby, decaying reminders of communism's failure; in the 1950s they

evoked its glorious future. Of course, even in the 1950s, the careful observer could discern the priorities of the new order in the ideological elephantiasis which seemed to be afflicting the region. The centre of Warsaw was dwarfed by a new Palace of Culture, described by one analyst as 'an architectural three-stage rocket' - a Stalinist skyscraper 'donated' by the Soviet onion; central Sofia was dominated by the neo-Byzantine Ministry or Heavy Industry. In Bucharest the mammoth Casa Scinteii housed a printing and publishing complex which produced newspapers, school books, brochures and symbolized 'man's triumph over nature and the social forces that have fettered him'. These 'great construction projects of communism' took precedence over private housing. Even after the 'New Course' increased the emphasis on housing, the shortage of living space remained acute. Yet while homes remained scarce, there were dramatic improve-ments in the provision of other social goods. The creation, for instance of a nationalized health service offered vast improvements in care. In Bulgaria, where the government had passed the 'Free and Universal Medical Care' Bill in 1951, the number of beds per 1,000 inhabitants was soon more than double the pre-war level. In Czechoslovakia where the entire health sector was nationalized, child mortality dropped dramatically from a pre-war rate of nearly 50 per 1,000 to under 15 by the 1960s. Life expectancy converged equally rapidly on west European norms.

Family allowances (often linked progressively to income), the provision of childcare and the liberalization of abortion were all presented as 'part of the emancipation of women' and were not unrelated to the needs of an economy desperate for female labour. It should of course be remembered that although large numbers of married and unmarried women did enter the workforce, they were still paid less than men. And what allowed them to do this were not only official childcare facilities but also the plentiful and indispensable supply of grandmothers, often cooped up in tiny flats with their grandchildren.

This example should alert us to the particular character of the east European welfare state; if (to simplify matters) the Nazi equivalent had been geared to the needs of the race, and the post-war west European model to the rights of the individual citizen, the Communist model was designed to respond, above all, to the needs of economic production. Hence not only the incentives to female labour, but also the relative lack of concern with the elderly or with the rural as opposed to the urban population. Lenin had warned that 'he who does not work shall not eat'. In accordance with this precept social insurance was used as a weapon; not only 'persons with fascist activities' (as in Bulgaria) but also peasants and others outside the socialist sector were often excluded from proper coverage.

Yet under the 'enlightened despotism' of communism some truly dramatic changes were afoot. Education became available to a much wider range of social groups than it had been before the war: the number of primary schools built in Yugoslavia nearly doubled; so did the universities, and the student population leapt from a pre-war 17,000 to 97,000. Schooling was vital to create the cadres for the new order: in Poland there were 250,000 students in higher education compared with 50,000 before the war; in Hungary some 67,000 by the early 1960s compared with a pre-war 11,000. Technical studies in particular enjoyed rapid increases in enrolments, partly because they offered the best job prospects and partly because they were often preferred to the more ideologically charged humanities.

All these changes formed part of a social philosophy which aimed to break down the traditional hierarchies of the past. Communism may have created its own governing class, but there can be little doubt that it was a lot less elitist than any previous kind of ruling system eastern Europe had known. In purely economic terms, there was a striking flattening of income differentials across the board: differentials between manual and non-manual were greatly reduced, despite the persistence of traditional respect for 'the trousered ones'. Upward mobility from the working class into the new administrative elite was deliberately encouraged by quotas for jobs and university admissions. 'Poverty as a social phenomenon had disappeared,' wrote Mlynar. 'People going about in rags, beggars in the streets, slums in the urban periphery . . . had disappeared for good and were known to the younger generation only from movies.' By the 1960s Czechoslovakia was - in terms of income distribution - the most egalitarian country in Europe; Poland and East Germany were not far behind.

All in all, this constituted a social revolution. Living standards were slowly rising. From Yugoslavia was reported 'the increased use of bicycles and motorcycles, and many people had even cause to hope that one day they would own an automobile'. Radio, TV and telephone ownership spread rapidly, posing all sorts of new challenges to Party control as village loudspeakers gave way to personal sets. Families shrank: torn between 'baby or car', an increasing number of couples were plumping for the car, or at least the hope of one. The changing pattern of daily life was mirrored in school textbooks: by the 1960s, these displayed an attention to consumption and leisure which had been unthinkable even a decade earlier. One illustration of the image of a little boy reading to his grandparents (parents presumably out at work), marked the change. A 1952 Serbian primer had shown them all sitting on low stools in a sparsely furnished simple home. The 1963 version showed them in comfortable chairs, in a room with a smart modern cabinet with a shelf of books and a carpet on the floor.

Despite these achievements, however, there was real dissatisfaction within society. In particular, the constant shortages and scarcity of consumer goods undermined the Party's proud boasts. At one level scarcity, far from being a

threat to the rule of the Party, was in fact basic to its power: one of the main reasons for joining or cooperating with the Party was to enjoy privileged access to scarce resources. Were goods suddenly to become plentiful, the Party would have lost one of its main sources of support. At another level, though, the shortages of consumer goods in particular did undermine the main justification the Party under Khrushchev offered for its leadership, namely its ability to outstrip the West in material terms.

Shortages focused popular discontent on corruption and favouritism among Party cadres themselves, as well as on national subservience to Soviet economic interests. Whereas western Europe received capital from its superpower, eastern Europe saw money and goods flow out instead through requisitions, rigged barter deals and Soviet-controlled joint companies. One estimate puts the total cost to eastern Europe up to Stalin's death at roughly $14 billion, which is the equivalent of the US investment in western Europe through the Marshall Plan. The formation of Comecon as a rival to the Marshall Plan did not ease the discontent of countries like Romania and Bulgaria, which saw themselves destined to serve as agricultural producers in the new communist division of labour.

By the 1960s the gap between East and West was widening. Czechs and Austrians had had roughly the same rate of car ownership before the war; by 1960 the Austrians had three times as many per capita. Most other east Europeans only reached the Czech level of 1960 in the 1970s and traffic congestion - that symbol of modern consumerism - came very late to the great cities of the region. The economic 'miracle' in Japan overshadowed everything Moscow had to offer and as Moscow's share of world GNP fell so that of Japan rose. Growth in eastern Europe, despite the reforms, dropped in the 1960s. Unlike western Europe, agricultural production barely exceeded the pre-war level. More worrying in the long term, that growth which had taken place since the war was based not - as in the capitalist world - on improvements in productivity, but rather on huge injections of labour. What would happen as the reserves of labour dried up? Communist cadres in eastern Europe were like a runner who makes a huge effort to catch up with a rival, only to see the latter disappearing over the horizon.

Looking to the future, the authorities could not fail to be alarmed by the disaffected attitudes to be found particularly among the offspring of this social revolution. The 'Hero's children' (as Hungarian emigre Paul Neuburg called them) had been in many ways the beneficiaries of the dramatic changes of the first decade of communism. Yet they did not appear to be grateful. A communist education, far from brainwashing them, had left them with a deep mistrust of ideology and critical of a political system which treated them 'like babies' and deprived them of information. Unlike their elders, they did not compare their lives with the pre-war or war years but rather with their contemporaries in the West.

They developed lifestyles which alarmed their parents and the Party - based around a private world of transistor radios, cassette players and the dream of Western affluence and autonomy. While some young idealists were attracted to the reform communism of the New Left or aimed a Maoist critique at the tired cadres around them, far more had 'embraced materialism with a vengeance'. They tended to be both nationalistic (i.e. anti-Russian) and 'cosmopolitan'. The Romanian politburo were not alone in criticizing their youth for their 'servitude to the cultural and scientific achievements of the capitalist countries'. Parties across the region sponsored endless teams of sociologists to research the 'youth problem'.

Yet not even social science could save communists from the truth. It was the Party itself which had brought the West to these young people - through its insistent materialism, through urbanization, and more directly and concretely through the tourists who were flocking to eastern Europe in the 1960s. Earlier generations had needed to migrate westwards to experience Western culture. Now the West came to them. One million seven hundred thousand tourists hit the Yugoslav beaches in 1963 (compared with a meagre 150,000 in 1926); two years later there were 2.6 million, by 1973 an incredible 6.2 million visitors formed a mainstay of the Yugoslav economy. Other Communist states quickly entered the field. At the same time it became easier for people from central Europe to travel westwards. 'The craze for foreign travel has swept our country like a summer storm,' observed a Czech journalist.

They might have been bored of communist ideology; but in their worship (not too strong a word) of modernity and material progress these young people showed that they were the Party's children still: it was striking how completely the image of peasant life, which had captivated a previous generation of east Europeans before communism, had been relegated to the dustbin of history. (But then the cities had become the homes of the peasants and their children, less prone to romanticizing the rural life than the old urban bourgeoisie, which had been decimated by the war.)

This was the paradox of the Party: its great achievement was precisely what now cast doubt upon its own existence. 'In proposing itself as the Ultimate Hero of History, Rationality Incarnate and the Sole Champion of Progress,' wrote Neuburg, 'the Party created the situation by which it was now ensnared.' This would have been the moment for the Party to retire. But of course it could not: it was committed to the eastern centralism which had once worked so dramatically but was now leading to failure.

THE END OF EMPIRE?

'Bulgaria will not be a Soviet republic, it will be a people's republic,' Georgy Dimitrov had insisted in December 1947. Yet Dimitrov would not have made this pronouncement without Moscow's permission. With the exception of the Baltic states, Stalin had decided not to incorporate eastern Europe into the Soviet Union, preferring a form of indirect rule through national communist elites. In their external as well as their domestic relations, the People's Democracies were an experiment under constant review. The tensions generated by such a form of imperialism remained a challenge to Moscow throughout the post-war era. But was Soviet hegemony ever really in jeopardy ? If the years from 1945 to 1953 were a phase of increasing Soviet control over their European empire, the decades after 1953 saw a gradual decentralization whose rhythms and extent were the subject of continual trial and error. In 1955 the Red Army actually withdrew from the Soviet occupation zone in Austria in exchange for a pledge of Austrian neutrality, a move which caught the West by surprise and was almost certainly inspired by the desire to settle the German question in the same way.

Only rarely did the widespread anti-Soviet feelings which existed across the region manifest themselves publicly (as in the flowers placed on T. G. Masaryk's grave each year, which led it to be guarded in 1953 by more than one hundred policemen), but Party officials were always aware of their existence. So, too, of course was Moscow, which was prepared to allow, indeed to an extent even encourage, the drift towards 'national communism' as the price to be paid for maintaining power. This was Khrushchev's line, which prevailed over that of the more hardline Molotov and which led directly to the dissolution of the Cominform in 1956.

