European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense

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Because of their distinctive histories, cultures, and geopolitical contexts, Europeans and Americans have generally contrasting perspectives on national missile defense. Few U.S. policymakers have recognized the depth of European skepticism, and even opposition. As a result, much political capital has been expended in futile endeavors to persuade Europeans of the true wisdom in U.S. policy. For a real dialogue on national missile defenses, it is necessary for each side of the Atlantic to understand the deeper reasons which have shaped the other’s policy perspective.

Introduction: Wrong Question, Unhelpful Answers

Empathy for the political and strategic culture of others is a quality in short supply. Even mere understanding, a necessary basis for possible empathy, frequently is absent. The subject of this paper is a classic case of a dialogue of the deaf. Europeans and Americans are talking past each other on ballistic missile defense (BMD). Occasionally, neither side credits the other either with competence in its reasoning or, in some instances, with honesty in its acknowledged policy motives. The purpose of this analysis may best be characterized as damage limitation; this is not an exercise in attempted persuasion. Indeed, this paper questions whether or not much sincere persuasion is achievable. By and large the question “how can Americans persuade Europeans to support BMD,” is the wrong question, and must, inexorably, generate unhelpful answers. If that is the wrong question, its parallel error is “how can Europeans persuade Americans to rethink BMD.”

It is worth recalling the fact that although BMD issues may appear fresh and exciting to young journalists and graduate students, the Western defense community has impaled itself debating this subject in every decade since the 1960s. There is much that is, and should be recognized as, novel about the emerging political and strategic context for BMD today. Nonetheless, the contemporary debate began with a huge baggage train of attitudes, opinions, and memories deriving from the BMD controversies of yesteryear. This is not to imply that views today of BMD simply are restatements of long-held opinions. It is to suggest, though, that many strategic commentators, European and American, have “been there, done that,” over BMD issues several times in the past. The author of this paper, for but one example, has participated in no fewer than four major debates on BMD over a thirty-year time span. The official U.S. BMD story has altered radically over time—from a reluctant Robert McNamara’s “thin” anti-Chinese Sentinel system, through Richard Nixon’s ICBM-protecting Safeguard, on to Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) scaled back to George Bush’s GPALS, (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes), revived and revised as an unenthusiastic Bill Clinton’s Theater Missile Defense/

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National Missile Defense (TMD/NMD), bringing us up to date with George W. Bush’s missile defense program today. The protagonists and antagonists of BMD, American and European, have been noticeably stable in their enthusiasm or hostility, even as the political-strategic context has changed all but beyond recognition.

As will be plain from the paragraph immediately above, BMD is a well-worked, if not overworked, issue area of public policy. The attitudes towards homeland missile defense that currently are dominant in the United States and in NATO-Europe, and which are the primary focus of this discussion, are deep-seated and carefully crafted. In 2000, and again in 2001, neither party to the transAtlantic “dialogue” had developed its position casually or in ignorance of contextual considerations. Both the broad-gauged American commitment to pursue BMD, and the somewhat less broad-gauged (i.e., it is fairly friendly to TMD) European skepticism, are the logically appropriate expressions of two different, but coherent, strategic worldviews. It can only be helpful for Americans to understand why Europeans are genuinely skeptical of the value in pursuing homeland missile defense, and why strategic persuasion, in terms of “educational efforts,” is not a promising course of action, no matter how dazzling the briefings. Only when the practicable limits of the America missionary push for BMD are fully recognized, will U.S. policy be properly liberated from the anchor chains of false expectation of enthusiastic Allied support.

Two Worldviews: History, Culture, Geopolitics

It is not misleading to identify two worldviews in transAtlantic exchanges over BMD. Of course, there is a range of opinion in Europe and in the United States. But, with only minor exceptions, that range is bounded by a distinctive worldview deriving principally from historical experience, political and strategic culture, and geopolitical situation. Even in Britain, as an insular maritime power the most exceptional of “Europeans,” true attitudes towards BMD are closer to the European norm than they are to the American.

Genuine dialogue among NATO members on BMD is difficult because contrasting opinions reflect barely recognized attitudes, which flow from typically largely unspoken assumptions. Inter-allied discussion of BMD issues may appear to be about particular threat projections, for example, but in reality it is also about the contrasting worldviews bequeathed by history, culture, and geopolitics. This fact usually is hidden from sight. Assumptions are rarely articulated, let alone defended, publicly. After all, distinctive communities of Europeans and of Americans do not need to repeat internally, let alone explain, that which all or most Europeans or Americans already know. That is one large problem with assumptions. Although rooted reasonably in experience they can, with longevity, become underexamined articles of faith. Another large problem with them is that they are not what friends and allies hear from across the table. This helps explain why U.S. “consultations” on BMD can be so fruitless, even when they are conducted by all parties in a friendly and constructive spirit. More often than not, neither side appreciates quite what it is dealing with when it puts on the best face it is able in reaction to hearing unwelcome views.

Because opinions on BMD express attitudes shaped by history, culture, and geopolitics, they are not likely to be shifted by multicolor PowerPoint briefings, or even by immediate events in the world. Difficulty in persuasive communication is especially
frustrating to Americans, among several reasons because they put more resources into studying an issue-area such as BMD, and hence believe that they should persuade, or win the debate, on technical merit.\(^5\) When Europeans are much less impressed by American arguments than Americans expect, it is natural, if unhelpful, to look for hidden agendas. Unpersuaded allies often are judged to be fearful of the financial implications of the latest American defense story, or to want to appease the “bad guys” for unworthy reasons of economic self-interest or plain political pusillanimity. It is difficult for American defense professionals to entertain seriously the possibility that European audiences have listened to U.S. political-strategic and military arguments (on BMD, say), have understood them, yet have found them unpersuasive.\(^6\) In their heyday, Athens, Rome, and Britain were not notably open to reasoned opposition to mainstream official thinking on central matters of grand strategy and military defense. As a very great power, the United States is in the habit of transmitting, rather than receiving, what it believes to be strategic truth. Hope lingers on in Washington that most of the potentially embarrassing differences with NATO-Europe over homeland missile defense will fade away: as Europeans come to understand the subject better; as the course of history demonstrates the correctness of U.S. policy; and as Americans refine and perfect their pro-BMD arguments.

Although this paper is a study of European, rather than American, perspectives on BMD, the former is of particular interest here only because of the latter. Some inter-allied tension over BMD questions might be released were both sides of the Atlantic to understand better just what they were hearing on BMD and whence that derived. The dominant American worldview on international security plays a leading role in this discussion, because its expression in policy on BMD is the stimulus to those skeptical European perspectives, explanation of which is the mission here. Most of what divides Americans from Europeans on BMD is not resolvable by logic or fact, because the positions of both sides already have logical and factual integrity.

Every security community brings to the defense issues of the day both transient contemporary judgment and the burden and enlightenment of its history. In turn, we will identify and discuss the roots of the worldviews that Europeans and Americans cannot help but apply to issues of U.S. homeland missile defense.

**Europe**

A worldview provides a coherent holistic framework for the interpretation of emerging happenings and the guidance of behavior. Although history, culture, and geopolitics merit the individual mention accorded in the title to this section, they are so mutually dependent as to require only a single stream of discussion. Europe’s historical experience is a geopolitical and geostrategic narrative that yields a distinctive political-strategic culture. This culture is neither better nor worse than the American; it is simply different.

Any reading of modern history tells Europeans that vulnerability and insecurity are entirely normal. For five hundred years there has been an irregular cycle of major wars in or about Europe. That cycle may have been broken by the abrupt demise of the USSR and the subsequent decline of Russia, but it is far too soon to say. In the twentieth-century, rampaging Germans and then potentially rampaging (and, after 1949, nuclear-armed) Russians successively reminded would-be complacent Europeans that life could be nasty, brutish, and short.\(^7\) Europeans do not need to attend seminars on international politics in order to appreciate the vanity of aspirations for protracted security. Even insular Britain, traditionally able to wage war conveniently abroad, with the homeland rendered effectively invulnerable by the peerless royal Navy, had to readjust its strategic attitudes
in the face of emerging technologies. On the one hand, understandably it was a source of national pride for Britain to win the world’s first air campaign in August-September 1940. On the other hand, that campaign was won at home, which was not at all the preferred British way in warfare. Britain is unusual in Europe in its fairly lonely exception to the (overstated) rule that Europeans can be defined as people who have been overrun and occupied by the Germans in recent times. To be just, a century earlier the same quip could be offered with the French in the villain’s role.

The recurrent experience of major war at home, or the plausible menace of such, has shaped a European approach to security that is not widely understood across the Atlantic. Paradoxically, perhaps, Europeans are both cynically accepting of the inevitability of a return of conditions of acute insecurity, while also being no little traumatized by their recent strategic history. There have been some really bad days in American history; we can reference Antietam, Shiloh, and the third day at Gettysburg. But with the exception of the Civil War there has been nothing in American history that equates with the protracted experience and then long-standing folk memories of the catastrophes at home of the Thirty-Years’ War (1618–1648), the Wars of the French Revolution and Empire (1792–1815), and—of course—the appallingly great, and then greater still, wars of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945. As if those lengthy episodes were not sufficient to dampen any residual lust for glory, 1945–1989 witnessed a Cold War focused largely upon, and in, Europe. History, their own history, tells Europeans that periods of peace tend to be interwar eras, not new plateaus in the upward ascent of politically organized Humankind towards a permanent context of good order and security.

It has been the general European experience to be a victim of the dynamics of international (in)security relations. Even the Germans, who some scholars maintain manipulated the July crisis of 1914 in order to bring on the war that they wanted, were convinced that their behavior was defensive and that they acted out of strategic, and cultural, necessity. In short, Europeans have become long accustomed to a lack of discretionary room in their security policy. They have done what they must: sometimes it worked well enough, but, more often it did not (for the geographically continental Europeans who were the victims first of Austrian and German strategic anxieties—1914–1918—and then of a manic German ideology—1939–1945). Janus-like, Europeans are enculturated into believing the maxim that “bad times return” in world politics, while also they cannot quite believe their luck to be living in a period in which the menace of major war is mercifully absent. This combination of an acceptance of cyclical peril and of near incredulity that the peril currently is resting, is not encouraging for those Americans who wish to persuade Europeans to sign-up for an BMD bandwagon. Europeans know, first-hand, how awful can be the consequences of great-power antagonism, and they are most reluctant to help fuel any policy commitment (i.e., to homeland missile defense) that might subvert a security order which appears to be working well enough.

Geopolitics, not political sophistication (as many Europeans like to believe), explains why Europeans profess to be guided in policy more by an assessment of intentions than of capabilities. After all, by their deeds and misdeeds shall ye know them! Those Europeans who like to contrast the alleged sophistication of their political approach to threat assessment, with the vulgarly material approach of Americans (“politics and hardware” in the official Dutch wording)—focused on capabilities—would have a difficult time identifying any superiority in the European approach to statecraft and strategy in the twentieth-century. Suffice it to say for now that there is rather less than meets the eye to European claims to a sophisticated political approach to threat assessment, in contrast to an American fixation upon capabilities. This is one of those beliefs that, largely for
reason of repetition and lack of challenge, has grown from the status of an opinion to axiomatic truth.