Occasionally popular anti-Soviet sentiment spilled out into the streets. When it did, as in Hungary in 1956, it tended to be in periods of relaxation, by those groups - workers, students - who far from being the chief victims of communism, were (in theory at least) among the elect. 'No more compulsory Russian' was one of the slogans chanted in Budapest during the uprising, 'Russians go back to Russia' another. Workers' uprisings tended to alarm the authorities much more than students' - but neither group could resist for long when armed force was deployed against them. Moreover, astute and flexible handling by the political elite - as in Poland in 1956, or Yugoslavia in 1971-2 - usually served to drive unrest underground again. Moscow disliked having to intervene directly, but was prepared to do so where it felt it was necessary. Djilas talked about a state of virtual civil war existing between the Party and the rest of the population. But Djilas was as given to exaggeration in opposition as he had been when in power. Popular dislike, even contempt, for 'democratic socialism' was always mixed with fear. Communism was highly successful in breaking up possible centres of resistance. Secret police, with the help of vast networks of hundreds of thousands of informers, penetrated the workplace and the home. If the queue could be turned (by Konwicki in his *The Polish Complex)* into a symbol of social relations under communist rule it was because it was organized around the principles of scarcity, rumour and the satisfaction of individual desires. Sullen acquiescence and withdrawal from politics were increasingly in evidence except among a small minority. Indeed a sullen populace was to be preferred to one that took communism seriously, for that only produced idealists and critics of socialist reality. Popular dissatisfaction, in other words, was not the most serious of threats to Soviet rule.

Far more serious for Moscow was the threat posed by communist cadres themselves. The key to Soviet control lay in the obedience of the satraps. After Stalin's death this was never assured. In 1956, for example, Soviet will prevailed in Hungary against the crowds on the streets but was powerless against the Polish Party's defiant insistence on bringing Gomulka back into power. Battles in Moscow itself between hardliners and reformists confused the East European leader-ship, who increasingly kept their distance from both the verbose but unpredictable Khrushchev and the more laconic and cautious Brezhnev. Moscow tried to reimpose discipline through the Warsaw Pact but although it gave Nato planners nightmares (and work) the Pact was basically little more than an instrument for legalizing the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary and Romania after the Austria Peace Treaty was signed in 1955. Neither it nor Comecon could bring back the discipline of the late 1940s.

The Sino-Soviet split harmed Moscow's prestige still further. Not only did it open up another front to worry Soviet policy-makers, but Chinese influence among east European hardliners was a threat from the late 1950s, and as Albania showed, could open up the opportunity for disobedient satellites to play Moscow off against Peking. From the early 1960s onwards, the 'Mother of realized socialism' was fighting a rearguard action in eastern Europe. What made the Prague Spring so much *more* threatening to Moscow in some ways than Hungary in 1956 was the fact that this time the impetus for revolt was coming from within the Party itself. Of course, neo-Stalinist nationalists like Ceausescu caused Brezhnev as many headaches as idealistic reformers like Dubček; wily long-term players like Janos Kadar in Hungary perhaps caused even more.

And yet in retrospect it must be confessed that this rearguard action from Moscow was on the whole strikingly successful. Observers, after all, spent decades predicting the break-up of the Soviet empire in eastern Europe. Ionescu, in 1965, argued that 'the internal history of the Soviet bloc since the death of Stalin is the story of its progressive disintegration and the unchecked decline of Russian authority within it'. According to Pierre Hassner, 'the

Balkanization of Communism has prevailed over the Communization of the Balkans'.

More percipient observers, however, were cautious. The machinery of Soviet control had proved its durability; despite the increasing senility of the Party leadership and its loss of ideological appeal, there were few signs of where a political challenge might come from. Gyorgy argued that the failure of the rebellions of 1956 'cannot augur well for future revolutionary success from below'. Paul Kecskemeti concluded his masterly analysis of the Hungarian uprising with the caveat that eastern Europe was unlikely to be the main centre of political upheaval in the Soviet bloc; instability was more likely to occur in the Soviet Union itself - the heart of the empire - than in its satellites. Most remarkably of all, Francois Fejtö saw in the Prague Spring not only the revival of Soviet obscurantism, but at the same time, the revelation that communism contained the seeds of reform within itself. 'One may hope', he wrote presciently in 1969, 'that the next Dubček will appear in the nerve centre of the system: Moscow.'

9 Democracy Transformed: Western Europe, 1950-1975

The number of communist voters in European countries stands in inverse proportion to the number of housing units per thousand inhabitants.
- Eberhard Wildermuth (West German Federal Housing Minister)

High employment, fast economic growth and stability are now considered normal in western capitalism.
- Michael Kidron, 1968

The vastness of their desires paralysed them.
- Georges Perec

REVIVING DEMOCRACY

After 1945 western Europe rediscovered democracy. The remnants of the inter-war authoritarian Right - Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal - were shunned as hangovers from an unwelcome past excluded from the new international organizations - the United Nations, the European Economic Community, even the Marshall Plan - at least until the Cold War turned them once more into ambiguous allies of the Free World. In the UK, Eire, Sweden and Switzerland' wartime restrictions were lifted and the normal functioning of parlia-ment resumed. The anti-democratic strongholds of the New Order - France, Germany and Italy - put the past behind them and built new constitutional systems. In Greece, the authoritarian legacy of the 1930s was abandoned, despite a civil war, and parliamentary rule shakily re-established. Rut this rebirth of democracy was no simple return to 1919; on the contrary what emerged after 1945 was profoundly altered as a result of the region's memories both of war and of the pre-war democratic crisis. The role of parliament, the nature of political parties and of politics itself all emerged transformed from the struggle with fascism. Democracy now encompassed both a fuller suffrage - as women acquired voting rights where they had previously lacked them (except in socially backward Switzerland and Liechtenstein) - and a greater degree of commitment across the political spectrum to real social and economic rights as well.

As after 1918, the change in attitudes could be charted through constitutional reforms. These displayed a concern for human rights born of bitter wartime experience, and an awareness of the need to defend the individual against the power of the state. According to article 2 of the 1948 Italian constitution: 'The Republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable rights of man.' 'The German people . . . acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights to be the basis of every human community,' ran article 1 of the new German Basic Law, which provided a tighter safeguard on arbitrary state power, and especially the police, than had been delivered by the Weimar Constitution. Given the strong feeling that in the inter-war years democracy had been undermined by over-powerful or disputatious assemblies, it is hardly surprising that many people also wanted a stronger executive. West Germany created what some came to call a 'Chancellor democracy and others - more pointedly - 'Demokratur' (a combination of democracy and dictatorship). But France illustrated the difficulties involved in asking parliamentarians to divest themselves voluntarily power. The Fourth Republic looked little different from this point of view to its predecessor: if anything it handed over *more* power into the hands of parliament, and it was not until 1958 that a disgusted de Gaulle, backed by an exasperated public, managed to create a more presidential regime. In Italy, too, the new 1946 referendum ousted the monarchy but otherwise altered little of the forms of pre-Fascist parliamentary procedure.

Moderation was the new virtue: explicitly in the Italian and German cases (where the Allies anticipated serious right-wing opposition after the war), implicitly elsewhere, governments committed themselves the suppression of anti-democratic political movements. West Germany's Basic Law, for example, laid down conditions governing the role of a political party, its democratic structure and the need for it to comply with the constitution. In some cases this led to neo-Nazi parties being banned by the Federal Constitutional Court. But such measures were probably not the main reason for the relatively poor performance of the extreme Right in post-war elections. More signifi-cant, apart from public disaffection, was the success of the mainstream Right in diverting the extremists' natural constituency into their own ranks. The leniency shown by Adenauer and Italian Christian Democrats helped keep the extreme Right at bay.

In the long run, for all the disgust such tactics now excite, it is not obvious that a total marginalization of the Right would have offered the very fragile new democracies greater security. We should recall how far the anti-democratic Right had predominated in Europe in the 1930s. There seemed a real prospect of its popularity reviving immediately after the end of the war: Allied opinion polls indicated no great commitment to democracy in the German public. Nationalistically minded refugees from East Prussia, Silesia and the Sudetenland in particular were reluctant to give up their dreams of *Heimat.* 'To a demagogue', warned *The Times* in December 1950 - with an eye to the past -

'refugees are what blood in the water is to a shark and the refugee problem is large enough to create a revolutionary situation' Adenauer may have given jobs and protection to a scandalously Iargr number of former Nazis (some 34 per cent of Foreign Ministry officials in 1952 had been Party members); but his defusing of the potentially explosive refugee vote in the fifties and early sixties was mastrlye Had he not brought about the decline of the nationalist Refugee Party by breaking it up and bringing one faction into his CDU, the millions of German refugees from eastern Europe might have jeopardize the very foundations of the new Federal Republic.

Fewer compromises, of course, were made with the extreme Left: conservatively inclined governments in the first decade of the Cold War felt a lot more comfortable excluding the Left than the Right. The Communist Party was outlawed in West Germany and Greece, tolerated but harassed elsewhere. Across western Europe, domestic custodians of anti-communism - especially in the police and security services - worked together with American Cold War warriors, whose centre, the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination, saw its budget mushroom from $4.7 million in early 1949 to $200 million by 1953. Anti-communism was a growth industry.

European governments helped the youthful CIA try out its latest theories of psychological warfare against the Left, attacking communism through advertising, cultural publishing, travelling exhibitions and film. Socialist and Labour parties were supported in their struggle with communists over control of trades unions. At the height of the Cold War, the Americans anticipated a possible Russian invasion of the West, and provided a few reliable anti-communists with weapons to organize armed resistance, just as had been done during Nazi occupation. Only in the late 1980s and early 1990s did the afterlife of these bizarre cells, their links with the secret services in Italy and Belgium, and their involvement in right-wing terrorism, become public knowledge.

Although such paranoia evaporated with the ending of the Korean War, many of the institutions of the new 'national security' state became permanent: West European spy services expanded enormously, and vetting public-sector jobs became standard practice. In UK, for example, the Attlee government rejected proposals from a Tory MP to form a parliamentary Committee on Un-British Activities, but did set up a secret cabinet committee on subversive activities and began regular 'negative vetting' of civil servants. The much more intrusive 'positive vetting' into applicants' views and past activities began in 1950 at the urging of the Americans: a process originally forecast to apply to some 1,000 posts encompassed 68,000 by 1982.

The public showed only limited concern at the consequent infringements of civil liberties. Partly there was a general suspicion of Soviet intentions towards western Europe. More fundamentally, though, there was a widespread feeling that 'all - isms are now wasms'. The war had left people with a deep antipathy to ideological politics And the reflection of this could be seen in the changed attitudes of mainstream political parties, which moved away from the polarized attitudes of the past in favour of compromise. Both Left and Right were coming to terms with parliamentary democracy, and losing their earlier reservations.

On the Left, the ending of the war had originally been seen - in the words of Leon Blum - as ushering in socialism's 'triumphant period'. 'After Hitler, us!' proclaimed the German Social Democrat Rudolf Breitscheid. It was not to be. The new era of social reconstruction would not take place based on socialist principles, as Blum had thought. Fascism might have been defeated, but the menace of communism posed socialists serious problems in its turn; outside the UK, Marxism was the umbilical cord which bound them together, and even anti-communist socialists - an increasingly common breed - found it hard to cut it. Moreover, both capitalism and conservatism proved more tenacious and indeed more popular in western Europe than had seemed possible in the dark days of Nazi occupation, and socialists were forced to come to terms with these realities. Thus, the Left's initial euphoria gave way to a protracted rethinking of the relationship between socialism, capitalism, and class.