As noted briefly above, geopolitics explains much of the European perspective upon threat assessment. Unlike Americans, Europeans are used to sharing a crowded continent among a variety of security communities. It has been entirely normal for Europeans to coexist with capabilities “across the border” that could, in theory, do them great harm. Even when a neighbor or near neighbor’s military capabilities began to be worrying, in principle Europeans had three classes of policy response: to ally (or “bandwagon”) with the emerging power; to balance with, and oppose, that power; or to attempt to stand aside with an armed neutrality. In other words, just because a troubling capability appeared on the close European horizon, it did not follow that that potential menace necessarily had to meet with the organization of a military opposition. Unlike Americans, Europeans are used to living cheek-by-jowl with well-armed peers or near-peers, some of whom are harboring or could harbor hostile political intent.

It would be a mistake to place too great an emphasis on a purported contrast between European and American approaches to threat assessment. Nonetheless, there is an important difference, and that difference is rooted deeply in historical geopolitical circumstance. Brute geography has dictated that for Europeans political intent is all but overwhelmingly important, because some vulnerability to military aggression has been a condition of political existence in an anarchic multi-state continent. By way of the sharpest of contrasts, since they shed their imperial ties with Britain, with one notable candidate exception Americans have had effectively zero experience of geopolitically proximate strategic cohabitation with peer security communities. The exception was of course the brief period when the United States of America and the Confederate States of America shared what had been politically unified space.

In short, Europeans are used to sharing a continent with potentially hostile armies, while Americans are not. Moreover, for reasons of benign geopolitics, Americans are not even used to “sharing” an alliance with genuinely peer allies. Hegemony in one of its several meanings has been the uniquely American historical experience.\textsuperscript{12} In European political and strategic culture, the need sometimes to defer significantly to the wishes and demands of allies is accepted as the way of the world—not so for an American super-state. Americans today need to appreciate that when they hold discussions, or engage in “consultation,” with NATO-Europeans on BMD issues, they are talking into (perhaps at and around) a culture different from their own.\textsuperscript{13} Because of geopolitics and history, European strategic culture assumes: the persistence of a complex political-strategic context, wherein several or more major players have to be taken seriously on their own terms; that national security depends upon a multi-skeined tapestry of political arrangements, attitudes, and capabilities; and that political intentions are for capabilities as three to one. Because no European polity has been able to secure its national survival or well being strictly by means of national military defense, Europeans reflexively focus more upon a putative foe’s intentions than upon his assessed capabilities. The contrast with American attitudes can be overdrawn, but it is nonetheless real and considerably unhelpful when it lurks underrecognized in the background to contemporary discussions about homeland missile defense.

\textbf{The United States}

From the Cherokees to the Taliban, the United States is used to disposing of its perceived security problems very much as it deems most fit. Although the United States has never
existed beyond the reach of the nastier strains of international strategic history, in practice it has been accorded by geopolitical circumstance an extraordinary measure of discretion in its security policy. In the “long nineteenth-century” the workings of the European balance of power donated a generally untroubled national security to Americans—save for the trouble with native Americans and with Southern Americans—while in the twentieth they intervened no less than three times by choice to prevent the maturing of a potentially menacing imbalance of power in Eurasia. The Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines was undertaken in desperation as a response to the increasing pressure that the United States applied in 1940–1941. Furthermore, Hitler’s foolish gratuitous declaration of war on the United States on December 11, 1941 was amply provoked by Washington’s decidedly non-neutral behavior over the previous year and a half.

Continental isolation has allowed the United States the luxury of choosing the time, place, and term of its lethal engagement in world affairs. Traditionally this has been the prerogative of insular sea powers, as was classically expressed in 1597 in the familiar words of Francis Bacon: “He that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will.” Once military victory in the 1860s had determined that the Union would be preserved, and the internal frontier was closed—by the mid-1880s—American strategic culture settled upon an expedient pattern to occasional military events. From a secure homeland base in North America, U.S. forces periodically would sally forth to smite the unGodly decisively. Whenever possible, it has been the modern American way in warfare to pursue an expeditionary ideal. The United States has intervened far abroad, typically belatedly, but usually—as noted already—truly at its own discretion, with massive force in quest of conclusive military victory. When victory, or some tolerable facsimile thereof, is achieved, the United States withdraws its forces just as rapidly as political circumstances allow, and sometimes more rapidly than that. The United States has been the world’s dominant power since the mid-1940s, but its undeniable hegemonic status has never been matched by an interest in the prolonged exercise of authority over non-Americans. The pattern of (a) belated intervention, (b) massive military effectiveness in pursuit of clear victory, and (c) speedy post-war withdrawal, can be appreciated from the Great War all the way, fast forward, to Afghanistan. As in a Hollywood movie, the United States rides into a deeply troubled town, does the clean-up job that needs doing and which no-one else can do, and then rides out again, asking nothing for itself.

In truth, the U.S. homeland has been vulnerable to awesome threats since the late 1950s. Moreover, the U.S. Government not only accepted vulnerability as a military-technical fact of contemporary life, but in the 1972 ABM Treaty tried to make something of a virtue of that vulnerability. Article 1, para 2, of the Treaty specifies that “[e]ach Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense….” The preamble to the Treaty expresses the two highly dubious propositions “that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons.” An absence of missile defense was seen not only as recognition of currently unsolved technological challenges, but also as a desirable contribution to international strategic stability. Repeatedly, paradoxically the safety of the American people requires their total vulnerability to Soviet/Russian (Chinese?) nuclear threats.

Europeans have some difficulty comprehending both America’s insistence today upon homeland missile defense against rogueish foes, and its apparently (as reported to Europe
in the media) near paranoid reaction to the outrages of September 11, 2001. European commentary makes an interesting point. For the better part of forty years, America security existed under the gun of what eventually was a nuclear threat to its survival. Despite that incontestable fact, it is commonplace for observers, American and European, to opine that the quest for national BMD, and official and political reactions to September 11, reflect a culture that expects it homeland to be inviolable. If the American people were shocked, not to say traumatized even, by September 11, one wonders where they were from, say, 1954 to 1989. Of course dastardly deeds actually were done on September 11, whereas the great nuclear World War III was only a possibility. However, only in retrospect could the American people know for sure that the “Big One” would not occur.

Missile defense and reactions to September 11 need to be considered together. Both bear upon attitudes towards homeland security. It may well be that the popular wisdom is correct that interprets the policy return of national BMD as evidence of an American-cultural rejection of societal vulnerability. Reactions to September 11 could reinforce the view that Americans expect to be secure at home in North America, and were traumatized by the terrorist violation, much as people can be shocked when their homes are violated by criminals. But, many Europeans genuinely are puzzled as to why an American society that stoically endured forty-odd years of truly serious nuclear threat in the Cold War, would be so insistent today upon prompt pursuit of homeland BMD, given that currently the only countries out there with ICBMs are Russia and China. Those same Europeans are puzzled also by the apparent fact, as noted already, that an America which tolerated, even helped institutionalize, life under a highly credible mutual threats of nuclear annihilation, is shaken to its core by a terrorist atrocity that kills 3,000 plus people. Perhaps the prospect of nuclear Armageddon was never real to most Americans, at least not in the sense in which the graphic video images from September 11 made post-modern “catastrophic” terrorism all too real. Whatever the proper explanation, overconfidence in deterrence, psychological denial, or plain ignorance, it appears to be a cultural fact of no small political and strategic significance that Americans today have expectations of security at home that are hard to reconcile with either the attitudes of NATO-Europeans, or even with the protracted experience of the Cold War. There is no necessary inconsistency between American society on the one hand tolerating life under nuclear threat for forty years, and on the other hand insisting now that BMD be provided to defeat rogue missile threats that have yet to appear. The circle is squared if we can argue plausibly that far from “learning” from the Cold War decades that a massive insecurity is just the way of the world in modern strategic history, instead Americans as tough-minded and resolute people accepted their vulnerability as no more than a temporary regrettable necessity.

It is quintessentially American to redefine culturally unsatisfactory conditions as problems to be solved. For yet another interpretation of America’s response to its Cold War experience, one can argue that the U.S. defense community “solved” the problem of its comprehensive nuclear vulnerability by the rediscovery and canonization of the theory of “stable” deterrence. Perhaps Americans felt nowhere near as insecure as they should have during forty years of bilateral superpower struggle, because they came to believe that in the theory and practice of deterrence they had found a reliable solution to the most lethal problem of the era.

Americans generally are portrayed, and certainly like to see themselves, as problem-solving pragmatists. As a large, wealthy, and typically outstandingly successful country, the United States expects to overcome problems, not to have to live with them indefinitely. In the realm of national security, the focus of attention here, time after time Americans have achieved the near impossible. Because of the unparalleled openness of
its society and the breadth and depth of its resources of all kinds, the United States usually has climbed every mountain that threatened to block its advance. Having secured a continent-wide, coast-to-coast land in North America, at the expense of native people and colonial powers (and Southern aspirations for a separate destiny), the United States proceeded to rack up amazing strategic and technological accomplishments in the twentieth-century. From a standing start in early 1917, the country deployed two million (admittedly, undertrained and underequipped) men to France by armistice day 1918—why? Because American society, much encouraged by cunning British political warfare, decided in 1916–1917 that German power and misbehavior constituted an intolerable problem. The U.S. Government in 1917–1918, with arguments that anticipated their direct successors in 1942–1943, insisted that American forces be concentrated and deployed for decisive military action only on the Western Front in France. In the Great War, as in World War II, Americans had reasons to be suspicious of the British maritime proclivity for “indecisive encirclement” and an “indirect approach.” Americans rarely favor cunning plans in the mode, say, of Sun Tzu (whose entire manuscript on The Art of War is a celebration of the virtues in asymmetrical strategy).

Americans are direct and definite people who are supreme as engineers, particularly as engineers of large-scale projects. From the Panama Canal, to the repeated defeats of Germany, the United States traditionally has judged no problem too daunting. In its second round with Germany, the United States simultaneously waged another war on the other side of the world, invented the atomic bomb, and created the greatest air and naval armadas that history has ever seen. There were several reasons why the United States, rather than Germany or Japan, was the first to weaponize atomic science. Prominent, however, was the sheer gigantic scale of resources that the United States was prepared to devote to the Manhattan Project. Whether it was inventing “the bomb,” rebuilding a Strategic Air Command worthy of the name after 1948, plugging a falsely predicted “missile gap” in the early 1960s, or going to the moon, American society took its perceived and accepted challenges very seriously and was not easily denied. Even when the country failed, as ultimately in Vietnam from 1965–1975, it was a “close run thing” (as the Duke of Wellington said of Waterloo), as American society snatched political defeat from the jaws of a military victory won by late 1968.