The retreat from Marxism began in some countries almost immediately after the war. In the Netherlands, for example, the Social Democratic Workers Party changed its name to the Dutch Labour Party in an effort to broaden its appeal and downplay its class character. In West Germany, Sweden and Austria, the process took social democrats into the late 1950s or even 1960s. Opposition to reform was even more prolonged in France and Italy, with their strong Marxist traditions, and above all in that bastion of non-Marxism, the British Labour Party. Nevertheless, even in these countries socialists were forced one way or another to recognize electoral and economic truth: the only way to avoid gradual extinction was to escape the ghetto of class politics and undergo the transformation into a broader-based type of party-Gaitskell, for instance, warned that Labour was doomed to defeat unless it took account of 'the changing character of labour, full employment, new housing, the new way of life based on the television, the fridge, the car and the glossy magazines'. Opposing him, Richard Grossman tried arguing that managed capitalism would not be able to match the achievements of Soviet-style planning in eastern Europe; but in fact neither the British Labour Party nor any other mainstream socialist movement made any radical attempt on the virtues of post-war capitalism.

The Right exploited the Cold War far more effectively. Less encumbered than the Left by theory and dogma, able to embrace anti-communism with greater ease, and more attuned to the widespread desire in the 1950s for

political quiescence, family stability and domesticity, pragmatic right-wing politicians rethought their earlier authoritarian impulses and built up new, powerful movements committed to democracy and sharing many of the social concerns of the Left. A former bastion of fiscal caution like the inter-war British Conservative Party succumbed to 'One Nation' Toryism: Tory governments in the 1950s were as committed as Labour to a national housing policy, for example. Where economic liberalism survived, as it did in West Germany and Italy, it competed and compromised with very different traditions: Catholic paternalism, social concern and anti-materialism. The rise of Catholic democratic parties was a key here. Germany's CDU, for example, offered a 'socially committed market economy' as a third way between laissez-faire and state planning.

In this way the old polarization and class antagonism between Left and Right slowly yielded to a new emphasis on consensus. In the extreme case, as in Austria, the outcome was a grand coalition of Left and Right (1945-66) whose durability reflected the two partners' determined avoidance of ideological conflict after their civil war in the 1930s: Vienna's two-party state, in fact, turned out to be far more impregnable than the older one-party version. Coalition became the norm in Western parliaments, a source of instability in France but not in countries like Italy or Denmark where frequent changes of goverment hid the continued hold on power of at least one of the major parties. Though on average west European governments were not particularly durable for much of the post-war period, this does not seem to have bred dissatisfaction with democratic politics, and there was relatively little civil protest or public violence. The chief reason for this public tolerance - so striking a contrast with the unsupportive stance of the inter-war years - was surely that the revival of democracy coincided with the most remarkable period of sustained economic growth in history. As people's lives became more comfort-able and prosperous, the political system reaped the rewards.

THE MIRACLE OF GROWTH

It was not easy, at first, to foresee the extended economic upswing that would transform the West in the two decades after 1950. Mindful of the experience of the years immediately after the First World War, most experts anticipated a post-war boom followed by some kind of slump. The slowdown in industrial production in western Europe from 12 per cent per annum in 1947-8 to 5 per cent in 1949-50 apparently confirmed their caution. In 1951 the *Economist* observed gloomily: 'In the third year of the Marshall Plan, which has succeeded beyond expectation, in conditions of prosperity and restored standards of living - in short in what ought to be a good year - a quarter of both the French and Italian electorates voted communist. .. There is almost nowhere a positive faith in the possibilities of progress, such as the Russians and the Americans both have.'

Gloom at the long-term outlook was evident. The Dutch government encouraged emigration on the grounds that the country was unlikely to be able to solve its unemployment problem by internal growth; in less than a decade, the country would be a net importer of labour. In West Germany, many economists predicted that the loss of the agrarian lands of East Prussia and Silesia would lead to permanent food shortage, and unemployed men wandered the streets as they had done before the war carrying placards or signs indicating their desire to find work. The stifling impact of the Cold War on business confidence was reflected in the caution of a French farmer, Lucien Bourdin, who told an American scholar: 'Plant an apricot orchard so the Russians and Americans can use it as a battlefield? Thanks. Not so dumb.'

As late as 1953, the overall verdict of the UN's Economic Commission for Europe was distinctly lukewarm: the 'general progress of the western European economy has not been entirely encouraging'. Balance-of-payments pressures were acting as a brake on expansion. The ECE was pessimistic about the chances of employment growth without inflation getting out of control in what it called a 'private enterprise economy'. Growth had so far been patchy and based on internal factors, with little sign of international cooperation so that 'the historical trend towards national autarky has not been clearly reversed'.

As it happens, the experience of a few countries in western Europe did bear out just such a gloomy forecast. 'National autarky' was exactly the economic strategy followed by the authoritarian fossils of the Iberian peninsula, and by the conservative Catholic government in Eire. The outcome was in every case an unambiguous failure, with sluggish growth and high unemployment or underemployment which looked less and less impressive as the 1950s progressed and the rest of western Europe prospered. Exporting tens of thousands of workers annually - as all three did - to take advantage of the boom was really admitting defeat. In the late 1950s, Eire and Spain changed course dramatically and embraced modernization: Portugal - under its pre-Keynesian economics professor Salazar - remained the odd man out.[17]

By this point there could be no doubt about the quite exceptional character of the economic upswing across the rest of western Europe. Growth was faster and smoother than ever before. Between 1913 and 1950 per capita growth in the region had averaged 1 per cent a year; between 1950 and 1970 this rose to an incredible 4 per cent. For the most part, the swings in the business cycle which had so disrupted businessmen before 1939 gave way to much milder fluctuations. Prewar mass unemployment seemed to have been banished for good: unemployment rates in western Europe fell from an average of 7.5 per

cent in the 1930s to just under 3 per cent in 1950-60 and 1.5 per cent in the succeeding decade. 'Today having a million unemployed and more is thought of as a disastrous possibility,' wrote a British commentator in 1967. 'We should greet it as a decisive mark of national failure.' With astonishing speed, full employment came to be seen not as a precarious and hard-won achievement, but as a natural part of a modern, scientifically managed capitalist economy.

There were substantial differences in performance between countries. Austria, West Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands notched up relatively rapid growth rates; Britain and Belgium some-what slower. Some economies did better in the 1950s than in the 1960s; for others, it was the other way round. Yet the really important point is that in all cases growth was well above any levels previously recorded. Even in sluggish Britain, whose poor performance alarmed domestic analysts, growth after 1950 was - at 3.0 per cent per annum - higher than the 1.3 per cent averaged between 1913 and 1950, or even the 1.9 per cent recorded between 1870 and 1913.

The causes of this unprecedented achievement - the so-called 'economic miracle' - remain fiercely disputed. Abundant labour - in the shape of refugees and underemployed peasants - may have kept wages low and encouraged investment. Yet labour was abundant in the Iberian peninsula, but did not by itself lead to growth there, just as it had not by itself brought prosperity in the 1930s. The abundance of labour was basically a permissive factor, contributing to growth where other circumstances were also favourable.

Much the same applied to capital. Wartime destruction of industrial plant was far less than originally believed. In fact, given the tremendous expansion of capacity during the war, there can be little doubt that western Europe's capital stock after 1945 was greater than in 1939, and growing fast. Tight government control of credit and investment, as well as rationing and other forms of forced saving, kept consumption low and investment ratios high - 16.8 per cent of GNP in 1950-70 compared with *9.6* per cent in 1928-38. But this pattern reflected not only the availability of capital but also the willingness of the public authorities to direct its use, as well as the willingness of populations to forgo consumption in the present for the sake of a better future.

In the mythology of the time, the European recovery is often attributed to the Marshall Plan, the massive American financial contribution which the USA committed itself to providing western Europe follow ing the initiative of Secretary of State George Marshall in the summer of 1947. It is certainly true that the solid economic, political and military commitment which the USA made to western Europe after 1945 was instrumental in making the recovery from the Second World War so much more successful than that from the First. Nevertheless, in purely quantitative terms it is now clear that, except in Greece and perhaps Italy, the Marshall Plan was less important economically than its propagandists - or their opponents - made out. Most European investment was domestically generated, while growth rates in the West were no higher than in eastern Europe where, far from enjoying Marshall Plan aid, countries were financing their superpower rather than being supported by it. What Marshall Plan funds did do was ease foreign-exchange bottlenecks, providing scarce dollars, and allowing growth to continue.

Americans helped change European capitalism - just as they had begun to do before the war - transforming industrial relations, preach-ing the gospel of scientific management and modernizing working practices and equipment. Productivity growth, averaging around 4 per cent per annum, undoubtedly underpinned the boom. The Marshall Planners and other propagandists for the 'American way' launched an array of Productivity Councils, exchange programmes for union leaders and managers, publications and exhibitions. In the late 1940s, a time of considerable labour unrest, 'productivity' was hymned as an ideological alternative to class war, a means of boosting *both* wages *and* company profits.

The debate over the Marshall Plan has highlighted the significance of other aspects of American economic influence. These include not merely the new gospel of productivity, but also attitudes to fiscal policy, investment strategy and class harmony. In general, Marshall planners tried to encourage European policy-makers to boost consumer spending (in order to reduce social discontent and the likely spread of the communist virus), and to break free of the rigid social hierarchies of the past in a kind of European New Deal. Perhaps most important of all, in the long run, was the broader political impact of the American presence in western Europe. The Cold War - at its height in the early 1950s - induced not only fear and alarm but also a greater degree of cooperation among the nation-states of western Europe than had ever been seen in the past. Washington's ambitious visions of closely coordinated European planning may have been quickly thwarted by devious Europeans like Bevin and Schuman. But American money and security could not be gained without strings attached, and these - by tying the recipients to some form of inter-state dialogue - changed the international economic environment in western Europe. In particular, they laid the foundations of the astonishing revival of trade which lay at the heart of the boom in the mid-1950s. France and especially Britain, locked into expensive imperial commitments, were less inclined to take advan-tage of such opportunities than the Benelux states, West Germany or Italy. But through the European Payments Union and later the Euro-pean Economic Community - all encouraged by American policy-makers-intra-European trade boomed. Noting how quickly Germans had abandoned the old inter-war obsessions with land and autarky, Elizabeth Wiskemann commented in 1956 that 'in a Europe which has plans to prevent

sharp recessions in trade and their consequences, in a Europe which is striving after peaceful integration, and whose communications have seemed to melt distances to nothing, the aim of national self-sufficiency seems to have become irrelevant'.