The same confidence that Americans rightly place in their engineering, logistical, and general management skills came in the Cold War to be extended to a pride in achievement with strategic ideas and methods of defense analysis. A “golden age” of American strategic theory, from c.1954 to c.1965—or, from massive retaliation to Vietnam—produced new thinking on deterrence, stability, limited war, arms control, crisis management, and escalation. American theorists applied themselves to the problems of the conduct of strategy for, and under, nuclear threat. They developed a whole architecture of linked ideas. For many years the new strategic enlightenment was broadly accepted as received wisdom and conclusive truth by all except the marginal far Right and the marginal far Left. Europeans were in awe of the American defense intellectual achievement. Robert S. McNamara and his RAND-educated “whizz kids” seemed to be the very models of modern defense experts. Through the disciplined application of rational defense analysis, in contrast too bad old-fashioned military intuition, the U.S. defense community could discover “how much, of what, is enough”—or so it seemed in the early 1960s.

Alas, the strategic history of the 1960s and 1970s was not kind to the reputation of the new strategy. In Vietnam, the practice of limited war, low intensity conflict, and escalation control demonstrated plainly enough that eternal military verities had not been retired by bright new ideas. If limited war theory was unduly eloquent adjectively,
but perilously neglectful of the nature of the noun, so it was discovered also that related arms control policy did not contribute very usefully either to the control of arms or to reducing the risks of war occurring. To the best of our knowledge the theories of stable deterrence and crisis management, unlike those of limited war and arms control, were not field-tested under live-fire condition in superpower relations, which was probably just as well.

Europeans have come to expect a procession of big ideas on defense matters from the United States. Many of those ideas, though powerful as theory, were developed and even applied to policy with scant respect for empirical evidence. Deductive theories of deterrence, limited war, arms control, and escalation, for but a few examples, were apt to “solve” defense problems only to the intellectual and political satisfaction of their American authors. The later emergence in the United States of a very mechanistic arms race theory which purported to explain how defense stimulates offense, similarly comprised a cultural assault upon the problem of competitive nuclear armaments. In the past decade, the United States has “solved” the problem of understanding the process of change in strategic history by elevating the old concept of revolutions in military affairs (RMA) to master explanatory status. Today, given an absence of peer or near-peer rival polities, the American defense community has “solved” the baffling problem of inchoate, shapeless menaces with rediscovery, and intellectual and policy celebration, of the idea of asymmetric threats. Tomorrow, we can be sure, there will be yet another very big idea.

Europeans understand that American perspectives upon an issue like homeland BMD reflect attitudes and views keyed to the responsibilities—and also, perhaps, the privileges—of the guardian of world order today. Those same Europeans have more difficulty comprehending the domestic American cultural push in favor of such BMD. Europeans raised on a continent that limited its own horizons with the effects of two fratricidal great wars, have trouble empathizing with those whose horizons have not been notably reduced. Europe’s brief belle époque was succeeded by “the American (twentieth) century,” which now seems likely to be succeeded by yet another American century. For reason of a culture necessarily shaped by history and geography, it is all too European to approach emerging problems with a cautious pessimism, or prudence, to put it more positively. By way of contrast, there is no belle époque in America’s perception of its past, because the country persists in believing that better times always lie ahead. Europeans and Americans cannot help but have the vices of their virtues. Europeans are unduly prone to define problems, which might succumb to determined assault, as conditions which we have to endure. Americans have a weakness for defining intractable conditions, which cannot possibly be eradicated or corrected, as problems which should yield to applied effort and imagination. Neither inclination is right or wrong, though the American certainly is the more attractive. Each approach is distinctive in ways that can matter when a complex subject like BMD requires policy decision. Europeans are almost overly aware of the constraints that limit their ability to mold the future they would prefer. Americans admit to the reality of few constraints upon their freedom of policy action.

The United States is a benign hegemon, utterly uninterested in establishing a military empire it does not need. It is, however, notoriously difficult to see oneself as others do. Americans know that they are the sheriff of last resort; theirs is the only country with the wealth, the logistical reach, and sometimes the will to take on the dirty jobs required if international order is to be maintained. The United States acknowledges the enhanced political legitimacy that action with a coalition confers, hence its repeated endeavor to
raise coalitions (e.g., in 1990–1991 to expel Iraq from Kuwait, in 1999 to expel Serbia from Kosovo, and in 2001 to make an example of the Taleban regime in Afghanistan). Nonetheless, unlike Europeans, Americans do not really believe that they require a broad base of foreign approval as a necessary legitimator of national action—at least, not in those rare cases when America’s primary interests are engaged. Benign though it may be as the contemporary hegemon, still the United States is the hegemonic power and is aware of the responsibilities and privileges that attend that lonely rank. The law of nations may command an equality among sovereign polities, but Americans, and indeed the world at large (including the United Nations, with the five Permanent Members of the Security Council enjoying veto casting authority), know better. The American sheriff sets the strategy for the posse. This would have been largely true in World War I, had hostilities extended into 1919; it was increasingly true among the Western Allies in 1943–1945; it was always the case in NATO from 1949 to 1989; and it applied, yet again, in Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001. America’s preeminence is of course widely resented abroad, even among its close friends and allies, and so are the privileges in national discretion over policy choice that that preeminence encourages Americans to believe they should enjoy.

Knowing that they are doing good in the world, and sometimes even doing it fairly selflessly, Americans tend to expect to be liked. American “briefers,” with their dazzling presentations, tend to seek cultural conversion, not a calculated acquiescence. As a country that continues to define itself ideologically, as well as by more mundane measures, the United States is uncomfortable with the notion that often it should be content to settle for respect or fear, rather than pursue the forlorn hope of affection. Uncommon perspicacity is not required in order to appreciate how transAtlantic security communities could talk at and past, rather than with, each other on a subject as fraught with delicate nuance and complex linkages as ballistic missile defense.

A structural difference between American and European defense debate is well worth noting. Although, today, somewhat ironically the United States appears as the demandeur over BMD—it is asking for foreign understanding of its decision to abandon the ABM Treaty—that fact does not flow solely as a consequence of America’s status and responsibilities as the superpower hegemon. In addition to what many Americans believe to be a strategically objective need for homeland BMD, there is the policy stirring, even propulsive, effect of a large and dynamic extended defense community. The notable imbalance in relative weight of contribution between Americans and Europeans on major defense issues, is attributable at least as much to differences of political culture, wealth, and sheer numbers of theorist-analysts, as it is to differences of geopolitical context. The U.S. political system is so structured that a “cast of thousands” can make its living providing advice on the security issues of the day because, as the French political scientist Raymond Aron, once explained, “[s]trategic thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events themselves pose.”

We can expand upon Aron’s persuasive claim with the point that strategic thought requires strategic thinkers, and those are thin on the ground in NATO-Europe.

America’s European allies are not blessed with an eighteenth-century constitution designed to produce a relatively weak executive, or with a First Amendment, which all but enshrines the principle of the citizen’s right to know. American political culture, in the context of the scale of the U.S. national security enterprise, guarantees critical mass in debate on virtually any defense issue. Moreover, American political culture allows the dissemination of expertise, in that—by way of the sharpest contrast with the European norm—security clearances are granted to thousands of independent consultants
and think-tank employees. Only in the United States is the playing field of information, fairly even between officials advocating a policy, and outside defense analysts criticizing that policy. Moreover, only in the United States does the executive have to take outside critics seriously, because it is unique in having an independent legislature that controls the public purse and that can, and regularly does, invite expert testimony from those critics.

It may be important for Americans to recognize the cultural and sociological differences between defense debate on the two sides of the Atlantic. European views on BMD overwhelmingly will be official views. Although most NATO-European countries have a think-tank or two, the few defense professionals employed therein are either officials in all but name, or, if truly independent, lack the access to privileged information which might oblige government to consider taking them seriously. It is the case routinely that if European scholars wish to participate in an emerging transnational security debate, as for example over U.S. homeland BMD, they have no choice other than to inform themselves almost wholly from American sources. So large is the critical mass of American defense debaters on a controversial topic like BMD, that European would-be participants can pick and choose their preferred American experts, from RAND, MIT, Brookings, and the rest.

There may not be much of a public defense debate in Europe, by American standards, but it does not follow that Europeans either are disinterested in security, especially their own, or lack deeply rooted (i.e., cultural) attitudes that shape their thinking on policy. We turn now to consider the principal themes in recent European reactions to American proposals for homeland missile defense.

Skeptical Allies: Themes in European Commentary on U.S. Homeland Defense

Notwithstanding the variety of “Europeans,” there is a striking similarity of attitudes towards U.S. homeland BMD across different countries in NATO-Europe. By way of a most important overall observation, it is fair to claim that, with the exception of France, America’s European allies would like to be enthusiastic about the latest U.S. BMD scheme(s). For deep historical reasons associated with the loss of great power status, the French have evolved a political culture that thrives on the promotion of anti-American sentiment. French machinations against American statecraft have little to do with strategic calculation. The French cannot be wooed by a better class of American political or strategic argument. The BMD question in its several guises is heaven-sent for Paris, because it is an issue area wherein France can encourage a large coalition of NATO-Europeans to oppose U.S. policy. Those Americans who, all too understandably, ask “what is the matter with France?” should be advised that the matter with France is the course of French history since 1870. For two hundred years the French were “Top Nation.” From the time of Louise XIV to Emperor Napoleon III, the principal recurring problem for European statesmen was the corralling of an actually, or potentially, overmighty France. This “French problem” was generically identical to the “German problem” of the first half of the twentieth-century.

When Americans hear Frenchmen criticize homeland BMD and extol the glories of nuclear deterrence, what they are really hearing is a paean to the (long-lapsed) glory of France, which requires some visible obstruction of American enterprises. What of America’s other two major NATO allies, Germany and Britain? German perspectives on U.S. homeland BMD are shaped significantly by geopolitics and geoeconomics. That is not a pejorative observation. After all, geopolitics, in the form of the spatial relationships
of extended deterrence (and compellence), lies behind the American insistence that its homeland be protected against missile threats. Succinctly stated, for reasons of strategic geography Germans are especially sensitive to Russian views on security issues. This is a truly deep and enduring fact of geopolitical life. Indeed, Russo-German relations comprised the central axis of European security politics for the better part of a century.\textsuperscript{41} When we add in such comparatively recent considerations as the huge financial stake held by German banks in the thoroughly unreliable Russian economy, and German (\textit{inter alia}) dependence upon Russia for energy supply, it becomes obvious that a topic such as U.S. BMD will not be judged narrowly “on its merits,” as Americans naively might expect.

As for the British, their perspectives on U.S. homeland BMD are quite as historically grounded, and political cultural, as are those of the French and the Germans. Whereas France typically perceives advantage in opposing the United State, virtually regardless of the details of the issue in question, Britain finds merit in supporting the United States, again virtually regardless of the details of the issue in question. The French believe that their stature in the world is enhanced by political distance from Washington; the British believe that their stature is increased by being, and being seen to be, the most loyal of America’s allies. Repeated historical experience, and a self-confidence bordering on arrogance, tells the British that Americans can be manipulated by cunning statecraft from London.\textsuperscript{42} A British political warfare campaign contributed in no small measure to the American decision belatedly to do the right thing in 1917,\textsuperscript{43} while Anglo-American relations from 1940 to 1945 demonstrated the possibilities for, as well as the limitations upon, ally management. During the Cold War, once the British had learnt in 1956 over Suez that they could no longer cut a significant independent figure on the world stage, London chose to make something of an art form of manipulating Americans. For example, in the 1960s, London managed to squeeze \textit{Polaris} missiles out of the Kennedy Administration (for Britain’s “independent nuclear deterrent”!), which set a useful precedent for British acquisition of \textit{Trident} SLBMs twenty years later. Britain’s Labor Government succeeded in subverting what had been Washington’s clear intent regarding NATO strategy: American defense analysts and strategic theorists had persuaded Robert McNamara that NATO-Europe could be defended \textit{without} NATO needing to have first recourse to nuclear use.\textsuperscript{44}

The Alliance’s official strategic concept of “flexible response,” which was to be authoritative for nearly twenty-five years, was all but entirely at variance from the prior American insistence upon conventional defense against conventional threat. Not unreasonably from their geostrategic point of view, Americans liked the idea of a military decoupling of Europe from North America. In other words, Americans favored a defense concept and capabilities for NATO which might plausibly allow a war which began in Europe to remain in Europe. At least, that is the way much of European elite opinion interpreted the new American enthusiasm for a conventional emphasis to NATO’s defense arrangements. For their part, NATO-Europeans had not the slightest interest in constructing a truly serious conventional defense capability for NATO in Central Europe—aside, that is, from appearing to do enough so as to appease those members of Congress who were ever ready to level the charge of free-riding and buck-passing allies. What had happened was that British and German politicians and officials took the fairly pure metal of the American concept of flexible (really meaning non-nuclear) response, and poured it into a mold that the European allies found much more acceptable. Americans always had great difficulty understanding what lay behind the apparent military underperformance of their NATO allies. The truth was that no matter how glittering the latest American briefing that would purport to show how this, or that, new scheme or weaponized tech-
nology might stop the Soviets dead, Europeans chose to place their faith in a combination of political engagement with the USSR (to reduce the potential political velocity of the threat) and deterrence. They were not only uninterested in the ever arguable prospect of NATO winning a war in Europe “on points,” also they were deeply unfriendly to any Alliance military plans which might elevate actual defense at the expense of (nuclear) deterrence.

From North Africa in 1942, through flexible response in 1967, to Operation Allied Force over Kosovo in 1999, it has been the British experience that Americans, notwithstanding their initial intentions to the contrary, ultimately allow themselves to be persuaded to do the “right” (i.e., British-preferred) thing. Much as Germans cannot tolerate a truly hostile Russia, so Britons are fearful of potentially absent Americans. If German security in the last resort is about managing the giant to the East, so British security—in British perspective—mainly is about managing the giant to the West.

NATO-European views of American homeland BMD can, at heart, be described as skeptical at best, and decidedly hostile at worst. Despite the distinctiveness of national political and strategic cultures among America’s European allies, the discernible perspectives upon BMD lend themselves quite readily to assembly in a common list. What follows is discussion of the dominant “themes” and other relevant foci of commentary which most accurately express European responses to current American policy on homeland BMD.

**Politics Before Technology**

Probably the most frequently expressed, certainly the most serious, of European attitudes towards U.S. homeland BMD is the affirmation of a preference for politics over technology.\(^\text{45}\) This attitude is sincerely held, though its true strategic parochialism is not well comprehended by those who repeat it. There would be some justice in an American critique which judged this widespread European attitude to be little more than an attempt to make a virtue of necessity. Such a reaction, though not wholly undeserved, would miss the sincerity in the preference for politics. It is gratuitously difficult for Americans to engage in genuine dialogue with Europeans on BMD, and the ABM Treaty, if they do not have some grasp of the roots of the apparent European disdain for technological solutions to problems of security. We must hasten to note that not only Americans can misread the basis for the European affinity for politics rather than technology; Europeans themselves appear unaware of the deeper fuel for this attitude.

The European preference for politics as the leading route to cope with the threats which might otherwise be addressed by BMD, is strictly a consequence of persisting strategic context. After a while, prolonged adjustment to an essentially unchanging strategic context manifests itself, *inter alia*, in beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences, that appear to be cultural rather than merely the transient opinion of the hour. As a matter of modern historical record, the greater European powers proved entirely capable of seeking, and sometimes finding, technological solutions to military technological problems. Then, as today, to juxtapose politics with technology is really to pose a significantly false opposition. To cite two telling British examples: in the second half of the 1930s, Britain sought both to avert politically the emerging threat from Germany, and to create the world’s first integrated air defense system keyed to the new technology of radar; a generation earlier, in 1916-1918, the British army co-invented “the modern style of warfare” which depended most critically upon excellence in scientific gunnery.\(^\text{46}\) What both episodes had in common was a strategic context wherein Britain itself was obliged
by actual or prospective military necessity to make the most serious provision for its own defense. In principle, there were political solutions to Britain’s security dilemmas of 1916–1918 and 1936–1939, but in practice those solutions were not available.

America’s contemporary search for a military technological dimension to the response to the threat posed by rogueish ballistic missiles is only the latest in a series of American initiatives about which NATO-Europe has been ambivalent, at best. Today, as yesterday during the Cold War, Europeans require Americans to make two basic contributions to security in Europe. On the one hand, Americans are asked to reduce the scale of what may be called the objective threat by providing potent military power to help thwart an aggressor via deterrence. On the other hand, and scarcely less important in European eyes, Americans are expected to labor hard and sincerely to diminish the scale of the subjective threat by influencing potentially hostile attitudes. In other words, the Alliance leader is required to contribute massively both to the balancing of possible military threats and to the alleviation of those anxieties and concerns which fuel the political engine of military threats. Just as today many Europeans believe that the United States is taking its leadership responsibility for addressing missile menaces on the technological dimension a little too seriously, so during the Cold War period U.S. enthusiasm for schemes for the actual (generally non-nuclear) defense of NATO-Europe typically were met with only muted praise from allies.

When countries cease to provide the last line of their own security—arguably notwithstanding the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France—they can forget that it is their good fortune that some other country, for its own excellent geopolitical reasons, is now picking up that tab. Because NATO-Europe has not been truly serious about providing for its own defense for fifty years, it is prone to forget that the greater part of its physical security may well have reposed in the military power of the United States. Since they have not sought to do much in defense beyond satisfying the minimum expectation of the U.S. Congress, Europeans understandably have come to exaggerate the importance of behavior to which they believed they could contribute significantly, which is to say efforts to influence the political context.

It is only just to mention that Americans are prone to commit the same class of error as Europeans; specifically, the placing of undue emphasis upon, and attribution of undue significance to, their particular long suit. Whereas Europeans treat political relations and the political context as the center of gravity for security, Americans are strongly predisposed to seek security through largely unilateral military preparation. Given that the United States is quintessentially a machine-minded and supremely machine-capable culture, this preference for security by unilateral military endeavor tends to translate as security through technology. Americans are good at technology, and they would rather place their trust in American engineers and military operators than they would in the outcome of political processes with many ill understood values and motives. In European eyes, the virtue of American military technological prowess becomes a vice when the United States chooses to define possible threats as challenges to be negated physically, rather than as subjects for political dialogue. That thought leads directly to the second theme in our discussion.

**Intentions Before Capabilities**

No aspect of intra-Alliance exchanges over U.S. homeland missile defense has promoted more misunderstanding than has the issue of “the threat.” We can speculate that a good measure of U.S.-European disagreement over the identity of missile threats and what to do about them stems from the very different strategic roles played by the superpower
in contrast even to its major allies. A combination of (uniquely American) military-technological optimism, and ultimate responsibility for the guarding of the international order of today, inclines Americans towards strategies of control rather than influence. In other words, the United States prefers to be able physically to control an opponent’s military behavior; as contrasted with influencing their decisions on how to behave (or misbehave). Because it is the White House phone that rings when friends and allies are in deep trouble, Americans are inclined along what they view as the path of military prudence in assigning heavy significance to capabilities when it comes to threat analysis.

Everyone agrees that “threat = capability × intentions.” It is a canard to claim, as do many Europeans, that the United States identifies threats almost wholly with reference to capabilities alone. However, certainly it is true to argue that Americans are apt to draw from threat analysis conclusions for policy action that differ notably from those most popular in the capitals of NATO-Europe. A NATO-European audience for an American “briefing” on emerging ballistic missile “threats,” is entirely capable of having no substantive disagreement with the intelligence on offer, all the while dissenting profoundly on “threat” diagnosis and treatment. In 2000–2002, NATO-Europe has found little cause to quarrel with official American estimates of emerging ballistic missile capabilities. Americans understandably are puzzled as to why a tolerably common understanding of the unfolding “threat” does not promote a common enthusiasm for homeland BMD.

In the dominant European view, missile capability should not automatically be regarded as a threat, and even if the threat label should fit the case the most appropriate Western policy response should not be a rush to deploy homeland BMD (not that NATO-European leaders would express themselves so bluntly in public, of course). With a lot of sometimes intense, if ultimately necessarily inconclusive, strategic history on their side, Europeans are genuinely deeply respectful of the phenomenon of deterrence. Europeans concede readily that there are individuals who might seek martyrdom, but they insist that countries do not. While deterrence may not be thoroughly reliable, it is judged reliable enough for NATO-European satisfaction.

It follows that from a fairly common intelligence base regarding emerging, even predicted, ballistic missile capabilities, allies can differ widely in their policy judgments. When NATO-Europe is obliged by intra-Alliance politics to devise some policy reaction to the proliferation of ballistic missiles, its first instinct is to advocate a process of political engagement to defuse the “threat,” and its second is to express confidence in good old deterrence. Although these European preferences may appear to be suspiciously economical, it would be a mistake for Americans to judge them insincere. As already noted, Europeans have no trouble with the concept of irrational individuals, meaning people whose cost-benefit reasoning is inaccessible to us, but they do have extreme difficulty with the proposition that world history might be marred by the bizarre behavior of truly “crazy states.” The idea of a leader who would wholly subordinate the interests of his society to the needs of his own disturbed psyche and will is not taken as seriously in Europe as it should be, given its experience with the course of German history from 1933 to 1945.