European governments, though, were not simply the passive recipients of American generosity. They had effectively thwarted a return to isolationism by dragging Washington back into Europe with their scare stories of the menace of communism. If the Americans were now the imperialists, they were there (in Lundestad's words) 'by invitation'. The Europeans too had their priorities and strategies and the post-war boom needs to be assessed in the light of their domestic policy choices. To be sure, the old concerns about inflation (especially during the Korean War), the balance of payments and the balanced budget had not disappeared: they survived particularly in countries like Italy and Germany which came out of the recent past with a deep mistrust of *etatisme*. But by the 1960s, governments across western Europe were placing demand management, the pursuit of full employment and economic growth above price stability. In other words, they were more willing than ever before to accept a degree of inflation in return for prosperity. 'In all European countries', Postan wrote, 'economic growth became a universal creed and a common expectation to which governments were expected to conform. To this extent economic growth was the product of economic growthmanship.'

We can chart the development of the new creed fairly precisely. In the early 1950s, the annual reports of the new OEEC (the Organization for European Economic Cooperation) spotlighted the need to improve productivity as the key to expansion. In 1956 it used the phrase 'economic growth' for the first time. When the organization was refounded in 1960 as the OECD, article 1 of its founding charter stated that the organization aimed 'to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries'. In Walt Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth* (subtitled 'a Non-Communist Manifesto') - which explained 'take-off' into prosperity as a universal, historical process - the growth creed acquired its gospel.

'Growthmanship' was not only to be found in official circles. In the private sector, too, confidence grew out of the uncertainty of the early 1950s, and private investment soared alongside public. Indeed, the striking feature of the post-war boom was the way public and private sectors seemed to have achieved a mutually acceptable and beneficial symbiosis. As the egalitarian mood of liberation faded, the socialist assault on capitalism failed to materialize; planning gave way to nationalization, and then to 'direction' and 'guidance'. The planned economy which the CDU had committed itself to in Germany in early 1947 melted before the triumph of Ludwig Erhard's 'social market economy'. In Britain, where Labour seemed initially so hostile to the private sector, employers were treated with a respect which would have startled, say, the more directive Dutch authorities; even in France, 'planification' turned out to be a largely hands-off affair, though apparently none the less successful for that. 'What was it', asked Andrew Shonfield, perhaps the most acute analyst of the new European economy, 'that converted capitalism from the cataclysmic failure which it appeared to be in the 1930s into the great engine of prosperity of the post-war world?' The answer, according to him, lay in the changing balance of public and private power'.

Contrary to the UN Economic Commission for Europe's 1953 fears, Pnvate-enterprise economies achieved high rates of investment and growth rivalling those in eastern Europe. Entrepreneurs benefited from official demand management and full-employment policies and could invest more confidently in the knowledge that counter-cyclical economic management by the state was smoothing out the trad fluctuations which had bedevilled inter-war economic life. As this management was widely regarded as resting on scientific foundations 'it is not surprising that Shonfield should have concluded confidently that there was 'no reason to suppose that the patterns of the past. will reassert themselves in the future'. Wise policy, social solidarity and adaptable institutional cooperation guaranteed for western Europe one of the most remarkable achievements of its history.

THE WELFARE STATES

This 'unexpectedly dazzling' revival of capitalism took place, of course, in a world where the extension of state power was accepted not only in the economic sphere itself, but also in the area of social welfare. For many commentators at the time, the two - a booming economy and an extended welfare state - seemed closely connected. 'Without the underpinning of welfare-state policies,' argued the SPD reformist Karl Schiller, 'the free market economic system might well have collapsed . . . Welfare state and dynamic market economy are mutually indispensable.'

In the Thatcher years, of course, such ideas came under attack. Spending on the welfare state, it was argued, had actually held back economic growth, not helped it forward. Less an argument about the economics of the 1950s than about the politics of the 1980s, it must be said that the historical record fails to bear out such a critical assessment. In Britain spending on welfare was actually a lower proportion of GDP than it was in West Germany, for example. In western Europe as a whole, low growth was accompanied by low spending on social services. Because the state's post-war involvement in social welfare coincided with the consolidation of European democracy, some have argued that it was an essentially democratic phenomenon. The phrase'welfare state'

had, after all, been coined in opposition to Hitler. In 1950 Attlee talked of his government having laid 'the foundations of the Welfare State' and within a few years the term had passed into common usage. It seemed to mark a watershed in the relationship between state and individual, and perhaps also as the sociologist T. H. Marshall argued, to inaugurate a new understanding of the notion of citizenship in a democracy, with social and economic rights now added to political ones. But Marshall's linkage of democracy and welfare reflected the specific experiences of Britain and Sweden. Elsewhere, post-war welfare arrangements reflected strong continuities with pre-war conservative and fascist regimes, while in eastern Europe they emerged under communism. It is salutory to remember that the term 'the life-ensuring state', introduced into West German discussions of social policy by the constitutional lawyer Ernst Forsthoff, had in fact been first employed by him - approvingly - in 1938 in the context of the Third Reich. Post-war Italian social services, too, basically worked through the network of semi-autonomous agencies set up under Mussolini. Yet despite these continuities of tradition, the Second World War did separate two very different policy environments. The world of the post-war welfare state was one of full employment, fast population growth and relative internal and external peace inside Europe. Inter-war social policy, by contrast, had been made against a backdrop of mass unemployment, fears of population decline, revolution, political extremism and war. In both eras, the state took the lead, but whereas before 1940 it aimed to secure the health of the collectivity, the family, and above all, the nation, after the war it acted chiefly in order to expand opportunity and choices for the individual citizen. Each epoch reacted against its predecessor: post-1918 against the individualism of mid-nineteenth-century liberalism, post-1945 against inter-war collectivism. To that extent Marshall's stress on citizenship hits the mark.

The post-war welfare state reflected some real differences of philosophy and institution across western Europe. West Germany, for instance, like the UK, had an ambitious housing policy and was building hundreds of thousands of council homes each year, while the post-war 'sack of Rome' and the sprawling concrete jungle surrounding Athens testified to the indifference of the state in southern Europe where housing was concerned. The British welfare system was financed through national taxation, free at the point of delivery and designed to provide a basic minimum to all citizens. In France, Belgium and Germany on the other hand, the government supported voluntary insurance schemes where contributions were linked to earnings. In these systems, welfare arrangements perpetuated existing income and status differences and were thus basically conservative in their social impact, whereas in Sweden the state was at the other extreme, interven-ing actively to reduce income inequality. Thus there were, according to one scholar, at least 'three worlds' or models of welfare capitalism in western Europe: conservative Catholic; liberal; and social democratic.

Everywhere, though, state spending on social services was rising. In the UK, spending on social services as a percentage of GNP rose from 11.3 per cent in 1938 to 16.3 in 1955 and 23.Z per cent in 1970. Over the same period total public expenditure was rising from 30.0 per cent of GNP to 47.1 per cent by 1970, by which point social services accounted for nearly half of all public spending. Across most of western Europe, public spending rose after the war proportionate to national income; simultaneously the composition of that spending changed, as the proportion spent on defence fell and welfare rose. Because national income itself was rising fast, as a result of the boom, the result was that per capita welfare spending by the state everywhere rose dramatically, accelerating in the 1960s before slowing down once more at the start of the following decade. During the two decades of the economic boom, moreover, the divergences between different countries became less apparent. In 1950, for example, it was only in Denmark, Britain, Norway and Sweden that the proportion of the labour force covered by accident, health, old-age and unemployment insurance topped 70 per cent; by 1970, this figure had been reached everywhere except in the southern fringe of Greece, Portugal and Spain.

To generalize, it seems as though the war had created - or intensified - a demand for social solidarity, while the economic upswing create the resources to support this change. Nor, of course, should it be forgotten that the change in attitudes applied to government revenues as well as spending: in other words, after 1945 people enjoying the security of full employment accepted rates of taxation which would have seemed unthinkable ten or twenty years earlier. Why they did so remains a question entirely ignored by historians - the history of taxation is not the most glamorous of subjects - yet it is a fundamental feature of the post-war evolution of west European society which marks off its own experience of capitalism from that of the USA or Asia.

Strangely, perhaps, the expansion of the state's responsibilities in the 1950s and 1960s was accompanied by a growing sense of disillusionment. 'All the impulses and ideals of the 1940s to recreate, rebuild and replan have now collapsed,' lamented the British social theorist Richard Titmuss. Rising expectations had certainly raised hopes and demands, and pushed poverty thresholds upwards. But neither the 'rediscovery of poverty' of the early 1960s, nor the more general concern at the nature of welfare provision, could be wholly attributed to rising expectations. The limits of the new welfare democracy were becoming clear.

As the egalitarian hopes of the 1940s faded, people slowly realized that the coming of the welfare state had made little difference to inequalities of wealth.

Income distribution was not significantly altered (outside Scandinavia) since there was little attempt to use either the tax or the benefits system for broader redistributive purposes. For whom, then, had the welfare state come into existence? It looked increasingly as though the answer was not for the poor but rather for the better-off, the middle classes and that element of the old working class which was sharing in the fruits of full employment. This suspicion underpins a new view of the origins of the welfare state, which now tends to be seen as the outcome not so much of heroic working-class Pressure as of middle-class interest groups, do-gooding paternalistic intellectuals and the risk-averse of all social strata.

What was so surprising about this? It was just a further instance of the way post-war west European democracy had been stabilized by the middle classes turning radical agendas to their own ends. 'It may look at first sight as if the *bourgeoisie* had, as usual, filched what should have gone to the workers,' Marshall wrote. 'But in the circumstances, that was bound to happen in a free democracy and is bound to go on happening in the Welfare State. For the Welfare State is not the dictatorship of the proletariat and is not pledged to liquidate the *bourgeoisie.'*

What some saw as the product of 1950s individualism, irresponsi-bility and selfishness, others regarded more neutrally as the growth of acquisitiveness and affluence. But the coming of the Affluent Society did pose new challenges to the Welfare State, which was linked in people's minds with the years of austerity, and based on a principle of universality that the rise in living standards made seem less urgent and even 'rather silly'. 'The acquisitive society', Marshall concluded 'has succeeded in expanding its frontiers and converting its natural antagonists to its own creed.'

THE INDIVIDUALISTIC MOBILIZATION OF EUROPE

'Many people of my generation,' wrote Shonfield in 1965, 'who in the 1930s had come to take for granted the ineradicable destructiveness of capitalism, have lived through a major personal experience in witnessing the metamorphosis of the system since the war.' This metamorphosis could be interpreted negatively - by disappointed socialists - in terms of waning social responsibility and the decline or wartime egalitarian goals; it could also, however, be cast in a more positive light as part of a profound social transformation - whar Alessandro Pizzorno termed the 'individualistic mobilization' or Europe. Capitalism's success eroded class rivalries and replaced the activist and Utopian mass politics of the inter-war era with a more bloodless politics of consumption and management. Goods not gods were what people wanted.

The origins of Europe's consumer society of course could be traced back well before the Second World War. If Henry Ford's USA was the prototype, it is true that even in inter-war Europe first signs could be found of the change in attitudes and aspirations that would become so evident in the 1950s and 1960s. Opening the 1934 Berlin Automobile Show, Hitler had stated that:

As long as the automobile remains a means of transport for especially privileged circles, it is with a bitter feeling that millions of obedient, diligent, and able fellows, who in many cases live lives of limited opportunities, know themselves to be denied a mode of transportation that would open for them, especially on Sundays and holidays, a source of unknown, joyous happiness...The class-emphasizing and therefore socially divisive character that has been attached to the automobile must be removed; the car must not remain an object of luxury but must become an object of use!

Such bold proclamations, however, ran up against the realities of the 1930s. Hitler's words were belied by the fact that economic stringency and war mobilization prevented a single Volkswagen being sold to the public in the Third Reich. But once the war ended, the popular tolerance of rationing and austerity quickly vanished. Even when people recognized the fairness of rationing, they increasingly demanded its ending and the reinstatement of the market. From the early 1950s onwards, as wartime controls were cast aside, the outlines of the new shopping culture became clearer.

The production of desires preceded the purchase of goods. Well before more than a small minority were able to afford the new consumer durables and other wonders, advertising agencies and retailers had revolutionized their practices. In the words of the Burton's Manager's Guide for 1953: 'Create desire to possess strong enough to overcome a natural antipathy to parting with money and you will make sale after sale.' Traditional salesmanship was transformed. Women, far from being ignored, were spotlighted as the 'motor' of 'modern life': advertisers saw them in the 1950s chiefly in domestic terms and concentrated on 'hitting the housewife'. 'You can't do any longer without electricity, espresso and Cola,' ran one German ad. 'But you can do without cooking! All these wonders are now yours, dear housewife! What your grandmother and mother had to suffer through by hand, a tiny miracle machine will handle in seconds . . . Tell your husband to dig a little deeper into his pocket!' 'I put the woman in first place,' commented an Italian businessman, 'then the dog, the horse and finally the man.' By the early sixties, advertisers were starting to distinguish the 'little Mums' from the 'timid mouse-burger' and the sexy, single 'Cosmo girl' whom models popularized with the new 'leaping about' style. Old-fashioned snob appeal, which in a way acknowledged the permanence of status and class differences, was now being

challenged by advertising which made a purchaser believe it was possible to move a few steps up the social ladder. 'American' advertising method targeted the 'new status hunters . . . the C2 commuters who drink lager instead of beer, smoke tipped instead of plain, eat plain chocolate instead of milk, and the young AB executives who've just acquired an open-plan and garden in the suburbs'. In 1937 only four American agencies had branches outside the USA; by 1960 there were thirty-six with over z8o offices. Their techniques of classifying potential buyers rested on a founda-tion of new disciplines - market research, testing and applied psychology - dissected in Georges Perec's novel of sixties consumerism. *Les Choses* (Things). 'Psychology, the science which we thought was to be the handmaiden of education,' wrote one alarmed observer, 'has been prostituted to serve the ends of salesmanship, the panjandrum of the inflated economy.' Such voices were crying in the wilderness: advertising as a profession lost the disreputable associations it had had before the war and became an exciting and even glamorous occupation.

The advertising revolution spread through the new mass media: commercial advertising appeared on television from the mid-1950s; while the growth of telephone ownership stimulated the emergence of Yellow Pages retail directories at the start of the 1960s. In that same period, the Sunday papers began to introduce colour supplement which carried articles as well as adverts extolling the new 'lifestyles' on offer. And there was even help for the anxious purchaser negotiate this proliferation of goods. In 1957 the new Association for Consumer Research, supported by the American Consumers' Union, began pub-lishing *Which?,* and in a few years acquired a readership or nearly half a million. The new desires thus created and diffused were satisfied faster than before. Attitudes to credit and debt were changing. The French peasant's view that 'credit is a festering sore on the body of commerce' was challenged, not only by the spread of hire-purchase schemes, but even by the commercial banks themselves through 'the active merchandizing of a range of banking services that are increasingly being adapted to cater for customers who have never before held bank accounts'. Thanks to these financial innovations, the consumer revolution got under way. Mild inflation acted as an incentive. As one cautious French villager put it in 1961: 'The way prices keep going up, it's stupid not to get what you want when you want it - within reason, of course.'

'Well-being' started in the home: all the evidence points to people purchasing refrigerators, washing machines, televisions and other domestic appliances as a priority. Although sales of such goods boomed, it must be emphasized that it was only gradually that the poorer social strata shared in their enjoyment. In this respect, contemporary adverts from the 1950s and early 1960s were not so much depicting reality as proposing the future. In 1959, for example, roughly three quarters of all French executives owned a car, compared with a fifth of workers and an eighth of agricultural workers; TV ownership lagged even more slowly, becoming widespread only late in the 1960s. The car was perhaps the single most important consumption good of them all. Car production in western Europe grew from half a million per annum in 1947 to over nine million annually by 1967. Ownership soared from 51,314 in 1950 to 404,042 in 1960, and 876,913 in 1966 in Austria; from 342,000 to 4.7 million in Italy between 1950 and 1964; from 1.4 million in 1949 to 9.5 million in 1962 in West Germany. As rail usage declined, the network of motorways spread across the continent. Work on the Paris Peripherique started as early as 1956; the expressway along the right bank of the Seine in 1967; in October 1964, at the completion of the Autostrada del Sole which united Milan and Naples, the Archbishop of Florence held a thanks-giving service in the Florence North service station. Congestion created a need for specialist traffic planners - competing with wartime bombers to level Europe's historic city centres - for traffic wardens, parking meters (first spotted around 1959) and yellow no-parking lines. From the late 1960s, cars also stimulated the development of out-of-town shopping, hitting small retailers in town centres and reinforcing the spread of the new supermarkets. In France, for instance, there were just forty supermarkets in 1960; by 1970 there were over 1,000: the age of Prisunic and Monoprix had arrived.

Rising living standards also encouraged spending on leisure. Not by chance did Coca-Cola stick for two decades to its winning slogan for the German market: 'Mach mal Pause' (Give yourself a Break) In 1948 some 3.1 million manual workers in Britain enjoyed two weeks' paid holiday; by the mid-1950s that figure had risen to 12.3 million - virtually the entire manual workforce. More people were taking holidays than ever before, and spending more on them. From the late 1960s, package deals to foreign destinations became increasingly popular: in 1971 only one third of British adults had ever been abroad on holiday; by 1984 only one third had not. As the United Nations recognized in making 1967 'International Tourist Year', tourism was now a major industry and Europe was at its heart, both supplying and receiving the bulk of the world's tourists. For the OECD, tourism was 'one of the most spectacular features of the "leisure civilization" which is gradually developing in the western world'. Tourism was also redistributive, channelling money - at some environmental cost - back into those areas which had been left behind by the boom, places like the continent's southern fringes, now lined with new tourist developments, or its unspoilt rural landscapes, now as often visited as worked.

These tourists were easy meat for cultural critics, who rarely admitted that tourism might have any merit in, say, breaking down the insularities of the past. American Paul Fussell contrasted the gentlemanly and perceptive 'traveller' of

pre-war vintage with the modern package barbarians. Hans Magnus Enzensberger's *Theorie des Tour-ismus* saw tourists as engaged in a hopeless, fundamentally bourgeois quest for freedom from the travails of industrial society. Alternatively, they were just part of that 'flight from freedom' which according Erich Fromm betrayed the bourgeoisie's susceptibility to fascism. But such intemperate attacks formed part of a much broader assault on the new consumerism that brought together everyone from Catholic clerics alarmed at the threat to the 'family and moral order', to high-minded Marxists like Pasolini who despised the fetishism of goods. In Franco's Spain, conservatives saw the boom of the 1960s corroding their 'Organic Democracy', driving the new 'tele-addict consumers' away from the old Catholic values. But even in genuine democracies the dramatic social repercussions of the 'economic miracle' were encouraging alarm as well as satisfaction. Giorgio Bocca in his *Discovery of Italy (La scoperta dell'Italia* (1963)) described 'Italia boom! ... transformed, hypnotized by *benessere* [prosperity]'. The consumer - a passive, conformist object of commercial pressures - seemed to have replaced the active citizen imagined by social theorists during the 1940s. Now - in this brave new world of market research and TV advertising- perhaps not even people's desires were truly their own. For the influential early theorists of consumerism, centred around the Marxist Frankfurt school, the new 'mass society' allowed the forces of modern capitalism to play on the 'false conscious-ness' of ordinary people. As these left-wing elitists saw it, the same masses who before the war had abdicated their own judgement to follow Hitler, were now flocking mindlessly in droves into the stores.

Such interpretations were propped up by snobbery and exaggerated the homogenizing and conformist tendencies of the new consumerism; in fact - as a later generation of cultural critics pointed out - by the 1960s, 'lifestyle' merchandising was actually breaking down the standardization of 1950s fashion. For some optimists, like Baudrillard and Bourdieu, consumer cultures actually offered people a new freedom to define themselves and shape their own identity.

Against this, the rise of the new individualism *had* apparently eroded older, collectivist solidarities. The strike wave of the late 1940s - especially visible in France and Belgium - tapered off in the 1950s. 'There is little point in talking about the "proletariat" . . . because it simply no longer exists,' observes a source in 1958. As a former miner explained to an American journalist: I look around me here in Doncaster. It's not so long ago since I saw people ill-nourished, ill-clad, their homes sparsely furnished. Now you see them well-dressed, well-fed. You go into their homes and they have decorations, pianos, carpets, radios, some of them are getting TV sets. It's all changed.

Working and middle classes alike split between those able to enjoy the new wealth and those left out in the cold. The white-collar managerial sectors expanded, while the peasantry rapidly contracted Ferdynand Zweig, in his study of the British worker, found the connotation of class changing. The term was 'invariably linked with snobbishness but rarely, if at all, with class struggle'. Its range of associations had shrunk, and was increasingly regarded as belonging only to the workplace itself. As one worker told him: 'I am working-class only in the works, but outside I am like anyone else.' *Classes* in the old-fashioned sense - offering collective action, identities and activities inside and outside the factory - were vanishing. Converging patterns of consumption (and reproduction) were blurring the old social boundaries.

German commentators seemed especially conscious of the dangers in a society which had swung from one extreme - of political fanaticism and violence - into passivity and apathy. A society once torn apart by class struggle seemed now to have fallen asleep. Karl Bracher warned of 'the frightful image of a mere technocracy' leading to an 'authoritative remodeling of parliamentary democracy'. Without an active citizenry, Europe would degenerate into a 'self-satisfied expertocracy' which placed all its faith in managerial solutions. Jürgen Habermas insisted that technology and science had themselves become a sort of ideology 'that penetrates into the consciousness of the depoliticised mass of the population'. American political scientists who hailed the 'end of ideology' were talking about the same process, but more positively.

If the Americans had indeed intended to defuse class tensions in western Europe through their 'politics of productivity', it looked -during the fifties - as if they had succeeded. One is reminded or the American official in Italy who had opined back in 1947 that 'there is little hope that the Italians will achieve a state of prosperity and internal calm until they start to be more interested in the respective merits of cornflakes and cigarettes than in the relative abilities of their political leaders'. Had his desires now been realized? Had western Europe in its turn abandoned politics and been transformed into the society of 'happy slaves' which French anti-Americans saw across the Atlantic?