The small community of strategic thinkers in NATO-Europe has not contributed noticeably to the new wave of research and theorizing on deterrence which has emerged in the United States since the mid-1990s. Europeans continue to be impressed with what they assume to be the success of deterrence in the Cold War from 1945 to 1989. The possibility of conflict with a political leadership that would be beyond deterrence is not wholly discounted, particularly now that missile and WMD proliferation is occurring in polities whose political cultures are not at all well understood in the West. However, Europeans regard homeland BMD as a disproportionate response to what they regard as
somewhat hypothetical perils.\textsuperscript{57} Without exception, every European ally of the United States would be content to address the emerging problem of proliferation with the twin policy threats of political engagement to reshape such political intentions as might need influencing, and old fashioned deterrence. Europeans are not inclined to define new missile capabilities as threats beyond political (or economic) amelioration. Taking a holistic view of the bases of their security, NATO-Europeans worry that homeland BMD most likely would be a cure worse than the disease it was designed to tackle.\textsuperscript{58}

For the sake of clarity it is useful to itemize in summary form the mainstream of European thinking on intentions and capabilities. Europeans typically believe

- that most emerging missile/WMD capabilities can be defused by a process of political and/or economic engagement;
- that such capabilities as do truly represent threats are quite reliably answered by a policy of deterrence;
- that the occurrence of the exceedingly rare case of a country that is beyond political engagement and deterrence, is a risk to be preferred to the alternative of a homeland BMD initiative which would have major certain negative consequences for the structure of international security.

\textbf{A Solution Looking for a Problem}

Europeans have been an interested audience for the succession of debates over missile defense that Americans have conducted among themselves for forty years. In European perspective, often it has seemed that American enthusiasm for the BMD story-of-the-day reflected a greater attraction to a particular military instrument, than it did for the purposes the instrument might serve. Given that the quality of American official, and extra-official, strategic thinking about so-called “strategic” forces, their purposes, strategy, and posture has been less than stellar for a generation, it is perhaps not surprising that Europeans have been underwhelmed by the coherence of the arguments favoring homeland BMD that they have heard so far. To somewhat cynical Europeans, a new American initiative for homeland BMD occurs every few years as a kind of strategic El Niño. When Europeans learn of the latest manifestation of American enthusiasm for homeland BMD, one can almost hear the widespread reaction to the effect of, “here they come again.”

The judgment that homeland BMD is now a hardy perennial among American strategic desiderata, virtually regardless of wider considerations, has come to be accepted in Europe as a fact of transAtlantic political life. The rather pejorative phrasing of the title to this third theme is borrowed directly from one of NATO-Europe’s most respected strategic commentators, professor Lawrence Freedman of Britain.\textsuperscript{59} It can be difficult for a particular security community to appreciate how its behavior appears to others, even to close friends and allies. A problem with the current U.S. rush for homeland BMD is precisely the fact that it is just the latest in a historical sequence of such proposals for the (thicker or thinner) protection of North America. Europeans have seen these proposals wax and, thus far, invariably wane under the pressure of unfriendly realities (technological infeasibility, cost, political opposition at home and abroad). Europeans are aware of the strong possibility that one day their American ally truly will persist with what they regard as the fantasy, or chimera, of securing safety-through-technology. Indeed, the Bush Administration in 2001, with its unexpected and dramatic, if overshadowed, announcement of intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty regime, has served undeniable notice of seriousness of political intent.
When Europeans hear the latest briefing explaining the technical merits of homeland BMD vis-à-vis rogueish threats, the whole long history of American on-again/off-again BMD advocacy plays in their minds and upon their judgments. It is felt in Europe that for a mix of reasons, good and bad—though mainly bad—the U.S. constituency for homeland BMD is more fixated upon the technical solution, which now at long last may be on the verge of being ready for prime time, than it is upon the problem allegedly in need of BMD offset. The political credibility of American arguments for BMD has been notably damaged by their repetition over forty years, albeit in different strategic contexts and with different technical details.

**A Threat to U.S.–Russian Relations**

Many Europeans who are agnostic, at best, on the prospects of genuinely troublesome rogue missile threats, are anything but agnostic on the subject of the possible political fallout in their relations with the Russian Federation. Thus far, at least, Europeans are wont to contrast what they see as the distant possibility that homeland BMD might be strategically valuable, with the near term certainty that such a dramatic policy will poison the well of U.S.–Russian relations, with all that that could imply for stability in Europe and elsewhere.  

It is perhaps not easy for Americans to grasp just how radical have been the geopolitical changes of the past decade. After all, the United States and its NAFTA neighbors are geopolitically exactly as they were. Peninsular Europe provided the actual or plausibly prospective battlespace for three great conflicts in the “short twentieth-century” (1914–1989). Although Americans lived for nearly forty years under Soviet nuclear threat, that threat somehow was abstract, psychologically quite different from the shadow cast by Soviet military power over Western Europe. Today Europe can scarcely believe its geopolitical good fortune. For the first time since the false promise of Locarno in 1925, a condition of apparently permanent political peace (not just a balance of military power) may be emerging. To societies that suffered 1914–1918, 1939–1945, and then the nuclear-charged Cold War, this current quietude in overt great power rivalry is an historical gift of inestimable value. It follows that any policy démarche which plausibly could threaten to upset this happy state of affairs, is certain to be deplored in European capitals. In European perspective, the issue is not simply, “is there an emerging ballistic missile threat to which homeland BMD can provide a technically convincing reposte.” Rather is the question, “does the emerging ballistic missile threat warrant the United States taking a policy initiative with BMD which could well destabilize its, and NATO’s, political relations with the new Russia?”  

It is feared in Europe that a U.S. program for homeland BMD will provide political ammunition for hard-line anti-Western opponents of Vladimir Putin. Just as some semblance of a “concert” of great powers is beginning to emerge in the wake of September 11, so the speculation proceeds, the BMD policy thrust threatens to make it extraordinarily difficult for Putin to be cooperative rather than competitive. NATO-Europe, and Russia, are not confused as to the genuinely limited capability expected of U.S. homeland BMD at first. But, they both understand that once a BMD system is deployed it will certainly be improved, such is the law of technical progress. In other words, Europeans accept both American and Russian judgments regarding U.S. homeland BMD. They accept at face value the American assurances that such a system will not threaten the military integrity of the Soviet nuclear deterrent, but they also give credence to the Russian complaint that a first-generation system will have notable growth potential.
If we are to sum up the European view of current East-West security relations, it would be to the effect that “it ain’t broke, so don’t fix it.” Above all else, do not “fix it” with a BMD deployment which Europeans fear could well cause political damage wholly disproportionate to its marginal strategic value. Needless to say, perhaps, Russia uniquely has the ability to dampen European anxieties over U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Thus far, the Russian response has been moderate, if regretful. Europeans are grateful for that, but they suspect that Putin’s low-key reaction to the new American policy is a matter of strictly temporary tactical convenience. Europeans note that the U.S. action is being taken unilaterally, albeit quite legally, and not in any real sense cooperatively with Moscow. It is feared in Europe that, unconstrained by the ABM Treaty, U.S. progress towards deployment of homeland BMD amounts to a basket of strategic and political troubles for years into the future.  

A Threat to Sino-U.S. Relations

For reasons of history, culture, geopolitics, and the duties of rank, U.S. policy in East Asia since World War II has not always met with warm sympathy in NATO-Europe. America’s security missions became ever more global, as the security duties of its major European allies withered geographically with the painful and protracted end of empire. If it is a truth of world politics that junior partners can get you into serious trouble, it is also a truth that the senior partner has the potential to drag its security dependents into deeply undesired conflicts. The American experience in East Asia has been quite different from the European, and that history plays in attitudes evident towards policy choices today. At the turn of the twentieth-century, the United States defined itself as the protector of free access to China by all. By way of contrast, the European great powers (and Japan) sought exclusive economic advantage and, in the British case, treated the region according to the logic of global geostrategy. Specifically, in 1902 Britain signed a mutual defense treaty with a Japan that was nearing great power status following its victory over China in 1895, a status later to be confirmed by its defeat of Russia in 1904–1905. The new British connection helped legitimize the pretensions of the Rising Sun, and provided some measure of security against Russo-French threats. For Britain the Japanese Alliance provided security for the Empire in the East, thereby enabling a homeward concentration of the Royal Navy for duties in European waters.

In the short twentieth century, and especially for the duration of the thirty-year struggle with Germany, China was a matter of little, if any, concern to the European great powers. In the 1930s, the British more than half regretted their having been obliged by American pressure to abandon the old alliance with Japan, in return for the highly dubious collective security agreements produced by the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Naval Arms of 1921. London realized in the 1930s that to count Germany, Italy, and Japan all as enemies translated as at least one foe too many. With Germany as it were on the doorstep, and with the impressive-looking Italian fleet sitting astride the short route to India, Britain was sensibly interested in appeasing Japan and in effect condoning whatever nastiness it was up to on the mainland of Asia. Not so the United States, of course. Whereas the British had regarded Japan as a useful, if greedy, partner who proved eminently briiable to ensure the security of the British empire in East Asia, Americans saw Japan as a predatory imperial power which harbored blatant and brutal ambitions against China. Unlike the European great powers, the United States came to regard itself as the protector of China in theory, against all would-be violators, but in practice increasingly against imperial Japan. Both views of Japan, the European
(British) and the American, were correct. In terms of British interests, the enmity of Japan would be geostrategically appalling and would far outweigh Tokyo’s many sins in Nanking and elsewhere. But for the United States, Japan posed a threat to American interests in the Philippines, and to the security and independence of a China that in U.S. imagination enjoyed a special relationship with American ideas (missionaries in particular) and commerce.

The United States did not think, let alone act, strategically about China until 1940, and then not with real purpose until after December 7, 1941. China, indeed, was at least as much a matter of “honor” to Washington, in the Thucydidean sense, as it was of more tangible national interests. Americans felt guilty at having let the Japanese run riot on the mainland of Asia for a generation, while they did nothing effective to discourage them. It so happens that, save as a sink for scarce Japanese military assets, China was strategically unimportant from 1942 to 1945. The reason primarily was geographical. The United States could not achieve economically convenient access to Chinese territory for the useful prosecution of the advance towards the Japanese home islands. The history of the grand strategy of the Grand Alliance shows that the British were as mystified by the American fascination with China, as the Americans were fundamentally unfriendly to the prospect of any serious level of Allied military contribution to their, American, war with Japan. (The sole important brief exception was the dubious belief by the U.S. Government that it needed the assistance of the Soviet Red Army in order to overcome Japan’s Kwantung Army in Manchuria in the summer-fall of 1945, a U.S. policy demand canceled strategically abruptly, but too late, by Hiroshima and Nagasaki!)

The combination of imperial interests, of German (then Soviet) threats very close to home, and a diminution in world ranking, produced in Europe a view of China noticeably dissimilar to that common in the United States. To repeat, the issue here is not to label one view more correct than another. For our limited purpose of improving European-American understanding, all that matters is to register clearly the roots of current attitudes and policy preferences. As of 1902, with its alliance with Japan, and in the strategic context of worrisome growth in the German, French, Russian, and American navies, Britain definitely eschewed any ambition to a maritime hegemonic role in East Asia. Britain’s primary interest was in India. The love-hate relationship between the United States and China has no European parallel. For a hundred years no European country has sought to be dominant in East Asia. Britain was the only European power logistically capable of mounting a fleet scale of operations in Asian waters. But Britain’s preference, in the 1930s as indeed today, was and remains to accommodate whichever power is on the rise in East Asia, provided only that vital national interests would not thereby be placed at risk. In the 1930s that meant the protection of empire and trade; today it means the protection of a tolerably liberal and orderly maritime trading system. The increasingly militaristic Japan of the late 1930s was a problem that Britain was in no way capable of addressing, just as NATO-Europe will prefer to ignore a China reaching out for a regional hegemony over the next several decades, though with less good reason.

Of all the countries in the Atlantic security system, only the United States is a player in the security order of East Asia. The reasons for this reality lie in history, culture, geopolitics, and—above all else—in the fact of the global distribution of power. NATO-Europe understands an enduring fact about alliance with a superpower. A price one pays for support where one wants it (in this case in and about Europe), is association with policies elsewhere in the world with which one has only limited sympathy. It has not escaped European notice that the United States has waged two major regional conflicts on the mainland of Asia since 1950, in Korea and Vietnam, neither of which evoked strong
enthusiasm among the allies. Europeans also recall the brinkmanship of the 1950s over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and the fairly unrelenting mutual hostility between the United States and the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC). That hostility was only relieved by a common fear of the Soviet Union.

Europeans are disturbed by what they see as a rush to threat identification, if not actually threat manufacture, on the part of the U.S. defense community. In the very early 1990s, before the wheels came off its economy, Japan was the subject of a speculative literature on America’s foe in “the next war.” The Japanese bogey did not long endure, in the face of new recognition of Japan’s vulnerabilities and structural economic weaknesses. Reflecting concern about a potential “peer competitor,” American threat-spotters were drawn understandably towards the PRC. There is sound logic behind concern about the PRC. China’s strategic policy vis-à-vis the United States was transformed by the meltdown of the USSR. From being a useful functional ally, whose East Asian regional pretensions were tolerable in the face of Soviet peril, the United States was redefined as an unwanted alien maritime-air (and nuclear) presence, standing between China and fulfillment of its destiny as regional hegemon. Furthermore, the United States stands as a major complication in the PRC’s drive to absorb Taiwan.

Europeans are thus aware that their American ally is the current ordering power in maritime East Asia, a role with which they are uneasy. They are particularly uneasy about the growing fatalism they believe they see in the United States concerning the alleged inevitability of a future great struggle with China. There is concern in Europe that China is next in line for American attention, following the resolution of the thirty-year German Problem, and then the forty-five year Soviet Problem in the twentieth century. U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is judged in Europe to be an unwelcome challenge to the military credibility of the PRC’s long-range nuclear missile force.

Europe does not appear to share America’s determination to discourage Chinese aggrandizement in East Asia. Indeed, as noted already, Europe is somewhat alarmed by its belief that it is witnessing the early stages of a geopolitical slide towards systemic hostility between the United States and China. In that political context, the decision by the Bush Administration to withdraw from the ABM Treaty is read as fuel for the fire of future conflict.

At issue here are two quite distinct views of China and its future role in world economics and politics. The United States, bequeathed as a legacy both of World War II and of the Cold War, the leading role in international order in East Asia appears to be inclining more and more towards a policy of containment. NATO-Europe, in contrast, sees the new PRC as an increasingly responsible and valuable partner in the global economy. Europeans do not believe that China requires much containing. If, or should, China continue to develop at its current claimed annual rate of approximately 7.5% annual growth, it would be only natural, indeed it would be inevitable, that the new superstate China should seek, and achieve, greater influence in its region. Europeans are fearful lest American anxieties about China should prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. They are concerned that political conflict could be propelled by developments such as the U.S. deployment of homeland missile defenses.

A Threat to the International Security Regime

Americans should not need reminding that the ABM Treaty has been regarded widely, and for very nearly thirty years, as the “jewel in the crown” of negotiated arms control. It has been viewed, on both sides of the Atlantic, as the keystone in the arch of the international
security regime that supposedly saw us safely through the Cold War.\textsuperscript{75} In European eyes, the ABM Treaty is an icon to the Russo-American, and East-West, commitment to cooperate in strategic affairs.\textsuperscript{76} Rephrased, the ABM Treaty is viewed as the central legal fixture in an international security regime that has worked well enough. The ABM Treaty, with its formal obligation against national missile defense is regarded as a vital feature of the known strategic world. It has the benefits of familiarity, and of aiding predictability in a tailored strategic competition. Of course, none of these highly contestable European beliefs is welcome news to the Bush Administration today. The point is not whether these European views are well founded or otherwise. Rather, the issue is the fact that America’s European friends have long come to feel comfortable in an international security context that derives some support from the ABM Treaty and its rejection of homeland missile defenses.\textsuperscript{77} There are many distinctive, albeit linked, elements to this European fear that U.S. homeland BMD will pose a threat to the international security regime that, in their view, has proven itself through three decades. America’s European friends and allies are not convinced that the international security regime is broken; in point of fact they are fearful that U.S. determination to proceed with homeland BMD itself will be the event which breaks the regime.

Five facets to European fear of U.S. BMD merit particular notice. The U.S. commitment to homeland BMD is judged likely to:

- diminish confidence in deterrence
- undermine strategic stability
- reduce confidence in the security of space systems
- harm the cause of non-proliferation of WMD and especially of their delivery vehicles, and
- distract attention from the broad gauged policy effort that is required to bolster and advance the global non-proliferation regime.\textsuperscript{78}

Without challenging the claim that nuclear deterrence is unreliable, and while recognizing that conventional deterrence has a poor track record, the mainstream of European opinion today is not sympathetic to the somewhat skeptical view of deterrence that has gained official ground in Washington recently. Europeans are concerned lest Americans making the case for homeland BMD reduce confidence in deterrence.

It is American to be bold, thoroughgoing, and uncompromising in addressing a problem. Europeans today witness a U.S. administration which appears to have decided that deterrence is inadequate and, as a result, it is moving energetically toward a homeland BMD hedge against deterrence failure or irrelevance. This exercise in explanation can slip into the realm of exaggeration. Europeans grant the theoretical fragility of deterrence mechanisms, and concede the historical reality of many failures of conventional deterrence, but they are not persuaded that deterrence today is such a broken reed that deployment of homeland BMD is warranted. To take the argument further, it is the dominant European view that even if there is considerable merit in the new-found official American doubts about deterrence, the opportunity costs of homeland BMD deployment will be disproportionately high.\textsuperscript{79} To rephrase the matter, Europeans see termination of the ABM Treaty and subsequent homeland BMD deployment, as a cure that promises to effect more damage upon international security than would the disease of undeterred missile threats it was designed to thwart.

Next, Europeans have always felt affection for the ABM Treaty. In their eyes, the Treaty institutionalized a political commitment to manage the strategic arms competition. The fact that the ABM Treaty did not deliver the promised benign effect of breaking the
so-called “arms race cycle,” is beside the point. As we noted earlier, Europeans approach security very much from a political standpoint and tend to be little interested in the fine print or technical detail of arms race dynamics. Whereas many American defense analysts, with their fixation upon analytical studies, write as if strategic stability and instability can be plotted exactly on draw-down curves, Europeans take a different view. In Europe the dangers of war and hopes for peace have been held to reside more in the minds, attitudes, and assumptions of key people, perhaps even in the mood of citizens, than in the mechanical and electronic detail of a strategic balance focused upon hardware. Europeans may have the closer approximation of truth in this regard. States rarely go to war at the moment judged militarily most advantageous by general staffs.  

In a shifting security environment, the ABM Treaty, and its injunction against homeland BMD, has been viewed as a usefully settled feature. A condition of “strategic stability” that serves the general welfare well enough does not have to be a context beyond all plausible challenge. Europeans concede readily enough that of course there is a case for homeland BMD, and even more for TMD. But, thus far at least, that case pales into near triviality when it is contrasted with the generally perceived costs of ABM Treaty withdrawal. The ABM Treaty and its prohibitions are, in this view, the solid pillar for a whole architecture of strategic relationships that is believed to work well enough. Strategic stability, in this view, is about political reassurance, an important measure of predictability, and institutionalized mutual commitment to joint management of the strategic balance. The U.S. push to develop and deploy homeland BMD is feared in Europe to be an initiative which will destabilize the existing architecture of institutions, habits, and practices. Europeans are convinced that the “stability” achieved over several decades of somewhat controlled competition is being risked for no obviously pressing reason.

Although the American policy initiative on the ABM Treaty is keyed to a reasonable concern about the proliferation of missiles and WMD, many Europeans believe that the net effect of the new push for homeland BMD will be quite the reverse of that intended. Europeans are fearful that America’s foes, unable or unwilling to compete directly (offensively or defensively) with a homeland BMD deployment, will instead disseminate missile technology, and perhaps complete systems, to potential “rogues.” Given the Chinese and Russian history of contempt for the letter and the spirit of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it is feared that foreign technology sales would present themselves as an interesting grand strategic response to U.S. homeland BMD.

Finally, among these European concerns for the stability of the international security regime, is the anxiety that the American focus upon BMD will come at the cost of inattention to the broad-gauged policy initiatives needed if proliferation is to be corralled, let alone reversed. In the dominant European view, there are few—one cannot quite say none—“roguish” missile programs that cannot be neutralized, if not actually aborted, by adroit diplomacy and some political or economic empathy. In other words, the general belief is that most of the reasons why states acquire missiles and WMD can be addressed by solutions other than BMD. Whether or not that proves generally to be the case, it is feared in Europe that the United States will come to equate BMD with its anti-proliferation policy. In such an eventuality, European are concerned that genuine opportunities to deflect proliferation through political engagement will pass untried.

**BMD Will Miss the Real Threats**

Leading opinion in NATO-Europe is not persuaded by concern about ICBM threats to the U.S. homeland. U.S. homeland BMD deployment, even if believed to be technically
reliable, must motivate hostile powers with only a very modest scale of long-range missile holdings, to develop threats less symmetrical with American military prowess (and certainly less easily traced back to their owner). As an elementary matter of strategic logic, therefore, it should follow that American’s regional enemies will seek out ways to threaten U.S. society by means more efficacious than firing a handful of missiles straight down the throat of a U.S. BMD system. Countries determined to hold America at some risk of catastrophic damage at home would be likely to explore the feasibility of air-breathing and of maritime means of insertion.

While it could be argued that homeland BMD deployment forecloses the most reliable mode of WMD delivery, Europeans believe that such a threat is amply answered by deterrence. They notice that missiles have unmistakable launch signatures detectable from satellites in geosynchronous orbit, and similarly have trajectories that are easily calculable back to their geopolitical coordinates of origin. In other words, unless a roguish foe is willing to run serious risks, ICBM attack upon the United States will not be a preferred option.