THE AMERICANIZATION OF EUROPE?

'Ten years ago we could still look down on the snack bars, the supermarkets, the striptease houses and the entire acquisitive society,' wrote a French critic in 1960. 'Now all that has more or less taken hold in Europe. This society is not yet ours, but it - or one resembling it - could be our children's. The United States is a laboratory exhibiting life forms into which we have entered whether we like it or not.'

In the 1950s, the homogenization of patterns of living across national and social boundaries seemed to many people to mark a loss of identity, and the

evolution of a typically American model of society. If mass consumption was an American invention, then did not the spread of the car, Coca-Cola and the TV presage the end of Europe's distinctiveness? 'Is what we have here the tendency of a new age through which it is possible to make out the pattern of future societies,' asked Pizzorno, 'or only a momentary flash after which we can expect the return of the same old-problems and impasses, the same old contradictions and conflicts?'

So far as most American policy-makers were concerned, Americanization was indeed the goal. In other words, they regarded the USA as providing a model for the resolution of social and economic conflicts which should if possible be applied faithfully to western Europe: this was the conviction underlying the productivity drive, the promotion of European federalism and free trade, and the advocacy of new types of technology (such as TV) and marketing (scientific management, aggressive advertising).

But how far had Europeans entered this new world? Their protests were certainly loud enough; American hegemony elicited a growing anti-Americanism, particularly in France. Keeping out Coca-Cola, struggling hard to gain a foothold in France, was seen by *Le Monde* in a revealingly hopeless metaphor as fighting for the 'Danzig of European culture'. Across the Channel, playing Greece to Washington's Rome, the British too found themselves torn between humiliation pride at their subordination in 'the special relationship'.

Yet anti-Americanism was markedly less pronounced lower down the social scale among those enjoying the new popular cultures than among the intellectuals and defenders of the old high culture. It was, "also weaker in the countries that had lost the war (Germany, Austria and Italy) than in those which believed they had won it. This was surely because anti-Americanism (and by extension fears of 'Americanization') was closely connected first with the goal of neutralism ('neither Coca-Cola nor vodka') and second with a sense of post-imperial humiliation. It was not enough that the former imperial powers should be forced to lose their colonial possessions; they - or their elites - now saw themselves turned into a colony in their turn. By contrast, in Germany and Austria, the *Amis* were seen as morew a positive force, offering a new modern identity to mask the awkwai national memories of the recent past.

Moreover, the shaping of a less deferential, more egalitarian and forward-looking society was not indeed solely nor even primarily the product of American influence. Images of American life certainly helped, as seen in films from the 1920s onwards. But mass democracy, fascism, the war and Nazi occupation had all effectively swept away much of the old order in Europe before the Americans arrived. The process continued under their hegemonic gaze, it is true, but reflected forces rooted deep in European politics as well. The cinema - often regarded as the spearhead of Americanization - in fact betrayed a more complex relationship: Hollywood films were, of course, immensely popular in Europe. But indigenous film-making traditions - British 'Carry-On' farces, the German *Heimatfilm,* and the French *nouvelle vague* - survived and flourished, even if they did not export well.

In general, American influences were modified once they came into contact with European traditions and wishes. Coca-Cola might have tasted the same on either side of the Atlantic, but other goods were altered. Cars, for example, looked smaller and more modest: Europeans embraced the VW, the Fiat 500, the Morris Minor and the Mini, not to mention the Vespa and Lambretta, which had no obvious parallel in the USA. Even large cars looked different: an expensive crafted 'European' look - as on the Jaguar XK 140, the Gordon Keeble and the Bristol - was deliberately retained; the Sunbeam Rapiers, Vauxhall victors and Ford Zephyrs - plebeian 'dream cars' with their rocket fins - hardly swept the board. Flashy Crestas and Zodiacs were easily outsold in the UK, for instance, by the resolutely traditional Austin Westminster. It was the same story in architecture. Modernism came back eastwards out of exile and brought skyscrapers and apartment blocks, Amerrican embassy buildings, and corporate HQs. Yet the resultant skyline was not quite American; the buildings tended to be lower, and blended more deliberately with the existing street frontage. Suburbs never destroyed the life of urban centres as they did in the USA, perhaps because the flight to the suburbs lacked the disturbing racial impetus it had there.

America was anyway not a homogeneous set of influences; it was an amalgam of different, often contradictory, strands, some real, others mythical. It was as much an idea as a reality, capable of turning into the vehicle for the creative fantasies of Europeans, whether young fashion victims, rock 'n' roll stars like 'Freddy Quinn' (real name Manfred Nidl-Petz) and Ray Miller (Rainer Muller) or film director Sergio Leone, reinventing the Western as Homeric epic in Spain or Cine-Citta.

America offered a variety of models for Europeans to draw on in their own social and political struggles. There was, for example, the 'national security' state (which of course also built upon respectably indigenous traditions of anti-communism everywhere in western Europe); there was the new consumerism. But then there was also the anti-advertising movement, which benefited from American critics like Vance Packard, whose best-selling *The Hidden Persuaders* appeared just as commercial TV advertising started in the UK. The struggle for civil rights, above all, helped to shape both local protest and national legislation in Europe in the mid-1960s and 1970s. In retrospect what is striking about the 'Americanization' debate is the way it fizzles out some time in the 1960s. It is as though by then most Europeans had lost their feelings of inferiority to their transatlantic protector. Loss of empire had not, it was becoming clearer, led to

economic decline; on the contrary, Europe was becoming more and more powerful a force in the international economy, while American power was showing signs of faltering. The old fears of being taken over by American multinationals (expressed most vocifer-ously by Servan-Schreiber in *Le Deft americain),* were allayed by the knowledge that western Europe was now a net investor in the USA . The old nation-state had not disappeared, as many had feared when confronted with the federalist enthusiasm of the Marshall Planners in the late forties. Instead it had survived and grown even stronger. Even TV, originally heralded as the ultimate dissolver of national cultures, had turned out in fact to have created a *stronger* feeling of nationhood, destroying the sense of allegiance to locality and region. Western Europe had accepted the new consumerism as its own.

PROTEST IN THE GROWTH SOCIETY

In 1955 the jurist Piero Calamandrei, one of the architects of the post-war Italian constitution, attacked the extent of his country's recent democratic achievement. The hopes of the resistance had been dashed by conservative obstruction, he argued, the constitution itself remained 'unrealized', and behind the facade of a 'formal democracy' lay the reality of continuities and compromises with Fascism and the 'police state'. The continued use of the 1931 Law on Public Security was but the most blatant example of democracy's imperfections in Italy; there was no real freedom of movement or assembly or genuine equality between the sexes.

In the 1960s, a younger, more urban Europe became conscious of the vast social changes which had taken place since the war, and demanded that politics and the law catch up. The old world of peasants and aristocrats was disappearing through economic growth, where it had not been destroyed by the war, and a more mobile, less deferential society emerged. This wanted real liberty in the Free World, and was no longer prepared to accept that calls for social reform be written off as communist subversion. It was bolstered by changes in Washington, where the elderly Eisenhower was replaced by Kennedy and the Democrats.

As Cold War fears receded in Europe, conservatives in office looked increasingly tainted by the past. There was near civil war in Italy in 1960 when the Tambroni government took office with the support of neo-Fascists. In France, the war in Algeria spilled over on to the mainland. When police in Paris broke up a demonstration and killed dozens of protesters, hurling them into the Seine in one of the least-publicized and most atrocious acts of mass violence in post-war Western Europe, the man in charge was Maurice Papon, who had been a prominent Vichy official. In Greece, the Karamanlis government was rocked by revelations of the wartime collaboration of senior ministers, and clung to power through rigged elections. In West Germany, the 1962 Spiegel affair reawoke memories of the Gestapo, while both Chancellor Kiesinger and President Lubke were haunted by their Nazi past. Adolf Eichmann's trial in 1961 brought the whole issue into the spotlight. It seemed increasingly that.Cold War normalcy and prosperity had allowed only a partial or even nominal democracy behind which lurked older authoritarian forces.

The political beneficiaries of this new mood were the parties of the centre-left - Harold Wilson in the UK, the SPD in West Germany, the 'opening to the Left' in.Italy, and George Papandreou with his 'unending struggle' in Greece. Labour and social democratic parties returned to power, as managers of a more modern society. Like the conservative Right before them, they were slowly emancipating themselves from class affiliation, and turning themselves into broader catch-all parties which could respond to deep, gradual shifts in popular opinion. These governments were keener than their predecessors to use the state to improve educational and health services, and to legislate for reform in areas of social and civil rights. The real prospect of change, in turn, fed the appetite of movements and lobby groups calling for reform and modernization. Thus the 1960s marked the beginning of a new deepening of democracy in western Europe, the real break with traditional social values and institutions, and - for may - the onset of modernity. In December 1965, the case of a young Sicilian peasant woman called Franca Viola hit the Italian headlines after she was abducted and raped by a young man whose offer of marriage she had refused. Normally in such situations - by no means uncommon - the woman was expected to yield, so that what the Italian Penal Code defined as *matrimonio riparatore* could cancel out the man's offence. For the first time anyone could remember, however, the raped woman refused to get married. As a result, her suitor was arrested and eventually sentenced to jail. It was Viola's obstinacy which local opinion in her home town regarded as dishonourable. But in the rest of Italy the case caused a sensation, and underlined women's lack of equal status and dignity in the eyes of the law.

In the 1960s, the demand for greater democracy was spearheaded by a growing awareness of women's continuing social and economic subordination. Constitutions might promise equality to all citizens irrespective of gender, but under existing penal codes, men and women were often treated quite differently. Men could commit adultery with impunity while women laid themselves open to punishment. Husbands could prohibit their wives seeking work outside the home, and fathers retained absolute power over the children. In Switzerland women did not even gain the vote until the 1970s; in France many could not open their own bank accounts. Large numbers of women continued to enter the labour market, yet once there they faced discriminatory

pay and working prospects.

In many ways, the move for female emancipation had been on the retreat in Europe since the early 1920s; certainly the inter-war years, beset by fears of national decline through falling birth rates and by mass unemployment, had seen women's rights eroded. Even Soviet Russia, which had given women unprecedented legal equality after 1918, reverted to the ideology of motherhood in the mid-1950s. Now reforms to benefit women, and to increase their autonomy, independence and equality before the law, threatened the basis of the traditional European family as it had been sanctified in the inter-war years and reaffirmed in the conservative 1950s. Demands for sexual liberty were even more frightening. An Italian Catholic sociologist castigated 'the exasperated individualism which is carrying the American and North European family to the edge of total disintegration and warned against 'a conception of matrimony as a mere sexual benefit for the individual'.

Yet the tide was turning in favour of reform, as an army of social commentators and psychiatrists discovered the costs of home-bound isolation, and what the French called the 'Madame Bovary syndrome'. In *The Captive Wife,* sociologist Hannah Gavron stood the 1950s ideal of domesticity on its head, to reveal the depressions and frustrations it bred as extended family and communal bonds withered, and television and traffic pushed the nuclear family indoors.