**BMD Has Become the Holy Grail in the American Quest for the Impossible Dream of Invulnerability**

Any discussion among Europeans about U.S. policy towards homeland BMD is certain to elicit the opinion that the subject at issue needs to be approached culturally rather than strategically. Rightly or wrongly, it is a firm European conviction that Americans long to return to a security condition wherein their homeland is literally inviolable. When Europeans hear rational American arguments explaining the connections among homeland BMD, extended deterrence, and regional expeditionary interventions, they are inclined to believe that, powerful though those strategic points appear to be, they do not comprise the real story. The real story, it is held in Europe, is to the effect that the United States is not reconciled to the fact of homeland vulnerability in an age of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and is eager to clutch at any straws which appear to hold out some hope of putting an impermeable security roof over the country. For reasons of history, culture, and geography, Europeans believe Americans harbor the attractive illusion that physical insecurity is a problem, not a condition, and moreover it is a problem that can be solved by American technology and engineering. Europeans are fatalistic, and tend not to be persuaded by the BMD promise to improve physical security. Americans expect to be safe at home, while most Europeans are heirs to an historical experience in the twentieth-century which more easily finds vulnerability a regrettable fact of life.

**Americans Have Confused Rogue States with Roguish Behavior**

NATO-Europe does not accept the concept of the rogue state, and it is even more hostile to the proposition that such a state could behave roguishly. It is felt in Europe that too often when Americans talk of rogue states what they mean are states that pursue policies at odds with American preferences. The highly pejorative idea of the “rogue state”—even when rendered almost painfully anodyne as a “state of concern”—carries implications of literally irrational behavior, at least of behavior indifferent to the norms and rules of standard international conduct. Europeans are not convinced that the U.S. defense community has thought through this concept. This possibility is held to be important if the rogue state is the justification for homeland BMD. Europeans suspect that Americans have allowed themselves to confuse unsavory leaderships with the notion of rogue states.
Many states are led by corrupt, even criminal leaders. But the equation between the personal behavior and psychology of a leader and the content of state policy is rarely one to one. Europeans believe that although leaders with unusual and dangerous psychological profiles certainly can come to power (and have done so, repeatedly), policy is rarely a wholly personal enterprise. Even dictators have reference groups, usually the army and the secret police. Roman emperors, no matter how roguish, could ignore the Senate but they were obliged to satisfy the expectations of the Praetorian Guard. So, while NATO-Europe is not wholly unfriendly to the notion that the West may have to cope with perilously roguish regimes, it is inclined to rest more confidence than does the United States in the prospect for successful deterrence. The idea of the literally “crazy state,” the country-assuicide-bomber, is not totally denied, but as an important basis for policymaking towards BMD this concept is largely discounted in Europe. Europeans believe that whatever small measure of merit should attach to the rogue-state thesis, is more than offset by the many negative consequences of homeland BMD deployment.

Conclusions and Implications
The themes and points discussed above comprise but the leading edge of a lengthy list of items that could have been treated here. For example, no mention was made of what NATO-Europe regards as the broken promises of the 1980s over industrial collaboration in pursuit of the SDL. Much was promised by way of economic benefit to participating countries, but very little actually was delivered. Memory of that disappointing experience runs deep in Europe, particularly in Germany. If Americans have an industrial cooperation plank to their new BMD story, they will need to be aware that their European friends have become somewhat gun shy.

This study has sought simply to report and to explain the basis for the continuity in general opposition to U.S. BMD. There is no implication intended to the effect that the European skepticism is in any objective sense, well founded. This study is not intended to pass judgment on the inherent merit, or otherwise, in the European views reported. Recalling the analysis offered much earlier in the paper, Americans should have little difficulty understanding that the dominant negative European view of U.S. homeland BMD flows logically and honestly from history, culture, and geopolitics, as does the current authoritative American view. Such positions may not be subject to even well-reasoned arguments that start from very different premises.

The question remains, what might this analysis imply for U.S. policy?

Implications for U.S. Policy
Three conclusions, which carry clear implications for U.S. policy towards homeland BMD, follow from the extensive discussion in this paper.

1. Proceed anyway. BMD discussions among allies easily take on the appearance of debate, as each party seeks to advance winning arguments, score points, and the like. It should be crystal clear from my analysis that there has not been, and probably could not be, a genuine debate over BMD issues within the Alliance. What we have witnessed in 2000–2002 is a somewhat ragged meeting of two quite distinctive world views, the European and the American. Both are right, in the sense that both flow reasonably, even inexorably, from their historical, cultural and geopolitical contexts. Arguments skeptical towards homeland BMD
that are eminently sensible in European circumstances, are likely to cut little ice when exposed to the considerations brought to bear by the American superpower. Because European skepticism is right for Europe, it does not follow that it is right for the United States.

2. **Better arguments will not win the day.** Strong arguments always are to be preferred to weak arguments, but Americans need to recognize the probability that most features of European skepticism towards homeland BMD are not vulnerable to superior argument or to apparently new facts. I have reported in this analysis that the dominant European approach to security differs in significant respects from its American counterpart, and that that difference is deep-rooted in historical experience. It would be understandable, even praiseworthy, for Americans to believe that if they could only “get the briefing right,” they would convert previously skeptical European audiences. Alas, such a belief would be an error. Europeans are not persuadable today that U.S. homeland BMD is a prudent step for international security. New evidence of emerging missile threats will not suffice to change European minds. Europeans will not agree with Americans that the preferred solution to missile threats is BMD.

3. **Try to listen without exasperation.** It can be difficult to remain calm and polite when your superior strategic arguments are either ignored or given short shrift by apparently ignorant, or willfully obtuse, allies. The discussion in this text should help Americans appreciate that their friends and allies can disagree honestly, and with what seems to them to be good reason. There is a temptation, especially for the superpower, to proceed from explanation into argument, and thus into pressure, on the assumption that policy discussion on BMD has a debate dimension to it. There is and can be no “debate” about homeland BMD issues. Europeans generally understand the arguments on all sides very well indeed. They are not in need of strategic education. European views differ from the current official U.S. view for reasons that are deep, serious, and are not liable to be changed by exposure to a flashier PowerPoint presentation. Both sides of the Atlantic are correct on their own terms, given the history, culture, and the geopolitics that shape attitudes, assumptions, and opinions.

**Notes**


3. Of course, there is a spectrum of views about missile defense in the United States and in Europe. In researching this study, however, I have found such close agreement on BMD among European politicians, officials, and commentators on matters of major significance, that generally speaking no violence to the truth is done by referring to the “European” view. When a particular NATO-European national perspective is important, I so specify. With reference to
American attitudes, which are not my primary concern here, I am treating the current policy of the Administration of George W. Bush as the dominant, certain the authoritative, U.S. approach to homeland BMD.

4. The Guardian (London), for February 16, 2001, for example, reported that although the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Defence would go along with U.S. NMD, the then Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, and the Foreign Office were strongly opposed. It was hoped in the Foreign Office that technical, if not political, difficulties would cause the NMD project to crash. The strategy of the Foreign Office was to play for time, and hope that some mix among technical problems, Russian objections, costs, and perhaps the political collapse of North Korea, would have the much desired lethal effect.

5. Notwithstanding the thesis of American exceptionalism, being only human Americans are not immune to the temptation to believe that rank means wisdom. In other words, the top nation is right because it is top. The exceptionalist view of the United States as the “city on a hill” is not content with acquiescent allies, instead it wants and expects allies to come to see the virtue in U.S. policy. The combination of American power and ideology can manifest itself in a self-righteousness which is not conducive to cross-cultural strategic communication.

6. By way of analogy, it was inconceivable to many missionaries in Asia that the Christian message might be understood yet rejected as unpersuasive. See Thomas Cleary, The Japanese Art of War: Understanding the Culture of Strategy (Boston: Shambhola, 1992), pp. 92–115, “Bushidô and Christianity.” Closer to our subject, the U.S. defense community in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, broadly expected its Soviet counterpart to allow itself to be educated in modern (nuclear) strategy by the American strategic enlightenment, or by the gospel according to RAND. See the excellent discussion in William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 66–71.

7. An American historian recently reminded us of the partial commonality of war experience. “Since 1648 major powers have engaged in a full-scale war approximately every thirty years. And from 1783 onward the United States has sent sizable forces into harm’s way every twenty years. To assume that this cycle has suddenly ended is wishful thinking.” Frederick W. Kagan, “Strategy and Force Structure in an Interwar Period,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 28 (Spring/Summer 2001), p. 94. The commonality is only partial because, since the 1860s, it has not been the American experience to suffer large-scale war at home.


11. A Spokesperson for the Government of the Netherlands has said that “As it is primarily based on the capabilities of risk countries alone, the American threat perception sometimes differs from that in Europe, where we generally look more at intentions, in addition to capabilities.” He did proceed, usefully, to add the thought that “This distinction in the perception also has to do with the difference in geographic position and the different rôles played on the world stage by the Atlantic partners.” “‘Politics and Hardware’: the position of the Netherlands.” Presentation at the RUSI Conference on International Missile Defense, London, October 16–17, 2001.

12. Thucydides distinguished between hegemony (legitimated leadership) and arkhe (control). Richard Ned Lebow and Robert Kelly, “Thucydides and hegemony: Athens and the United States,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4 (October 2001), p. 593. Mearsheimer advises to the effect that “the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system.” Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 2. Mearsheimer overstates matters, but he does capture the essence of the
idea. A hegemonic power is a polity very much greater than other polities. The term has some pejorative baggage, but I will ignore that and use the concept strictly descriptively in pointing up the contemporary primacy of the United States.


14. Of course there has always been a strong providentialist strain in American self-assessment. The fairly commonplace notion that the United States is an exceptional country, quite unlike those benighted lands beyond the oceans that were rejected by waves of immigrants, acquires more bite when a divine providentialism is assumed to help explain American policy. If Americans confuse a permissive geopolitics with divine providence, it can make for an intolerant style in international affairs. Moreover, a providentialist view of the legitimacy of one’s country’s international behavior will be extraordinarily offensive to foreigners.


18. The preamble to the ABM Treaty expresses the popular thesis that an offense-defense, or defense-defense, dynamic is a significant explanation of the course of the strategic arms competition. Unfortunately, the popular thesis was not plausibly correct, at least not if the record of Soviet military modernization in the 1970s and early 1980s is regarded as useful evidence. Quite what the relationship is between arms race instability and the outbreak of war may have been understood by the drafters of the ABM Treaty, but scholarship on the causes of major war tends to favor political, rather than mechanistic military-technical, explanation.


20. “The other face of American unilateralism in the world has been a belief in America’s invulnerability at home, with NMD supposed to complete the image of ‘fortress America.’” Anatol Lieven, “The Cold War is Finally Over: The True Significance of the Attacks,” in James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose, eds., *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War* (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 305.

21. It is true that September 11 was a real event, whereas the great nuclear war was not, but in the 1950s and 1960s, at least, American society certainly took the prospect of nuclear war very seriously indeed. The objective basis for American anxieties in the early years of the Cold War is superbly presented and analyzed in David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: the Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).


23. Confidence in deterrence as a panacea should be healthily shaken by the argument in Keith B. Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001). Fred C. Iklé periodically posed disturbing questions, but his


25. “Indecisive encirclement” was the damning characterization offered by British military theorist J. F. C. Fuller to describe Britain’s strategic preference for the conduct of war against Germany in World War II. The “indirect approach” is associated indelibly with the British theorist, Basil H. Liddell-Hart. See his *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, new edn. (London: Faber and Faber, 1967).


31. Preeminently, the U.S. Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV) was not permitted to “isolate the battlefield.” As a consequence, North Vietnam could behave in a manner analogous to an insular power, able to take as much or as little of the war as it chose.


35. Americans may regard their interest in homeland missile defense as a strategic priority, but European observers tend to interpret it more as a cultural priority, to restore the integrity of the homeland fortress.

36. The logic of the American worldview today has best been expressed by historian Donald Kagan. “What seems to work best, even though imperfectly, is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose.” *On the Origins of War and the Presentation of Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1995), p. 570. This has been an influential book, read and absorbed by many of those who are policymakers in Washington today.


38. Because it can be agreeable to hear one’s policy preference praised by foreigners, Americans need to be alert to the phenomenon of what we can call the strategic echo. A handful, or fewer, of friendly European commentators, by and large repeating American arguments, should not be confused with European opinion. On homeland BMD, for example, the organizer of an American conference certainly could rustle up one or two “pro” commentators from each of the major NATO-European countries.

39. The Great War against France was conducted by no fewer than seven coalitions between 1792 and 1815.

40. President Jacques Chirac has said, with confidence, that “Deterrence should also enable us to face the threats that regional powers possessing weapons of mass destruction may pose to
our vital interests.” Quoted in Camille Grand (Chargé de mission, DAS, Ministère de la défense). Presentation at the RUSI Conference on International Missile Defence, London, October 16–17, 2001. In case anyone remained unclear on the point, M. Grand stated that “As far as we are concerned, and to face the challenge of WMD and missile proliferation, nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of our policy.”

41. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), is an excellent introduction to this theme.

42. The self flattering idea persists in London that the British are Greeks to the Americans as latter day Romans. The proposition that “we bring wisdom to help direct, or restrain, your muscle,” is of course as insulting as it is unlikely to be true. There is some merit in the argument that the most important test for the adequacy of Britain’s military posture, is whether or not it meets the entry price for a hearing, and just possibly influence, in the Oval Office.

43. For example, the British government was delighted to intercept, decode, and pass on to the U.S government, the famous “Zimmermann telegram,” in which the foolish foreign minister of Germany offered Mexico restoration of its lost lands in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, in return for belligerency on the side of the Central Powers. From the beginning of the Great War, Britain had sought to cultivate and influence American public opinion. Stories about Hunnish atrocities in Belgium, and the like, followed by the first use of poison gas, and the illegal and immoral conduct of the war at sea, were all tailor made for the British propaganda machine.

44. Alain C. Enthoven, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) under Robert McNamara, argued that “Our forces will be adequate if we can never be forced because of weakness to be the first to have resort to nuclear weapons.” “American Deterrent Policy,” in Henry A. Kissinger, ed., *Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readings* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 127.

45. A leading British scholar of proliferation issues recently offered the sweeping judgment, with particular reference to European BMD, “that Europeans are more inclined to seek political solutions to a technically—possible—missile threat to their security than to embark on an expensive counter-proliferation strategy of missile defence.” John Simpson, “Implications of Missile Defence for Europe: An Academic Overview.” Presentation at the RUSI Conference on International Missile Defence, October 16–17, 2001. The Atlantic Council of the United States made the same point when it noted that “the most pervasive differences in threat perception across the Atlantic derive from a different weighting of technological capabilities as opposed to political intentions.” Quoted in Ian Kenyon and others, *Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System*, Southampton Papers in International Policy No. 4 (Southampton, UK: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, June 2001), p. 8. It is worth noting that the largely American profession of modern defense analysis and strategic thinking has long been criticized for being overly fascinated by technological challenges and solutions at the expense of political. For example: “The technical rigor and precision of much strategic analysis has been achieved at the cost of losing touch with political variety and change.” Hedley Bull, “Strategic Studies and Its Critics,” *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 1968), p. 600. Bull was the most respected British/Australian strategic thinker of his generation.


48. A condition of serious security dependency encourages irresponsibility and is psychologically hard for proud nations to accept.

49. The recent American debate over RMA issues has highlighted intra-American disagreements over the relative importance of technology. See Admiral Bill Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War*

50. “Indeed the British Parliamentary Select Committee [House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2001] appeared to speak for most European states in stating that ‘we are concerned that the U.S. over-emphasizes the capability component of the threat equation, when it comes to assessing the extent of the threat it faces, and attaches too little importance to intention.’” Kenyon and others, Prospects for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System, p. 6 (Hereafter cited as Prospects). House of Commons, Hansard, for July 11, 2001, records that 264 MPs (including 197 Labour, the governing party) signed “early-day motion 23,” expressing concern and “grave doubts” about U.S. NMD.

51. “While European states may agree with the U.S. on many of the technical evaluations of the WMD threat, they differ in their judgments of its timing, significance and the methods of dealing with it.” Kenyon and others, Prospects, p. 1.


53. Ibid. John Simpson offers the British thought that “Thus the label of ‘rogue states’ was conveniently attached to those political entities that were seen to have the territorial and other properties of a state organisation, yet were mistakenly believed to have the human mentality of a terrorist.” “Implications of Missile Defence for Europe.” Yehezkel Dror, Crazy States: A Counterconventional Strategic Problem (Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books, 1971), is an underrecognized classic.

54. Keith B. Payne’s writings comprise the cutting edge of the new thinking. See his books: Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); and Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence.

55. In the words of Camille Grand, from the French MOD, “In the French view, nuclear weapons have successfully preserved peace over the last 50 years; France is therefore not eager to enter a potentially more unstable era dominated by defensive options that would in the long term challenge deterrence, maybe not for the best.” “France, Missile Proliferation, and Missile Defences.”

56. A German spokesman grants that “When the capability to assess a potential adversary decreases, a defence philosophy which aims to maximise the protection of one’s own forces may gain priority over cleverly thought-out concepts for prevention of war.” “A German Perspective on Missile Defence.” Presentation at the RUSI Conference on International Missile Defence, London, October 16–17, 2001.


59. Professor Lawrence Freedman in a seminar at the University of Reading, UK, November 2001.

60. The Germans, for example, are concerned that “The ABM Treaty is one of the last elements that place Russia on the same strategic level with the U.S.. It will be difficult and painful for Russia to find herself forced to accept the status of a regional power albeit a major one. She needs time to adjust to the new situation.” “German Perspective on Missile Defence.”

61. See Kissinger, Diplomacy, ch. 11. Locarno guaranteed frontiers in Western, but not Eastern, Europe.

62. “Hubert Vedrine, the French Foreign Minister, remarked in May 2000 that he did not see the missile threat as ‘dire enough’ to warrant deploying missile defences, and this appears to be a widely held view among European states.” Kenyon and others, Prospects, p. 8.

64. An unnamed NATO official has referred to “the unappetizing inevitability of missile defence” (which he hopes might be turned into an appetizing opportunity). Quoted in Kenyon and others, Prospects, p. 9.


66. With the opportunistic presentation of its infamous “twenty-one demands” to the Chinese government on January 18, 1915, Japan’s intention to dominate all of China was plain for all to see.


68. In the 1930s, Britain had major commercial interests, as well as 4,000 nationals, in the great port city of Shanghai. In the so called “Shanghai incident” of 1932, the British army deployed three battalions to the city, while the RN’s China Squadron was led by no fewer than four 8-inch gun cruisers. The trigger for this muscle flexing was of course Japanese threats to those sections of Shanghai under Chinese control. For the balance of the 1930s, however, Britain grew ever less interested in confronting Japanese ambitions in China. See Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919–39 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986), pp. 323–34.

69. In the late 1930s, the Royal Navy did not have a third fleet—in addition to the Home fleet and the Mediterranean fleet—to spare for Far Eastern waters. If the main fleet were sent to Singapore to meet some East Asian crisis, as London promised its antipodean dominions, that would mean leaving the home islands and the short route to India considerably underdefended in the face of the new Germany and Italy.

70. See Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture.

71. Whereas it has become commonplace for American strategic thinkers to speculate about future conflict with China, such is not the case in Europe. Many European officials and analysts are surprised, even shocked, by what they discern as the emerging assumption in the United States that China is the great enemy of tomorrow.

72. For example, George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).

73. The appearance of Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), was a sign of the times. Some European observers of contemporary Sino-American relations are sufficiently well educated as to know that a fatalistic acceptance of the probability of war played a significant role in the July crisis of 1914. It is feared in Europe that China already has been elected by Americans as the next worthy foe, for reasons that would benefit from closer scrutiny than they appear to have received thus far.

74. It is suspected in Europe that a China outclassed catastrophically in conventional firepower, and facing the negation of its long-range nuclear “deterrent,” would choose to respond asymmetrically in grand strategy with a flurry of technology transfers to fuel proliferation. Kenyon and others, Prospects, p. 27.


76. Camille Grand of France spoke for all of NATO-Europe when he said, “from the French perspective, there is a major risk to see the ABM treaty disappear without being replaced. Limitations on missile defences are, rightly or wrongly [guess which!], perceived as an essential element of international security and stability and should therefore, in the French view, be handled with
care. This explains the clear French preference for a negotiated amendment process, avoiding chain reactions in Russia and elsewhere... Missile defences are seen as potentially opening a new era in which the logic of deterrence would be undermined with destabilising effects on international security.” “France, Missile Proliferation, and Missile Defences.”

77. Americans should ponder these words from a recent British scholarly study of European attitudes towards European BMD (EBMD): “In the case of the emergence of EBMD as an item on the NATO or EU agenda, some guidance for possible attitudes of key European states towards it can be found in government or parliamentary reports on the implications of WMD and missile proliferation, and possible ways to respond, published in France, Germany and Britain. The most striking difference between these reports and the U.S. equivalents is that none of the European reports advocated national missile defences (of Europe or the U.S.) as the best way forward.” Kenyon and others, Prospects, p. 5.

78. “‘Politics and Hardware’: The Position of the Netherlands.”

79. This point is argued forcefully in Kenyon and others, Prospects, p. 9. Also see Heisbourg, “A View from Europe,” pp. 68–9.


81. The idea that there may no longer be a Russo-American “strategic balance,” because there is no political context of conflict, has yet to be aired in Europe.

82. On May 9, 2001, Brian MacArthur, the associate editor of The Times (London), wrote as follows about the new U.S. policy towards BMD: “The president’s comments on NMD suggest that nuclear policy in the Bush administration is dominated by a hard-line group of nuclear unilateralists who are more interested in undermining arms control than they are in coming up with a cost-effective defense strategy.”

83. Prior to President Bush’s announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and also prior to September 11, 2001, Russia’s spokesmen had speculated that U.S. abandonment of the ABM Treaty might oblige them to withdraw from the INF treaty, the MTCR, and also from START. This threat to revisit INF matters caught NATO-Europe’s attention. See Kenyon and others, Prospects, p. 7.


86. Kenyon and others, Prospects, p. 6.