Changing sexual practices (chiefly through the pill, which entered western Europe in the early 1960s), and the emergence of a newly independent generation that aimed at higher education and professional autonomy, prefigured the legal reforms which came at the end of the decade. Birth control liberated itself from its pre-war eugenic implications and family-planning clinics spread across Europe. Most Scandinavian countries had legalized abortion very early; Britain followed in 1967. But in Catholic Europe, the battle took longer, mobilized hundreds of thousands of women and led to major political conflicts before decriminalization occurred, chiefly - and very hesitantly - during the 1970s. Even today, abortion is only available in Germany and Portugal on very limited grounds, and illegal abortions continue to be widespread.

Legal changes were more rapid where contraceptives were concerned, no doubt because the baby boom had made the old fears of population decline seem irrational. In 1961 Nazi police ordinances against the sale of contraceptives were finally taken off the books in West Germany, and France relaxed its prohibitions in 1967; Italy repealed Fascist legislation four years later. As for realizing the equal status of women in marriage and the family, the reform of divorce procedures and of family law generally took place in the 1970s, and - in post-dictatorship southern Europe - in the 1980s, more than sixty w[e]ars after civil divorce by mutual consent was introduced in Sweden and Bolshevik Russia. Slowest of all was effective action to secure equal rights in the workplace. Constitutional guarantees and Common Market directives mostly remained empty promises, and although a few countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, France and the Scandinavian north did bring in legislation on equal pay and treatment, too often provisions were unenforced, or realized only through lengthy court battle West Germany and Austria, entrenched conservatism made the look even bleaker.

Overall, the battles for female emancipation and equality bore out Calamandrei's critique of post-war democracy: formal guarantee of constitutional rights had meant little without effective political action for their realization. This applied as much to the post-dictatorial constitutions of southern Europe (Spain, Portugal and Greece) as to the earlier post-1945 models. Constitutions might offer women full *political* rights; but without equality in private law and commercial practice as well, women remained subordinate to men. In the 1960s and 1970s, the struggle to achieve such equality formed one of the most remarkable and sustained examples of social protest in western Europe. Full equality was not gained, and neither were many of the rights which women claimed were necessary for their protection and well-being; but the paternalist basis of social institutions was exposed and gradually reformed. As so often, the starting point for reform in liberal democracies was exposing the gap between what they promised and what they really provided.

Nothing so revealed the continued authoritarianism in post-war conservative European politics as the generational warfare which broke out during the boom. In 1957 a law was passed in Austria to protect young people from immoral influences, including 'dangers in the streets, the indiscriminate visits to restaurants and events, the consumption of alcohol and nicotine, and from all harmful influence from outside'. Such measures, it seemed to those in authority, were urgently needed. When Elvis Presley came to Europe, he turned teenagers into 'wild barbarians in ecstasy' or even 'haunted median men of a jungle tribe governed only by music', threatened western civilization with African primitivism, and drove young girls into 'intoxicating' sexual delinquency. Behind the rock 'n' roll hysteria of the 1950s and the equally hysterical reaction of the mainstream press and politicians was a very real challenge to post-war conservatism. A new front opened up between the adults who had gone through the war and their children.

Post-war economic growth helped fuel this. Generational authority was threatened by the emergence of a separate youth culture, based on the fourfold rise in teenage earnings between 1938 and i960. Young people more of them than ever before thanks to the post-war baby boom - were being sought after by employers and retailers. What puzzled and concerned commentators in the

late 1950s was the way this growing affluence appeared to be accompanied by a new violence and lawlessness. This was what the Germans, faced with the rock 'n' roll cinema riots, called 'prosperity criminality' *(Wohlstandskriminalität*). In 1956 Bavaria's Interior Minister declared that, as 'humanitarian molly-coddling' had failed to make the *Halbstarken* behave, the authorities would now act 'with brutality'. In Italy the activities of the *teppisti,* gangs of teenage joyriders, pushed an anxious government into passing'regulations for the repression of hooliganism'. (Conservatives in Greece followed suit.) Observers were quick to point out the link between the new vandals' love of cars and the consumer boom with its spreading auto culture. In England - whose Victorian mores had probably been less shaken up by the war than anywhere else - rhe problem seemed equally serious. 'Get rid of that suit and try to become a decent member of society,' an outraged magistrate told one Teddy boy. 'Dance halls, cinemas, police and public join forces to wage WAR ON THE TEDDY BOYS,' reported the *Sunday Dispatch* on 27 June 1955. 'Menace in the streets of Britain being cleared up at last.'

Some put the problem down to the effects of the war on family stability. Yet it was around 1954 - coinciding with the ending of austerity - that juvenile crime and disorder had suddenly taken an upward turn, with large gangs brawling in cafes and clubs. A sympathetic observer of 'rebellious youth' connected these trends with the disintegration of older social norms: on the one hand, the working class was splintering; on the other, the 'bourgeois age' of a dominant middle class was being replaced by a broader, mass culture. Some working class youths could rise socially in this setting; but others were marginalized more than before. In fact, retrospect suggests that the whole problem was blown up out of all proportion; there was rather *little* youth violence, considering the extent of social disruption during and after the war. Conservatives demonized the *teppisti,* the Teddy boys and the *Halbstarkeri,* and exaggerated their significance. Most countries had long traditions of urban youth riots. But in the stolidly conformist climate of the 1950s and early 1960s even small disturbances and signs of independence threatened the authority of a ruling generation which - just as in eastern Europe - felt increasingly unable to understand its own children. They were disobedient, wore scandalous clothes and hairstyles, and took for granted - when not actually attacking - the achievements that their parents had made through self-sacrifice and hard work since the war.

'My parents, relatives and their friends live like mice in a closed cage . . . and want us to live the same way,' wrote a girl to the Italian teenage magazine *Mondo Beat* in 1965. 'They want more money and spend it on stupid things: a bigger television, covers for their cars ... But they don't know how to really enjoy themselves.' German student leader Rudi Dutschke fulminated against 'aggressive and fascist consumerism'. The children of the consumer revolution were thus turning against it and coming back to politics and protest. What was so enigmatic was the way they combined an anti-consumerist stress on spiritual enjoyment, on love, Flower Power and individual self-fulfilment with older kinds of political visions - of social revolution, class war, strikes and barricades.

First in West Berlin, later in France and Italy, youthful dissatisfaction with the mainstream Left was expressed in a radical critique of post-war social development. In December 1966, for instance, students demonstrated down the Ku'damm, symbol of Berlin's new shopping culture, just before Christmas. They attacked the 'myth of Western democracy' and drew on Marxist critiques of consumerism to decry the emptiness and authoritarianism they saw around them. The Vietnam War had shattered the American dream even - perhaps particularly - in countries like West Germany and Italy, where it had been so strong before.

The signs of a revival of mass protest were already visible - in the marches of CND in the early 1960s, in the violent demonstrations against American involvement in Vietnam, against the Greek colonels' coup in 1967, and the Shah's tyranny in Iran. TV images of the civil-rights marches in the USA, together with a reawakening interest in the legacy of resistance from the Second World War, fed a growing anti-authoritarianism. In 1968 came the explosion: campus sit-ins, riots, strikes and demonstrations rocked Europe, threatening at one point to topple the de Gaulle government; street fighting returned to rhe streets of Paris, Berlin and Milan. The scale of the turmoil shocked and delighted those who had observed the apathy and conformism of middle-class youth in the previous decade. For subsequent generations, '68' came to assume the proportions of a myth, a myth fed subsequently by the large number of its participants who as writers, broadcasters, teachers or film-makers found themselves able to provide a public interpretation of what it had all meant. 'It would not be unjust', writes Sunil Khilnani in his study of the intellectual Left in France, 'to see 1968 as an interpretation in search of an event.' To a later and perhaps more cynical generation, the turmoil of 1968 looks less impressive than it did to its protagonists, more noise than lasting achievement, a product in many ways of the very prosperity the students were attacking, and an unrepresentative product at that. Despite the rapid expansion of student numbers - itself, of course, an achievement of post-war democracy - only a small proportion of the youthful population was actually involved in the upheavals: in the mid-sixties only 5.5 per cent of twenty-year-olds in the UK were in higher education (8.6 per cent in Italy, 7.7 per cent in West Germany, 16 per cent in France). Their demands too were unclear: stressing the present rather than the future, absolute liberty and freedom of expression, hindered the expression of unified, concrete demands. Indeed when these finally emerged in

an organized shape, they took the form of an extreme Marxist sectarianism - 'Stalin, Mao and the "great Popular Republic of Albania' - which left many of the original Participants cold. The events of 1968 thus created a fragmented and bitterly dogmatic Leftist fringe, tempted by violence and unable or unwilling to comprehend the scale of capitalism's triumph. It had its own way of life, with endless proclamations, critiques and public theses, and a fondness for intellectual gurus whose pronouncements did not save their followers from a complete misreading of the political situation. This detachment from the realities of power reached its culminating expression in the terrorist Red Army Faction in West Germany, which saw itself as a 'city guerrilla force' carrying out an armed 'anti-imperial struggle' under the slogan 'Victory in the People's War!' These terrorist groups and the police repression and right-wing counter-terrorism they provoked mostly disappeared by the end of the 1970s. But for a time thye raised the spectre of that inter-war political extremism and ideological polarization which most of western Europe hoped had been left behind for good.

And yet the student radicals did have some real achievements to their credit. First, they drew attention to a vacuum of belief at the heart of post-war politics. Their passionate idealism reminded people of the need for political and ideological debate; not all problems are reducible to questions of scientific management or interest-group bargaining. Second, their often satirical attack on post-war authoritarianism, if exaggerated, was well aimed, and encouraged a more critical look at the centres of corporate, military and political power. Finally, they acted as a typical interest group, securing resources for the university system and opening it up to more democratic influences.

Effective if less glamorous interest-group action was also being mounted by the organized working class, as student dissatisfaction coincided with an upsurge in labour unrest and inflationary pressures. The protests of 1968 showed that class activism had been written off too quickly: in fact, post-war state-led corporatism was coming under strain as never before. With full employment, the unions pressed for long-delayed wage rises, and used the opportunity provided by the students' actions to attack the prevailing distribution of wealth. In Italy and France, the result was that the protests of thousands of students were quickly supplemented by a wave of strikes as millions of unionists demanded a fairer share in the growth society.

Yet if the students wanted to do away with capitalism, the workers aimed instead to enjoy more of its profits. Their aims were thus divergent, and it is not surprising that once the unions had achieved most of their demands, hopes of a continued student-worker alliance quickly faded. The working class was no longer revolutionary: its bargaining power was at its height in these last years of the boom, and its most advanced sectors were able to use this to their advantage.

As a result, in the early 1970s, union bosses and frightened conservative opponents both fell into the trap of exaggerating labour's political strenght, the fortunes of western Europe's workers rose and fell with capitalism itself. This was to prove the last victory for the old working class in a century of organized struggle, before recession, mass unemployment and global restructuring wiped it out in little more than a decade.

MIGRATIONS

In 1964 the German magazine *Der Spiegel* devoted its cover to a Portuguese worker called Armando Rodriguez, hailed as the one millionth 'migrant worker' to enter the country, and greeted at Cologne with an official welcome and the present of a motorbike. This was an era when immigrants were welcomed and regarded as indispensable for continued prosperity.

Post-war capitalism thirsted for labour, and demanded human mobility. Europe's nation-states, on the other hand, aimed to patrol their borders and to distinguish between their own citizens, to whom they offered an increasing array of rights and benefits, and foreigners. Thus there was - and remains - an inherent tension between the demands of capitalism and the nation-state where immigration is concerned. After 1950, mass immigration started out as an economic necessity but soon turned into a cultural and political issue which brought to the surface the racism still entrenched in European society, fascism and communism had between them more or less eliminated many of eastern Europe's ethnic minorities; now capitalism introduced quite different minorities into the West. The evolution of multiracial societies became as great a challenge to post-war democracy in Europe as the struggle for gender equality.

Of course western Europe, like the continent as a whole, had long supplied and received vast flows of human beings. The immigration wave after the war - somewhere around ten to fifteen million people in total - was dwarfed by the fifty-five to sixty million who had emigrated from the continent to the Americas before 1921. So far as labour mobility was concerned, German industry and agriculture in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had relied heavily upon Polish labour, while the French working class which evolved over the same period included many Belgians, Italians, Poles and Swiss. The use of migrant labour, much of which would become permanent, was nothing new in Europe's history.

Yet the great post-war immigration was so completely unforeseen that after 1945 a wave of emigration took place from the continent, as governments viewed pessimistically the chances of avoiding long-term mass unemployment:

this was why the Dutch, British, Italians and others encouraged overseas settlement. But at the same time, refugees were pouring into West Germany, while other countries accepted some of the millions of DPs who refused to return to eastern Europe. 'People were afraid for their jobs,' recalls a Polish man who settled in the UK after the war. 'They still remembered the slack before the war and that was understandable.'

Even at this stage, a link between immigration policy and racism was evident: Whitehall, for example, operated its European Volunteer Workers scheme in the late 1940s on the basis of a racial classification, granting priority to Baits and keeping out Jews. Still haunted by the old fears of population decline, Britain's post-war Royal Commission on Population - worried about national weakness in the face of Soviet expansionism - recommended that 'immigration on a large scale into a fully established society like ours could only be welcomed without reserve if the immigrants were of good human stock and were not prevented by their religion or race from inter-marrying with the local population and becoming merged with it'. Immigration and racial issues remained intertwined thereafter.

Yet the dynamics of capitalism pushed in quite another direction. From the mid-1950s, sustained economic growth fed an apparently insatiable demand for labour. At first, this was satisfied domestically - either by refugees, as in Germany, or by the rural economy, which supplied hundreds of thousands of workers annually to the urban centres of western Europe. In Italy alone over nine million people moved from one part of the country to another. Between 1950 and 1972 the numbers working in the agricultural sector overall in the West fell from thirty million to 8.4 million, or from one third to one tenth of the total workforce of the original Six. The curtain fell on the centuries-old history of the European peasantry, and only the FEC's Common Agricultural Policy acted as a form of historic preservation of this vanishing species. In the cities, villagers found work, anonymity (from the repressive surveillance of relatives, the gendarme and the state) and new, more modern ways of living.

As these sources were exhausted, employers started to look further afield. Switzerland and Sweden had been recruiting Italian labourers from as early as 1945, but the main effort started in the late 1950s. By the 1960s, France, Germany and Switzerland were competing for labour in southern Europe. The state tried, not very successfully, to control this trade: the West German Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit set up recruiting offices in six countries round the Mediterreanean; the French, through the Office National d'lmmigration, had no fewer than sixteen, mostly in Africa, operating on the basis of bilateral agreements between host and supplier country. In Britain, the state was less involved, partly because labour requirements could be satisfied by British citizens, and partly because of a traditional reluctance to intervene in, still less encourage, recruitment of workers from the empire. It was thus left to employers, like the National Health Service and London Transport, to arrange their own schemes. Even so, immigrants from Cyprus, the Indian subcontinent and the West Indies soon responded to the needs of the British labour market.

In fact, even in France and West Germany, the state actually had little control over the immigration process, and channelled only a small proportion of incoming workers through its offices. But in the 1960s this seemed scarcely to matter. In 1958 55,000 foreign workers entered Germany; by i960 the number had risen to 250,000. In France numbers rose from around 150,000 annually in the late 1950s to 300,000 by 1970. What makes the trend even more remarkable is that both countries had, by British standards, enormous refugee influxes at the same time - three million young men fleeing East Germany by 1961, and one million *pieds noirs* from Algeria. Mass unemployment seemed a figment of the past; modern capitalism's insatiable demand for labour coped simultaneously with several millions of refugees the twenty million or so west Europeans who moved from agricultural work to industry or services, *and* with the approximately ten million workers from southern Europe, the Mediterranean fringes or more far-flung colonies. European labour markets were internationalized as the number of foreigners living in western Europe trebled in three decades.

The initial newcomers were young men, without families, lodged in inadequate accommodation and poorly treated by locals. Entrances to public parks in Switzerland carried signs saying 'No entry for dogs and Italians'. In English lodging houses the placards read: 'No Blacks Irish or dogs.' Greek 'guest workers' in Germany were following in the steps of the forced labourers taken to the Reich during the war barely a decade earlier: living conditions sometimes seemed little better. In Germany and Switzerland, those who came on the basis of the bilateral labour agreements were placed on short-term contracts and housed in hostels, segregated from the rest of the population. They enjoyed minimal rights and could be deported. Although legally the situation of workers in Britain and France was better than this, socially they suffered a similar degree of segregation and discrimi-nation. Across western Europe, immigrant workers tended to cluster in urban centres, forming iz per cent of the Paris population, *16* per cent in Brussels, n per cent in Stuttgart and 34 per cent in Geneva by the early 1970s.

One reason why governments had failed to plan any kind of long-term strategy for immigration on this scale was that they assumed it was a temporary phenomenon. For at least a century, migrants had provided a useful cushion, taking up the slack in the boom and shielding the indigenous workforce from unemployment during a downturn. In France, Germany and elsewhere, short-term and even seasonal contracts were the traditional instrument for regulating

labour flows. Within a short time, however, it became apparent that not all immigrants intended to return home quickly: many Italians. Yugoslavs, Greeks and Spaniards did, but not so many from Turkey, the West Indies and India. In a pattern identical to that observed among those European migrants to the USA in the nineteenth century, these incomers now brought over wives and started families. In the early 1970s, they were in fact pushed to do so by the threat of forthcoming immigration controls. Although they moved out of unpleasant hostels into flats of their own, their segregation did not cease, for as in the USA – though on a lesser scale - many whites moved house rather than live in a racially mixed neighbourhood, and enclaves began to appear in the cities. Soon a second generation emerged. Of the approximately 924,000 members of the 'coloured' population in the UK in 1966, 213,000 had been born there: what had started out as a question of immigration policy inescapably raised issues of race, citizenship and national culture.

In his 1973 film, *Fear Eats the Soul,* Rainer Werner Fassbinder depicted a love affair between a Moroccan 'guest worker' and an older German woman, Emmi. They are 'just a rabble', her friends tell her, 'mean, filthy swine'. Surrounded by prejudice, the two get married, however, and have their wedding meal in a Munich restaurant once frequented by Hitler. As Fassbinder implied, pre-war and post-war racism were closely linked, and the influx of foreign workers brought out the enduring sense of superiority, the cultural anxiety and prejudice that were never far beneath the surface in west European society. In 1955 it had been London's Cypriots whom Teddy boys had attacked in the name of the 'white man'; three years later it was the West Indians living in Notting Hill. Although racist violence and overtly xenophobic politics were relatively uncommon, and indeed criticized by mainstream opinion, a milder form of racism was widespread and growing. In the early 1970s, the economic climate changed and became more hostile to continued immigration on a large scale.

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw a series of restrictions placed upon immigration, with an increasingly evident racial bias. Both Britain and France retreated from their earlier relatively liberal imperial citizenship policies; the empire had collapsed more quickly than anyone could have predicted, and citizenship rights were swiftly confined to the *métropole.* In Britain legislation between 1962 and 1971 closed the door on new arrivals, except for the Irish, who remained the largest ethnic minority in the country. From 1968 British citizenship was, for the first time, made dependent on having a British parent. Similar developments followed in France, which tightened up its immigration procedures in the early 1970s. Further immigration was halted into France in 1974, and recruitment into Germany stopped at about the same time.

But stopping immigration was easier than taking action to improve race relations. West Germany, unlike the former imperial powers always differentiated between ethnic Germans and 'guest workers'. The 1965 'Foreigners' Act' *(Auslandergesetz)* was an even more stringent measure than the National Socialist legislation it replaced; expul-sion no longer depended on the behaviour of the individual worker but simply on the needs of the state. Keeping its head in the sand, the Bonn government steadfastly refused to acknowledge the new social realities. In the resolute words of the Federal Commission of 1977: 'The Federal Republic is not an immigrant country. Germany is a place of residence for foreigners who will eventually return home voluntarily.' Yet there were 1.3 million foreign workers there in 1966 and 2.6 million by 1973; foreigners were responsible for 4.3 per cent of all births in the country in 1966, and 17.3 per cent in 1974.

Most countries took a long time to grapple seriously with racial prejudice. 'We were foreigners and treated as such,' recalled an east European who settled in Yorkshire. 'You - every time you had to prove yourself - that you were, well perhaps not equal, but almost.' The existence of prejudice was generally regarded as an unfortunate fact of political life, to be found on both Left and Right. There was no anti-discrimination machinery, and in most countries the state clearly believed that encouraging migrants to return home was the best answer to racial tensions (as in Bonn's 1983 Act to Promote the Preparedness of Foreign Workers to Return). Only a few people argued that such policies actually made the problem worse.

Even in Britain, where limited race-relations legislation *was* enacted, the stimulus was effective lobbying by small groups rather than widescale public protest. The 1971 Immigration Act too contained provisions for 'repatriation', though these were never publicized or promoted, to avoid jeopardizing 'good race relations'. In fact, to judge from opinion polls, although west Europeans recognized that the expression of racial prejudice was no longer as acceptable as before the war, much of their underlying hostility towards foreigners, especially those from outside Europe, remained. Labour unions suspected immi-grants of undercutting wages, conservatives feared them corrupting the national culture. Few seemed aware that Britain, for example, remained a net *exporter* of migrants for most of this period, that immigrants brought net economic gains to their host societies, or that immigrant populations formed a mere 2.3 per cent of the total population of western Europe (1970-71). Few would have agreed with one immigrant that 'as (your) culture enriches ours, ours enriches yours as well'. As economic optimism evaporated in the early 1970s, immigrants were transformed almost overnight from valued factors of production into a threat to jobs, a drain on the welfare state and unwanted aliens.